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The “measurement problem” of quantum mechanics, and the “hard problem” of cognitive science
are the most profound open problems of the two research fields, and certainly among the deepest
of all unsettled conundrums in contemporary science in general. Occasionally, scientists from both
fields have suggested some sort of interconnectedness of the two problems. Here we revisit the main
motives behind such expectations and try to put them on more formal grounds. We argue not only
that such a relation exists, but that it also bears strong implications both for the interpretations
of quantum mechanics and for our understanding of consciousness. The paper consists of three
parts. In the first part, we formulate a “no-go-theorem” stating that a brain, functioning solely on
the principles of classical physics, cannot have any greater ability to induce subjective experience
than a process of writing (printing) a certain sequence of digits. The goal is to show, with an
attempt to mathematical rigor, why the physicalist standpoint based on classical physics is not
likely to ever explain the phenomenon of consciousness – justifying the tendency to look beyond
the physics of the 19th century. In the second part, we aim to establish a clear relation, with a
sort of correspondence mapping, between attitudes towards the hard problem and interpretations of
quantum mechanics. Then we discuss these connections in the light of the no-go theorem, pointing
out that the existence of subjective experience might differentiate between otherwise experimentally
indistinguishable interpretations. Finally, the third part is an attempt to illustrate how quantum
mechanics could take us closer to the solution of the hard problem and break the constraints set by
the no-go theorem.
INTRODUCTION
Some critics rightfully argue that majority of attempts
to relate the quantum measurement problem with the
hard problem of consciousness follow a pretty shallow
reasoning pattern: both problems are difficult and open,
so thus they must be somehow related. Indeed, we are not
aware of many serious scientific papers (clearly set apart
from pseudoscience) which discuss the precise connection
of the two problems. And yet, the existence of this con-
nection is nevertheless beyond any dispute, at least for-
mally. As this might sound to some as a (slightly at least)
controversial statement, we will right away mention an
example that clearly proves the assertion. In Everett’s
seminal paper [1, 2] (doctorate thesis, to be more pre-
cise) where he introduces the “relative state formalism”
– the basis of now quite popular many world’s interpre-
tation – he explicitly writes: “As models for observers
we can, if we wish, consider automatically functioning
machines, possessing sensory apparata and coupled to
recording devices capable of registering past sensory data
and machine configurations”. Therefore, by equating ob-
server with an automaton, he decisively takes a very defi-
nite side in the ongoing debate in the contemporary cog-
nitive science and also in AI research (presuming such
automaton would possess “strong AI”1), seemingly not
even noticing that he is introducing a highly nontrivial
1 Term coined by J. Searle for a machine with mind, i.e. conscious-
ness.
statement. This cannot be easily brushed aside as he then
completely relies on this assumption to infer, as he writes
a bit later, that the wavefunction collapse thus appears
merely as a sort of illusion in the subjective experience of
the observer.
We will return to this aspect of the many-worlds in-
terpretation (MWI) when dealing more comprehensively
with the relation between the hard problem and the inter-
pretations of quantum mechanics (QM). Of course, it is
not only the many-worlds interpretation that takes sides
in the cognitive science debate, nor it is only the hard-line
physicalist views that enjoy the support of the physicists.
Quantum mechanics has been notorious for flirting with
ideas on consciousness that were not generally considered
as mainstream in the western school of thought. Since the
advent of quantum mechanics, scientists were perplexed
by the new role that the act of observation had seem-
ingly gained in physics. Basic (Copenhagen) formulation
of QM carried an inherent, though maybe unspoken, sub-
jective character that was hard to avoid in the measure-
ment postulate, palpable in the vagueness of (or lack of)
the definitions of the “measurement apparatus” and the
“moment of measurement”. The formalism allowed the
Heisenberg cut – that was dividing the objective realm
of superpositions governed by deterministic Schrodinger
equation and the subjective perception of a single well-
defined stochastic measurement outcome – to be posi-
tioned fluidly and arbitrarily along the von Neuman’s
chain. This prompted some of the founding fathers of
QM to assume crucial interconnection between the phe-
nomenon of subjective experience and the basic laws of
nature: from Heisenberg’s “the concept of the objective
2reality of the elementary particles has thus evaporated...”
[3], via Planck’s “I regard consciousness as fundamen-
tal, I regard matter as derivative from consciousness” [4],
to Schro¨dinger’s “mind has erected the objective outside
world...out of its own stuff (from his book of an appro-
priate title “Mind and Matter” [5]) and all the way to
the most radical Wigner’s stance that “consciousness”
objectively causes reduction of the wavepacket [6].
The dilemma of whether the wavefunction collapse is
objective or subjective (if existent at all) still lingers, be-
ing a divergence point of many interpretations of QM.
The views that hold the collapse to be truly objective,
in some experimentally measurable way, actually should
not be seen as interpretations of QM, but as scientific
proposals which predict new physics (we prefer to de-
note this type of ideas as “mechanical collapse” models).
Namely, in whichever way the objective collapse is there
envisioned, such a collapse event can be in principle en-
closed in an isolated box and the following noted: the
Schro¨dinger equation dictates that the evolution within
the box must be linear and unitary, while the proposed
objective wave-packet reduction demands the opposite.
The expected violation of unitarity is, in principle, a
measurable effect and thus requires both experimental
confirmation (so far in all cases lacking) and a mathe-
matical modification of the QM formalism that would
replace and extend Schrodinger’s equation in a consis-
tent way. Very diverse ideas belong to this same cat-
egory of objective (mechanical) collapse, some of them
proposing certain relations to “consciousness” and some
not at all: from purely physicalist GRW collapse models
[7], over Penrose-Hameroff orchestrated objective reduc-
tion hypothesis [8], to Wigner’s expectation that “con-
sciousness” should somehow cause this objective collapse
[6]. While all suffer from the same lack of a slightest ex-
perimental indication in their favor, those attempting to
relate collapse with mental phenomena in an experimen-
tally confirmable way are further hampered by difficulties
to construct a consistent underlying mathematical theory
(most evident in the Wigner’s case: whose conscious-
ness is entitled to cause collapse, would a mouse, or an
amoeba, or single neuron suffice, and how to write down
an analogon of the Schro¨dinger equation which would
break down unitarity only for complex enough systems
representing conscious observers?)
There is a fairly common misconception that relat-
ing QM with subjective, i.e. observer-dependent elements
must lead in the direction of the previously mentioned
“consciousness causes objective collapse” variations. On
the contrary, interpretations that firmly stick to the ex-
isting QM formalism (predicting no new physics) are the
most interesting from this aspect. The original Copen-
hagen interpretation, strictly adhering to both the pos-
tulate of unitary evolution and the measurement pos-
tulate, can be seen as a representative: the two postu-
lates are not contradicting as we will discuss in more
detail, but can be reconciled if we take the collapse to
occur subjectively, whereas the perpetual unitary evolu-
tion is applicable from the “third-person view”. Apart
from the explicitly “subjectivist” reading of Copenhagen
interpretation, but similar to it, in the group of interpre-
tations that fully acknowledge both postulates at the ex-
pense of introducing observer-dependent elements (such
as subject/observer/system relative collapse) are also
e.g. Wheeler’s “participatory universe” concept [9, 10],
QBism [11], relational interpretation [12] and Brukner’s
variant of the latter [13, 14]. Some of these views ad-
vocate a relatively radical denial of the existence of ob-
jective (non-observer-relative) facts in general (Brukner’s
“no facts of the world” doctrine), but this is not a neces-
sity [15]. While all these views see collapse to some extent
as subjective only, the collapse nevertheless does happen,
and a subject exists always in a single well-defined state
of reality (from his reference point at least). This is to
be contrasted with the many-world interpretations (or,
somewhat more generally, Everett’s relative state inter-
pretation) where the subject himself keeps being in a
superposition and subjective perception of a single real-
ity is a sort of illusion itself (the result of a certain brain
state being correlated with only the corresponding state
of the environment).
Therefore, from the speculations of the fathers of QM
to the present-day debates on the enduring issues, at-
tempts to understand quantum mechanics have often
led out of the boundaries of the purely objective realm,
touching upon the problems of cognition and subjective
perception.
More recently, in a last few decades, we have witnessed
a push from the opposite direction: researchers dealing
with the “hard problem of consciousness” are increas-
ingly looking in direction of quantum mechanics, feeling
that some extension of the classical physics paradigm (ei-
ther into quantum mechanics or into something else) is a
prerequisite for further progress in their field. Namely, in
spite of the advances in the understanding of brain func-
tions and of the neural correlates of consciousness – and
maybe even more so due to these advances – many scien-
tists and philosophers find that there is an “explanatory
gap” between understanding of how the brain functions
and why does that functioning produce any subjective,
first-person experience. Most notably, this problem with
a long philosophical history has been, some 20 years ago,
rephrased by David Chalmers as the “hard problem of
consciousness”: even if we understand all brain functions
and explain in detail how the physical processes inside it
produce behavior, there remains a puzzle of “why should
physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all?”
[16]. Why are not we “philosophical zombies”, biological
mechanisms performing all human functions, but devoid
of any subjective experience? (Throughout the text we
use notions “subjective experience” and “consciousness”
interchangeably – possible subtle differences are highly
definition-dependent and are of no interest here.)
In attempts to solve this biggest problem of cogni-
tive science (as proponents of the “hard problem” see
it), many researchers in the area have sought possible
3answers in physics, e.g. [17–21]. Already in his semi-
nal paper [16] and the follow up [22], Chalmers discusses
what QM potentially has to offer to elucidate or at least
ameliorate the “hard problem”, rightfully pointing out
that not all interpretations of QM are born equal in this
regard. This remark leads to the following question: if
explaining the phenomenon of subjective experience re-
ally requires a departure from classical physics, can the
ability to potentially explain this phenomenon be used
as a further probe into different interpretations of QM –
and tell apart even those which yield absolutely identi-
cal objective-experimental predictions? In other words,
can the “subjective-experimental” fact that we possess
the first-person experience succeed where the “objective-
experimental” facts have failed: to differentiate between
mathematically identical interpretations of QM?
It should be noted that some of the researchers working
on the hard problem are seeking extensions of classical
physics even farther than QM. Ideas of panpsychism, that
attribute to matter another fundamental property often
called proto-consciousness, are gaining popularity of re-
cent [23–25]. As dubious from the perspective of physics
as they are, these research directions provide further in-
centive to seek arguments that QM, properly understood,
is alone sufficient to account for the existence of subjec-
tive experience.
However, not everybody from the cognitive side of the
fence agrees that any departure from cold minded ra-
tional materialism of classical physics is needed at all.
Often, as prominently exemplified by Daniel Dennett’s
stance, there is already disagreement on whether at all
there is any “hard problem” that awaits for explanation
[26–28]. For, if neuroscience can entirely explain why
we behave in certain ways, why we report things as “I
see red”, “I subjectively feel that I exist”, or “I am puz-
zled by the hard problem of consciousness” and if we
can explain all that without need to invoke any “con-
sciousness” thing, then it must be wrong to artificially
postulate existence of such “consciousness”. Moreover, if
we do not need any consciousness to explain any objec-
tive phenomenon or experiment, then acknowledging its
existence would be tantamount to acknowledging as real
something that objectively does not exist – and no won-
der that such a mistake would lead to a “hard problem”.
To proponents of such views, that something which we
subjectively experience and which, as it seems to us, in-
stigates us to utter “I feel that I am conscious” is only
some sort of illusion. In addition, there are also some-
what different purely materialist positions that acknowl-
edge the phenomenon of subjective experience as real
and yet hold that this first-person perspective is only
a byproduct of the functioning of the material brain, a
sort of “emergent phenomenon” [29–32]. This emergence
is then usually seen as a nontrivial (sometimes even ir-
reducible) consequence of the extreme complexity and
peculiar structure of the brain organ. Often, but not al-
ways, it is implied that a similar “subjective experience”
phenomenon should accompany information processing
of the comparable scale and type, even if performed in a
different medium (e.g. in a computer, by proponents of
the “strong AI” idea).
Proponents of these strictly physicalist views, by a
rule, maintain that classical physics seems to be perfectly
sufficient to explain the phenomenology of brain pro-
cesses and thus also our behavior and what we call “con-
sciousness”. Classical physics here of course also includes
chemistry of the processes in brain, but our emphasis on
“classical” implies that neither explicit quantum effects
(e.g. interference, entanglement over distance), nor, more
importantly, underlying quantum principles (indetermin-
ism, indefiniteness of system properties manifest through
superpositions) should play any role in explaining of the
subjective experience. The good old XIX century mech-
anistic and deterministic picture of reality should suffice
since the direct chain of causes and effects can be followed
through a brain and result in complete explanation of
its outputs given the corresponding sensory inputs and
memory content. Not only that neuroscience supports
the view that the inner workings of the brain can be
fully explained in a deterministic causal manner (with-
out resorting to QM), but also progress in AI research
indicates that deterministic classical computers should
in principle be able to replicate computational powers
of the brain. So, if the paradigm of classical physics is
indeed sufficient to explain all objective brain functions,
is it really necessary to extend this paradigm in order
to encompass also this murky objectively-non-definable
phenomenon of subjective experience? Is not it more
rational to expect that the so-far-eluding subjective phe-
nomenon will be also somehow explained within the basic
mechanically-deterministic framework? And even if we
reach the opposite conclusion and decide as necessary to
extend the paradigm on which physics rests, how could
that help?
Of course, essential is the main question of whether
subjective experience can be explained solely based on
the ontology of classical physics – as long as this direc-
tion seems fairly plausible, going further into discussions
of possible paradigm extensions (in cognitive science) is
hard to justify. However, arguments are abundant both
pro and contra, though a reader going through discourses
on the subject can sometimes get an impression that
proponents of opposing views either speak in different
languages or really have different personal levels of sub-
jective experience – so often reasons that seem too ob-
vious to one side are quite unintelligible to the other.
It is not surprising that, on this extremely abstract, by-
definition-non-objective topic where even the central con-
cept of “consciousness” eludes strict definition, a good
part of the arguments reduces either to hand waving or
to pointless analogies. Several inspiring thought experi-
ments/mental abstractions have become very influential
(e.g. Chinese room argument [33], Mary the color-blind
scientist [34], philosophical zombies [35]), but in the end
they at most served as good intuition pumps, not leading
to any convergence of the opposing opinions.
4We believe that some progress can be made by bring-
ing the discussion to a more formal level. In spite that
the topic here obviously does not belong to mathematics,
any related analysis certainly employs elements of logic,
which motivated us to formulate our statements here in
the form of “Theorems” (regardless of the mathematical
jargon, the text does not contain formulas and is fairly
easy to follow). In the next section, we formulate and
prove our main “no-go” theorem. The theorem is the fi-
nal step in a succession of a number of previously defined
theorems, each derived from the predecessors. This no-
go theorem claims that a human brain, functioning on
principles of classical physics, cannot have any greater
ability to induce subjective experience than a process of
writing (printing) a certain sequence of digits (printing
can be done in an arbitrary way and on the arbitrary
surface).2
This no-go theorem per se does not directly say any-
thing about whether the subjective experience can or can
not be explained based on processes governed by classi-
cal physics. We do not think that such formal conclusion
can be ever given, simply because there is no generally
accepted definition of consciousness (and there cannot
be, as some find it to be a mere illusion, while others
find it so real to pose the hard problem). Instead, we
try to avoid the trap of defining the consciousness by
confining our reasoning only to establishing qualitative
“equivalence classes” of subjective experiences. Surpris-
ingly, as we show below, this can be done even in the
absence of a precise definition. In this way, by build-
ing equivalences step-by-step, we finally conclude that a
human brain, active for a certain period, must produce
the same or similar type of subjective experience as the
process of writing of a certain huge number.
Once we establish this equivalence, we will introduce
the notion of mapping between the evolution of the sys-
tem (functioning of the brain or writing of the digits) and
the content of the subjective experience (i.e. the scene
and qualia that are being experienced). If we assume that
this mapping exists and is nontrivial – in other words,
that some subjective experience (with a clear meaning)
emerges as the consequence of the dynamics of the physi-
cal system – then, due to the established equivalence, we
will face a grave problem to explain where, when and why
exactly this one mapping occurs and is somehow experi-
enced while writing (or chanting) the numbers. Alterna-
tively, to avoid logical inconsistencies and openly magical
connotation, we may assume a Dennett-like position and
claim that there is no such mapping at all and that the
dynamics of the system (i.e. behavior) is all there is. In
other words, that the equivalence stated in the no-go the-
orem is of form 0=0, i.e. that neither brain nor writing of
a number can induce any experience and that whole con-
sciousness thing is an illusion. But the translation from a
2 Formaly precise statement is postponed until the next section.
human brain to a number being written helps to clarify,
as we argue below, that the zero in this case, i.e. the ab-
sence of emergence of anything, must be a true nothing
and cannot be even an illusion. Namely, we will clarify
that denying any (nontrivial) mapping implies that there
is no any meaning of the experience, nothing to specify
the particular (illusionary or not) experienced content or
the qualia, and we can no more speak even of an illusion,
simply because it cannot be said “what is that illusion
of”. (After that, it is up to the reader to perform a sub-
jective experiment of checking if possesses or not any sort
of inner experience, even an illusion of, and to compare
the results with the hypothesis.)
Of course, one can also try to logically dispute the
theorem. Contrary to the theorem, one can try to ar-
gue that the premise of classical physics can be main-
tained while still insisting that activity of a human brain
produces subjective experience whereas writing of any
number does not give rise to any, let alone similar expe-
rience. In this case, it must be precisely explained and
elaborated which logical step in the no-go derivation was
unwarranted, and why. By splitting the main statement
into a number of steps and by assuming a math-like ap-
proach to discussion we hope to keep counterarguments
and pondering about the theorem to the point, forcing
any analysis to pinpoint the exact disputed step and de-
tail (including the obvious need for a clarification of why
is that point relevant and acknowledgment of the logical
consequences of taking a different turn at that point).3
If reasonable, such a counterargument could shed sub-
stantial light on what is essential for the emergence of
the consciousness – history of science is full of examples
where finding holes in no-go theorems has provided new
directions for progress. (Interestingly, some preliminary
discussions about the theorem have shown that even peo-
ple who disagree about the final conclusion of the no-go
theorem are looking for logical ways out in very different
directions).
Finally, the logical option that we find most plausi-
ble is that the basic premise of the sufficiency of clas-
sical physics is simply wrong. The rest of the paper is
devoted to the implications of such a conclusion. Pur-
suing the hope that, unlike classical physics, QM could
be sufficient, in the second part we investigate which in-
terpretations of QM are likely to sustain the test of the
no-go theorem. The underlying idea is to extend the
corpus of the empirical data a good theory should take
into account in a way that it includes not only external,
third-person perspective experiments, but also the most
elementary first-person empirical data – i.e. the fact that
we possess some sort of subjective experience. While it
would require full resolution of the hard problem to truly
establish which interpretations positively can account for
3 It is not likely than anyone would even consider hand-waving or
an analogy as a counterargument to a theorem.
5the consciousness in a consistent way, in that section we
will concentrate on a more modest problem: which inter-
pretations have potential merely to defy the conclusions
of the no-go theorem, when the latter is generalized to
QM. (We will also restrict our analysis only to a few more
common interpretations of QM.)
Important in this regard will be the recognition that
the “measurement problem” is essentially a direct rewrit-
ing of the “hard problem” in the language of QM.
Namely, those cognitive-science positions that maintain
that the third-person perspective is sufficient for descrip-
tion and understanding of the entire universe, including
understanding of the (illusion of) subjective perspective,
naturally translate into no-collapse (many-worlds) inter-
pretation(s), where objective unitary evolution of the
complete wavefunction is taken to provide the full picture
of reality. On the other hand, cognitive-science views
sceptical of the prospect that the phenomenon of sub-
jective experience can be derived from the third-person
explanation of the world, naturally map into QM inter-
pretations that hold linear unitary evolution governed
by Schro¨dinger’s equation as insufficient to explain our
subjective perception of the single measurement outcome
(i.e. those that find the collapse postulate also necessary).
Investigation of this connection will become the central
issue of Part II. However, once this mapping is under-
stood, it is not surprising that interpretations of QM in-
herit, at least partially, the same consequences of the
no-go theorem as the corresponding “interpretations” of
the hard problem.
Finally, in the Part III, we will try to address the more
difficult question: whether and how the introduction of
quantum mechanic can truly change the conclusions of
the no-go theorem and at least leave some room for a
plausible explanation of the subjective experience. The
considerations in this section will be more speculative,
aimed to demonstrate that QM, with a correct read-
ing, has this potential. At this point, it is only worth-
while to stress that neither “consciousness causes objec-
tive collapse” (Wigner-like) approaches nor invoking ex-
plicit quantum phenomena in the high-temperature noise
dominated brain (along Penrose-Hameroff lines) is nec-
essary for this. It is the mere turning upside-down of
the ontology of classical physics, and recognition of the
subjective experience as a primary non-derivable entity
while preserving the laws of QM unchanged that may
provide the ground to truly understand both the mea-
surement and the hard problem. Nevertheless, as we will
see, even after such paradigm-shift the essence of the no-
go theorem still largely constrains the set of available
hypotheses.
PART I: THE NO-GO THEOREM
In this section, we explore in detail and with logi-
cal rigor the assumption that the concepts of classical
physics are sufficient to explain the phenomenon of sub-
jective experience. This assumption is commonly taken
for granted in the neuroscientific brain research, and thus
we label our starting position as the “neuroscience pos-
tulate” (NP):
Postulate. Neuroscience postulate (NP). Classical
physics, based on ideas of mechanical-determinism and
ontology of physicalism, is sufficient to explain the func-
tioning of the brain and the emergence of consciousness.
Of course, the classical chemistry is included above
as a part of classical physics (the latter is understood
in broad terms). By ontology of physicalism, we im-
ply the paradigm that only matter (including fields)
and material things are considered to be real. In ad-
dition, we assume by the postulate that matter follows
certain causally closed deterministic dynamics, the de-
tails of which are unimportant. In particular, the pos-
tulate excludes dualistic and idealistic ontologies, as well
as the essential traits of quantum mechanics: the mat-
ter properties are here always well defined and observer-
independent. However, we will also take into considera-
tion physicalist views on consciousness which incorporate
(explicitly or in-between the lines) mapping from physi-
cal states of the brain to the “emerged” conscious states
– in spite that such views might be sometimes classified
as property-dualistic.
Note that we deliberately do not attempt to strictly
define the word “consciousness”. It can be either, follow-
ing ideas of D. Dennett, that “illusion” which accompa-
nies certain brain responses and behavior, or whatever
complex phenomenon that somehow emerges during the
functioning of the brain in what is commonly seen as a
conscious state. Or it could be any other (more or less
common) understanding of consciousness which complies
with the rest of the postulate presumptions (but it can-
not be anything dualistic in common sense, like qualita-
tive states of non-material spirit or mind). In this sense,
any time we mention “consciousness” in the context of
this analysis, one is free to insert words “an illusion of”
beforehand.
Now we proceed to the formal analysis of a certain
chain of logical consequences of the Postulate, by formu-
lating a sequence of Theorems which end in the already
announced “no-go” theorem. Here, in the main text, we
will describe only the outlines of the “proofs”4, whereas
4 In spite that the subject here is not of mathematical nature,
and that the weight of the logical arguments given in favor of
some statement here cannot be compared with the strength of
the “proof” in the mathematically strict sense, we nevertheless
prefer and dare to use this word, albeit with quotation marks.
6more detailed arguments are carefully considered in the
appendix. (Reader is encouraged to skip the detailed
“proofs” in the appendix of those theorems that (s)he
personally finds self-evident – in this way we hope to
facilitate perusal of the otherwise maybe overly lengthy
paper).
The first question we have to deal with is whether
this ability to generate subjective experience (or an il-
lusion of it), which we assign to a human brain, can be
granted to anything else apart from the brain. In partic-
ular, whether we could consider as conscious another be-
ing, behaving in all (relevant) respects indistinguishable
from a human (e.g. demonstrating emotions, reporting
self-awareness, claiming to experience qualia, even being
capable to autonomously reach the “hard problem” and
express its puzzlement over it [36]), but whose physiol-
ogy of the cognitive organ (brain or some equivalent) is
possibly different? Apart from being of philosophical sig-
nificance, this question has important ethical, as well as
potential legal (in the wake of the AI era) implications.
We hold that the answer to such a question must
be positive, at least under the presumption of the NP.
Namely, we must first note that we have no objective
means to infer the existence of anyone’s subjective ex-
perience apart from our own since, already by its name,
we generally here denote a subjective phenomenon. Even
assuming consciousness of other human beings formally
requires a “leap of faith”, but one that in general must be
made to avoid the blind alley of solipsism (the so called
“problem of other minds” [37]). Besides, solipsism is cer-
tainly not an option allowed by the Neuroscience postu-
late.
Within the paradigm of physicalism (and thus also
when deprived of the solipsism option), it is very hard
to motivate why the attribute of being conscious should
be given to another human, but not to another agent au-
tonomously behaving in a qualitatively indistinguishable
way. For example, we may imagine a perfect human-
replica android, e.g. like the popular Data from Star Trek
science fiction series and an identically looking human,
e.g. the actor Brent Spiner, next to each other (unlike
in the original Star Trek plot, we shall assume that this
Data is also programmed to show emotions just like a
human). We have absolutely no means to verify if Brent
Spiner possesses any inner experience, but he claims to
be conscious, behaves so in every way, and we agree that
he must be conscious. We have no more and no less
chance to objectively confirm or deny that Data has sub-
jective experience, and he behaves in every way like the
human Spiner, reporting his conscious/emotional states
and reacting to stimuli in a human-like fashion. At-
tributing consciousness to one while not to the other, in
spite of admitting that there is no objective way in which
such an assertion could be tested, is to actually acknowl-
edge the real existence of objectively not measurable (yet
well defined) properties. While this would be in princi-
ple logically acceptable e.g. in a dualistic setup (where,
theoretically, one could even arbitrarily assign that cer-
tain agents have soul/spirit attached to them while some
other are philosophical zombies), such assignment is in-
compatible with physicalist presumption implied by NP.
(Formally, one could misuse our freedom in definition
of consciousness to define it as “possession of human-
like nervous system” but such a definition would com-
pletely miss the common meaning of the word and fail
to grasp the essence of the “subjective experience” prob-
lem.) Therefore, we formulate the following theorem:
Theorem 1. (Behavioral theorem). Under the premise
of NP, two agents behaving effectively in the same way
when it comes to reacting to external stimuli, report-
ing about internal conscious/emotional states, having the
ability to autonomously introspect and recognize its sub-
jective experience and engage into related discussions –
must possess the same qualitative level of subjective ex-
perience.
By saying “the same qualitative level” we leave the
freedom that the two agents may experience qualia in
(somewhat) different ways. These details are not essen-
tial here. Simply stated, the crucial conclusion of the
theorem is that of the two such agents either both have
subjective experience or none has. Note also that the
theorem does not state the converse: that the two agents
with different behaviors cannot have the same subjective
experience (this need not be so and anyhow is not rele-
vant for our further reasoning). Another remark is that
behavior should be here and throughout the text taken in
a broader sense, which includes not only obviously visible
behaviour, but also responses to stimuli in general: in a
hypothetical case of a patient with impaired motoric abil-
ities who could process sensory data but would require
NMR scan of the brain to somehow read out responses
(e.g. yes or no answers to our verbal questions), these
measurable brain responses would also then fit into our
definition of behavior.
While we have provided, above, some basic arguments
for the Theorem 1, in the Appendix we give a more elab-
orate “proof”, arguing also that its conclusion is almost
unavoidable even in a general setting (i.e. without rely-
ing on the Neuroscience postulate and, in particular, for a
certain class of property dualistic hypotheses). Besides,
we also note that, to our knowledge, there are hardly
any cognitive scientists or philosophers that adhere to
the neuroscience postulate and yet deny the conclusion
of the Theorem 1.5
The statement of the Theorem 1, combined with the
mechanical-deterministic assumption for the brain func-
5 A likely exception is J. Searle, though even he seems to occa-
sionally imply necessity of certain behavioral differences, as, for
example, in his review [38] of N. Bostrom’s book “Superintel-
ligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies”. There he concludes that
there is no risk of AI rebellion since AI is unable in principle
to “engage in motivated behavior” – by which he implicitly but
obviously admits unavoidable behavioral differences.
7tioning, has an immediate consequence. Namely, causally
closed mechanism of the brain organ can be in principle
simulated on a powerful enough classical computer to
arbitrary precision. This means that given the current
brain state and the sensory inputs, brain responses can
be, in principle at least, calculated on a standard type
of computer. In turn, this means that a computer can,
in theory, predict the same behavior that would be the
result of the brain functioning. Given the appropriate
artificial body, and fed with sensory perceptions that the
body receives, a powerful classical computer (based on
silicone or any computationally equivalent technology)
can thus assume the role of the brain and control an agent
that is behaviorally indistinguishable from a human, in
the context of Theorem 1. This leads to:
Theorem 2. Under the NP premise, a sufficiently ad-
vanced android controlled by a classical type of computer
may possess the same level of subjective experience as a
human.
In the Appendix, we give a more formal “proof” of
the theorem, and discuss some generalizations (e.g. to
include also stochastic processes in the brain).
We “derive” also the following two theorems that will
help us in the later stages:
Theorem 3. (On temporal correlation): Subjective expe-
riences (or illusions of) that accompany dynamical evo-
lution of a certain system (e.g. brain) are synchronized
with that evolution, and do not depend on evolution of
the system either before or after the considered period of
the dynamical evolution (apart from due to the contents
of memory).
In other words, if we consider a brain activity within a
given 5 minutes period, there will be (assuming the brain
is conscious) the corresponding subjective experience un-
folding during that same time, whose content and quality
do not depend either on the past or on the future of that
brain, apart from, possibly, due to recollection of previ-
ous events. For example, if the physical brain in that
period receives and processes stimuli that correspond to
pleasure (or pain), it is during that same time, i.e. simul-
taneously, that the pleasure (or pain) is subjectively ex-
perienced (or illusions of). Also, smashing the brain with
a hammer after these 5 minutes or not, will not influence
the prior experience. While being a simple corollary of
the Neuroscience postulate and the behavioral theorem,
and something that is generally taken for granted, it still
deserves to be mentioned. Since subjective experience is
not objectively measurable, without the physicalist NP
premise this synchronization is an additional assumption
(which, as argued in the paper [15], is not necessarily
warranted in a more general, e.g. QM setting).
Theorem 4. (Repetition theorem): If a physical sys-
tem that gives rise to consciousness undergoes identical
dynamical evolution more than once (fed by the identi-
cal stimuli and starting from the same initial state each
time), each time the same subjective experience arises.
Alternatively, if another system identical in every detail
to the first one, undergoes the same dynamics, both evo-
lutions must be accompanied by identical subjective expe-
riences.
This seems to be unavoidable: either as a consequence
of the previous theorem or noting that if the conscious-
ness is a consequence of system dynamics, the fact that
a period of identical dynamics in the same system state
has already occurred before cannot preclude or influence
the emergence of the same experience again. Same goes
if we consider a different system, but identical with the
first in all relevant properties. Nevertheless, in the Ap-
pendix, we will also address some non-standard views on
this line of reasoning.
Now we proceed to establish further equivalence re-
lations between different systems, proceeding in small
steps.
We take as a starting point an android satisfying pre-
sumptions of Theorem 1, named Data (as we already
discussed, unlike the Star Track Data, this one is in-
distinguishable from the humans also when it comes to
expressing emotions). By Theorem 1, Data belongs to
the same consciousness class as humans. From Theo-
rem 2 it follows that Data’s CPU can be, in principle,
based on some standard, e.g. silicone, computing. This
CPU receives inputs from Data’s sensors and body parts,
does the calculation and feeds back the results to various
actuators in Data’s body (speech synthesizer, artificial
muscles, etc).
Lemma 1. The physical location of the CPU controlling
the behavior is inessential, as long as its function is not
diminished.
This hardly requires special proving: it might be in
the android’s head, but also it could be localized in some
computer nearby which is (e.g. by some WiFi equivalent)
connected to to the rest of the android. According to
Theorem 1, this should not affect its level of sentience,
as it would not influence its behavior.
Next, we take a slightly bigger step:
Theorem 5. (Simulation theorem): Simulated android
(or androids), existing only in a virtual reality realm sim-
ulated on a classical computer, can be, in principle, pro-
grammed to be as conscious as humans.
The outline of the proof is as follows. Just as one an-
droid can be remotely controlled from an external CPU
and be as conscious as a human, so can be two or more an-
droids controlled from the same computer (or a powerful
enough computer cluster). Furthermore, sensory input
arriving at the computer that governs androids’ behavior
is certainly digital from some point on, and thus, in prin-
ciple, can be simulated, i.e. replaced by computed input
that would correspond to a computer-generated virtual
surrounding. Also, the behavioral feedback that android
bodies provide to the environment (by their motions and
8sounds they produce) can be taken into account when
computing the evolution of the virtual surroundings. It
can be also imagined that the androids, until some initial
moment t0, possess actual physical remotely controlled
bodies and receive environment information from real
sensors in their bodies, but that after that initial mo-
ment real sensory input is replaced by a simulated one
(virtual surrounding is generated to closely mimic the
real surrounding at t0). Even if the androids would be
able to tell the difference after some time (e.g. by noting
some artifacts of the simulation, due to its finite preci-
sion), this switch of the source of sensory input has no
way to immediately influence their level of consciousness
(at least under the Neuroscience postulate). A somewhat
more detailed argument can be found in the Appendix.
Therefore, we must conclude that under NP, also an-
droid(s) entirely simulated in a virtual reality can have
qualitatively the same level of consciousness as human
beings. In spite that there are no more any physical en-
tities around, apart of some information being processed
inside the computer, the subjective experiences of the
simulated androids would be no less real (or no lesser
kind of illusion) than our subjective experiences in flesh
and blood. To visualize events in the simulated realm,
we could attach a display to the computer and have it
render some parts of the virtual reality on it. In this way
we can observe the android(s) “inside” behaving as con-
scious beings, and still reporting their subjective states.
Of course, presence or absence of the display cannot in-
fluence subjective experiences of the androids (according
to NP our observation is certainly inessential).
We note that a conclusion that simulated beings in vir-
tual reality can be conscious is nothing new – moreover,
it is part and parcel of all variations of the “simulation
hypothesis” [39] and alike. But we had to go through this
reasoning carefully, to show that under the presumption
of Neuroscience postulate these conclusions basically turn
out to be a logical inevitability, rather than any arbitrary
belief.
The “hypothesis” commonly conjectured in this con-
text is that we are actually living in one such simulation.
But, unlike most of the proponents of that idea, we are
next to consider problematic aspects of such and similar
hypotheses. Namely, as we did the job of isolating the
agents from the outside world, deeper problems already
begin to get more palpable, at least a bit.
For the sake of concreteness, let us assume that in-
side such simulation there is the android Data, exist-
ing and living through his subjective experiences. Let
him be at first content, quite tranquil, pondering about
something pleasant while calmly wandering through the
simulated environment. All of a sudden, while passing
through a door in the virtual reality, the door unex-
pectedly gets shut (e.g. due to wind) and his finger gets
severely slammed. Momentarily, the feeling of content is
replaced by the sudden shock and shortly replaced again
by the feeling of excruciating pain in the finger. We re-
mind that this Data was programmed to have emotions
and feel and react to pain in the same way as a human – in
particular, his cognitive units might work by simulating
the functioning of a human brain which is exposed to the
same stimuli. If required for having experience of pain,
we may simulate also the reaction of the entire human
nervous system when the finger is exposed to extreme
mechanical pressure. In this way, we ensure identical be-
havioral reactions, which, according to Theorem 1 and
under NP assumption means that also some correspond-
ing subjective experiences must be (qualitatively) there.
(After all, if for any reason someone finds relating an an-
droid and pain too stretched, the same argument could
be made by considering any other type of subjective ex-
perience/quale, the choice of pain makes the conclusions
only slightly more intuitive.)
Therefore, there inside the computer, must “some-
where be” that feeling of content, of shock and that famil-
iar feeling of the pain in the finger. In a similar sense as
when any human experiences these feelings – if the latter
is an illusion, then so is the former. Even if the qualia are
not experienced identically, there still must be a couple of
distinct subjective experiences (or illusions of), emerging
in a succession. Besides, there “inside” is someone that
has experienced the sudden closing of the door, who saw
them close, who has subjectively perceived that. And
yet, there inside the computer, we objectively find noth-
ing but sequences of binary zeros and ones, evolving and
changing according to certain rules. How comes that this
familiar feeling of pain can appear in the processing of all
those zeroes and ones within that computer? And, even
leaving the feelings (and qualia in general) aside, do these
zeros and ones really have interpretation per se, do they
really have that unique meaning of a human-like android
Data that has just hurt his finger? Where is objectively
that door inside? When there is no longer our interpre-
tation of the bits in the computer as this virtual environ-
ment with Data (which disappears when we remove the
monitor), does this information inside still, without us,
external observers, really and objectively has this same
meaning, this and only this interpretation? When the
monitor is on, it is us who endow with the meaning the
endless streams of zeroes and ones in the computer regis-
ters: the conversion of the stream of data into the pixels
on the monitor is tailored to translate the information to
be readable to us, and even there, that pattern of differ-
ently colored pixels on the screen, does it have any mean-
ing per se? Does it really have the distinctive meaning of
the Data feeling pain, and the door being shut, even with-
out us who correlate colors of the pixels on the monitor to
form the picture of an android in our heads? One should
take care not to unintentionally infiltrate the syntax of
the bits with the meaning that we ourselves provide to it,
if we are to investigate the possibility of “self-emergent”
meaning. And furthermore, even if we accept that these
zeros and ones have the unique meaning of Data android
in his virtual world, is that enough that these zeros and
ones become alive and feel the hurting finger? A book
has meaning (at least the one that we give to the written
9symbols), but we do not usually take that the characters
in the plot really experience the narrated events, neither
as the book is written, nor when it is read.
Intuitively, we get a glimpse of the problems, but our
intention is not to rely on intuition. Instead, we proceed
in the manner as formal as possible, to make the problems
more obvious and harder to deny.
Indeed, at this point, it is not at all yet clear if there
is an actual problem, at least if there is an unsolvable
one. The gap that some believe to exist between the bi-
nary digits and the subjective experiences might be just
a consequence of wrong intuition and over-simplification.
Unlike the static symbols in a book, we here have a dy-
namical computation process of immense complexity, on-
going on an advanced supercomputer of huge capacity
and extreme speed. There is a widespread opinion that
the combination of such complexity and delicate struc-
ture can bring about the first-person experience as well.
Thus, we proceed further in establishing the chain of
equivalences. We start by noting that the supercomputer
performing the computation need not be fast at all, only
of a sufficient memory capacity:
Lemma 2. The computer running a closed simulation
that contains conscious agents can be arbitrarily slow.
This is an important direct consequence of the fact that
the entire simulation is completely isolated from the outer
world, resulting in that agents within can perceive the
passage of time only relative to other events in the virtual
reality. Overall slowing down of the pace of simulation
(as seen from the outside world) cannot be detected from
the inside.
No longer requiring calculation speed, we can choose
computer architecture much more freely (according to
Theorem 2, the technical realization was not essential).
We decide to run the simulation on one from the vari-
ety of universal Turing machines, with a binary alphabet
[40]. It has been almost a century of how we know that
any computer calculation, even those usually associated
with the most powerful computers imaginable, can be
performed just as well also on a very long tape of check-
boxes which can be either ticked or unticked by a “head”
that moves over the tape one step at the time, following
a given set of instructions (program). In computational
theory, the tape is usually of infinite length, but we are
concerned with a well defined finite problem: running the
simulation of the android(s) and virtual environment for
a finite virtual time (e.g. one hour). As this is doable on
a super-powerful but finite-resources computer cluster, it
is also doable using a finite length tape.
As Turing machines are abstract concepts, we will also
pick a concrete realization. We will imagine a strictly
mechanical wooden Turing head6 that reads and writes
“X” and “O” symbols in the sand (e.g. on a huge stretch
6 Much like the ingenious craft described in [41].
of beach or in some desert). For example, the head can
be wind propelled (though this is completely irrelevant).
The symbols are equally spaced, imprinted deep enough
so that machine can also read them by sensitively “touch-
ing” to check the depth of the sand at a few points. With
a universal Turing machine the program of the simulation
is also embedded in the sand symbols (much like the com-
piled source code in a conventional computer is stored in
the same physical memory as the data) and in this way
we maximally reduce the complexity of the head itself,
while effectively all relevant information is encoded in the
sand. In the beginning, a row of “X” and “O” symbols
that represents the simulation program together with the
simulation initial state (state of the android and the vir-
tual environment at some given moment) is imprinted in
the sand, after which the wooden head is positioned and
activated.
As this setup is computationally equivalent to the su-
percomputer performing the simulation (apart from the
processing speed, which is irrelevant according to Lemma
2), the same level of subjective experiences must emerge
now as when running the simulation on silicone architec-
ture. This conclusion is summarized in the following the-
orem (some more formal technical details of the lemma
and theorem “proofs” are presented in the Appendix):
Theorem 6. A system comprising a pattern of X/O
symbols written in sand and a wooden Turing head mech-
anism performing certain automatic operations (of “read-
ing” the symbol beneath, flattening out the sand, inscrib-
ing a new symbol and moving left/right one step) ac-
cording to the instructions embedded also in the sand,
can contain conscious agents living through human-like
subjective experiences (i.e. agents belonging to the same
equivalence class of consciousness level as humans).
The reasons behind this switching to sand-symbols
Turing machine are twofold. Firstly, the word “com-
puter” (especially “supercomputer”) is nowadays quite
emotionally charged: as ever more powerful comput-
ers/smartphones enter all spheres of our life, we are left
with an intuitive impression of their omnipotence, at
least in principle (especially omnipotence of hypothetical
futuristic computers). It is hard to keep in mind that,
in regard of the ability to perform calculations, they are
in principle no different from the first computers ever
made – the only advances were quantitative, in speed
and capacity. Restating the problem in the form of sand
symbols and a wooden head we see as a sobering way to
counter these prejudices, especially in the case like this
one where speed does not matter. This is also the rea-
son why we opted for a purely mechanical wooden head –
any involvement of electrical devices may unintentionally
lead to mystifications.7
7 Alternatively, instead of a wooden head, we could imagine a
middle-aged fat warehouse worker, unshaven, with a cigar in the
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The second reason is far more important. Though we
have now stripped away illusion that it could be the ad-
vanced architecture/structure of the computer, combined
with its power expressed in billions of operations in sec-
ond that might lead to the emergence of consciousness,
there still remains the mystification that computational
process itself can somehow bring about the emergence of
the subjective experience. However, once we have gone
from relatively abstract electronic circuits to simple mo-
tions of some amounts of sand, we can now closely follow
the computational process in every mechanical detail. In
this way, we set the stage for the next step aimed to
show that relying upon “computational process” to in-
duce consciousness is no less illusory (at least within the
realm of classical physics).
A few comments beforehand. If the equivalence of the
two “computers” (the silicone one and the sand one) is
too counterintuitive to grasp it, we can again resort to
a variant of a “computer display” aid. The simulation
program can be written so as to reserve one million sym-
bols (at some preselected positions) for a “screen”. The
algorithm will be such that, when we arrange that mil-
lion of X and O symbols in a 1000 x 1000 matrix, we get
a rendered picture, a “monochromatic” snapshot of the
current state of the simulation, e.g. as a camera focused
on Data would see. It is not quite millions of colors,
but the resolution is fine enough to glimpse on how Data
fares “inside”. The algorithm can even “refresh” these
million symbols each tenth of a second of the simulation
time, so, if we are patient enough, we may follow Data
calmly roaming around, responding to stimuli in the vir-
tual world and behaving in every respect as a sentient be-
ing (the corresponding real-time refresh rate might well
be one frame in a thousand years, but that does not take
away from the argument). Just as before, a few virtual
minutes into the simulation, after a quite while of writ-
ing/rewriting of the sand symbols, the Data’s finger will
get smashed.
And the same intuitive problems arise again, yet even
more pronounced. Simulated Data must feel a lot of pain,
just as would a human in the same situation, and that
familiar feeling of pain has to originate somewhere there,
on that beach. He will also have a stream of thoughts,
and that inner dialogue must be there too – thoughts
having a very precise meaning, about the pain and the
slammed door – thoughts that have nothing to do with
the sand or the X/O symbols. Are the scene of Data’s
finger caught in the closing door and the qualia of his
feelings, really embedded objectively there in the endless
X/O sand symbols, irrespective of our interpretation?
But first and foremost: what is, on that huge stretch of
corner of his mouth, strolling down a huge beach and unenthu-
siastically carving by his finger X and O symbols in the sand,
according to a table of instructions that he carries along. Or, in
a tribute to Douglas Adams, we might entrust the same job to
two well trained white mice, though it does sound less realistic.
beach, with no one else there but the mechanical wooden
head and the immense number of X/O symbols, feeling
the pain? Is it the symbols? Could hardly be the head: it
has only a few internal states and is comparatively very
simple (as we discuss in more detail in the Appendix,
some universal Turing machines can have as little as two
internal states, and some other only mere 22 instructions
overall). However, a determined physicalist relying on
the Neuroscience postulate probably will not flinch: the
consciousness and the pain are emergent (or illusionary)
properties of the system, so it is the system comprised of
symbols in the sand and the wooden head, combined as a
whole, that feels the pain (or has that illusion) during the
dynamical process of the computation. Whatever that
exactly means. But it is far from clear what this should
mean, especially in the context of classical physics: “sys-
tem as a whole” is an abstract and at best an emergent
property, just as the “pain” or “feeling of red” must be
under the NP. Real should be only matter and its mo-
tions (interactions). There is nothing that “holistically”
binds the wood and the sand together in a system, es-
sentially no physical interaction apart from that reading
and imprinting (i.e. apart of some sand motions caused
by the head), as no kind of miraculous “entanglement”
can occur in the world of classical physics.
This is where we turn to the final step of our no-go
theorem. We intend to exploit the fact that Turing ma-
chine computation, being a mathematical idealization, is
not something which exists per se in the real world (espe-
cially not in the world of classical physics). It is merely
our invented name for a real physical process – in this par-
ticular case, the process of relocation of certain amounts
of sand. Therefore, it is pointless to explore how the run-
ning of a Turing machine can cause consciousness. The
goal is to try to explain, if possible, how exactly this mov-
ing of some sand here and there can result in a subjective
experience of serenity, pain or color. What is essential in
these motions that should have such power?
To investigate this, we will first concentrate on the dy-
namic of the wood-sand computation process. Indeed, so
far, symbols are frequently changing during the compu-
tation: some are being erased and replaced with others
– and that gives an impression that something is “alive”
here. But this “dynamics” turns out to be less essen-
tial than it seems. To show this, we will slightly modify
our Turing machine. Instead of replacing the symbols by
new ones in the same row, the machine head will now
write each new state of the “Turing tape” one row below
the previous (we deal with the technical details of this
modification in the Appendix). While certainly not be-
ing optimal with respect to the computation speed and
spatial (i.e. sand) resources, in this way we attain the
following: nothing is any more deleted, no symbol is ever
replaced and the symbols in the sand no longer represent
only the current state of the Turing machine, but also we
now have, in the rows above, the entire log of the calcu-
lation up to that point. (In this operation mode the head
merely copies basically all of the symbols into the next
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row, apart possibly from the one that needs to be mod-
ified – instead of repeating that symbol, the new value
is written.) We can embed in the sand also the current
state of the head so that each line contains all relevant
information. Obviously, nothing is significantly changed
by this modification that could diminish the ability of
the entire system to compute and to elicit subjective ex-
periences. We thus let the simulation run in this way
for, e.g., an hour of the virtual time – long enough that
Data has suffered the smashed finger and went through
all discussed transitions of his subjective experiences.
A number of new conceptual problems now arise from
the fact that there, in the sand, in this “entire log” setup
we have not only the state of X/O symbols that encode
the present state of Data, but also all the previous states.
What is Data then experiencing at any given moment? If
we assume that the simulation has just progressed up to
the moment when Data smashed his finger, he must feel
that shock, and pain. But a few million rows above, there
is another line, encoding the same Data who feels content
and joy. If we discard somewhat ridiculous possibility
that each row in the sand gives rise to one Data that
lingers frozen in existence experiencing that instant (it is
easy to identify many inconsistencies if one is to follow
this line), then what is Data actually feeling (or having
that illusion of feeling) at the moment, as it should be
just one thing? One is tempted to say that it obviously
must be the last row, as, after all, the position of the
“head” is there and the process of calculation is taking
place there, while the rows above are just the system log.
But, the situation is actually much less clear. What we
know “for sure”, is that if we flatten out all sand sym-
bols but the first row, and position the head again at
its initial place, then the Repetition theorem guarantees
that the same simulation, with the same subjective ex-
periences of the agents inside, must happen once more,
identical in all details. But what if we forget to erase the
old symbols? We just reset the head, that is, put it on
the initial position and reset its internal state (so-called
“m-configuration”) to the first instruction, but we do not
explicitly erase the “memory”. The head is now moving
the same way as the first time, mechanically carving sym-
bols in the sand in the row below – only that this time
it does not change anything in the row below, all same
symbols are already there. There seem to be essentially
two options.
The first one is that the subjective experiences will
reappear again as the head is moved to its initial state
and its voyage restarted. But what is so special with
the few winded pieces of wood that we call the head, to
produce this effect? If we make another identical head
and put it at any other of the rows, then that another
head must produce the same effect. In such a case, there
must coexist subjective experiences of Data who is at the
moment experiencing joy and content (emerging due to
the head moving along the first row), and of Data who
is going through the stress of hurting the finger (due to
the motion of the second head, many rows below). Of
course, we can add more heads, but this is not a prob-
lem by itself. The tricky part is to understand what
in that head would have this power, since it is doing
nothing?! The head is only traversing the rows, rotating
its gears and changing its internal state. The internal
state is just the ordinal number of the current instruc-
tion, indicated by the orientation of some gearwheel, and
the overall number of instructions isn’t necessarily that
huge – maybe a couple of dozen. It is not truly calcu-
lating even its “m-configuration”, i.e. it is not generating
truly new information about its internal state as it pro-
gresses – this information about the “m-configuration”
is already written in the sand. Head is not moving any
sand, though it is reading it by sensitive touching, a sort
of as a blind man is reading Braille alphabet. The click-
ing of the wooden parts, directly correlated with the sand
symbols but ending nowhere and affecting nothing, does
not seem likely to produce consciousness. Otherwise, it
is very difficult to motivate why then, a blind man, or a
seeing one, would not elicit the same effect of bringing
the subjective experiences of Datas into existence, also
by tenderly touching rows of X/O in the sand? And if
that sort of Braille reading of symbols carved in the sand
would bring a consciousness of someone into the being,
the proper name for that would be simply – magic. Be-
sides, if we have established that it is the “reading” of
the symbols by the head that matters, we might now
replace the “reading” mechanism of the head by some
optical instrument instead of the mechanical “depth de-
tector”. The same reasoning would lead to the conclu-
sion that even optically reading (without disturbing) the
sand symbols would induce the subjective experience of
the encoded agents. But, since observation plays no role
in classical physics, this would further mean that simply
having the symbols written somewhere makes Data alive
(while it might be magically necessary to point to and
follow the symbols by a finger, just as the head sort of
points to symbols in its motion).
The other option is that having the head move through
the lines but without any effect on the sand would not
cause any conscious existence of the simulated agents.
Not until the head finally reaches the last row again
and starts carving symbols in the sand anew, which then
causes lives and experiences of the Datas to resume. In
this view, writing of the symbols by the head must be
essential – that is, the “motion” of the sand, instead of
clicking of the head’s gears and switching of its internal
states. Thus, in both the previous and in this case, writ-
ing of all symbols in the correct order would cause the
emergence of the subjective experiences.
And, in principle, though seemingly weird, there is
still the possibility that the sand motions per se are not
enough, even if they completely and properly mimic mo-
tions during the computational process – they maybe
need to be produced by the the wooden mechanism
“clicking” in a proper way, for the consciousness to
emerge.
To explore this already pretty stretched assumption,
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and to complete our our analysis of the previous options,
we consider another run of the identical computation. A
few rows below the result of the previous run, we start
a fresh simulation: we again manually initialize the first
row in an identical manner as before and then let the
head do its deterministic computation anew. Of course,
it will again produce exactly the same output in the sand
as before (the new symbol rows positioned slightly below
the last row of the first run). Furthermore, as the result
of the Repetition theorem (Theorem 4), the same sub-
jective experiences must arise again in this run, just as
they did in the first run. Besides, according to Theorem
3, the abrupt termination of the simulation cannot influ-
ence the subjective experiences that must have emerged
simultaneously with the computation.
Finally, we again consider running the second round of
the simulation, but this time we would be using a slightly
different wooden head: instead of a Turing head that
calculates the next sand row based on the previous row,
now we envisage a simpler head – one that generates the
next row by merely copying the corresponding row of the
previous simulation run (it goes “up” a few billion rows,
reads the symbol, returns back and imprints it at the
proper position). Our claim is that the “copying head”
must produce the same type of subjective experiences as
the “computing head”. In slightly more general terms
the statement can be formulated as:
Theorem 7. (The no-go theorem). The Neuroscience
postulate implies that a human brain cannot have any
greater ability to induce subjective experience than a pro-
cess of writing a certain sequence of digits (writing can be
done in an arbitrary way and on the arbitrary surface).
Since this final step in our chain of theorems probably
goes against some widespread expectations, we devote to
it a lengthy and detailed “proof” in the Appendix. The
essence of the argument is in the following. First, we note
that the objective effects of the operation of both heads
(computing and copying) are identical, at least as far as
the motion of the sand is concerned. To analyze this
in detail, and to account for a possible difference in pro-
duced experiences induced by different functioning of the
head mechanism, we consider a series of “hybrid” heads,
that incrementally bridge the technical gap between the
computing and the copying head. We discuss each of this
incremental steps and argue that there is no any objective
element which could account for any possible qualitative
difference in emergent subjective experiences (i.e. there
is nothing that could explain why the operation of one
head would produce the consciousness and of the other
not). Note that we, of course, do not claim computa-
tional equivalence, in the mathematical sense, between
a calculating Turing machine and one doing a copying
process – such assertion would be obviously false. Our
conclusions here stem from the fact that mathematical
idealizations such as “Turing machine” or “computing”
do not exist as such in the universe of classical physics,
and that all there is are motions of some sand and some
wood – and we compare the potential of these motions
to elicit subjective experience, in these two cases. In the
Appendix, we also offer a few additional variations of the
argument.
The remainder of the logical steps towards the con-
clusion of Theorem 7 is fairly obvious. Once we have
ascertained that the copying of the log of the previous
run has no lesser potential to produce the consciousness
than “computing” of the sand-symbols again, it is also
immediate that: i) copying the proper X/O sequence on
any surface by any means would necessarily elicit the
same subjective experiences (the entire chain of theorems
could be repeated by using the new surface and a differ-
ent head); ii) by putting the conclusions of all the theo-
rems together, we find that a human brain, under the NP
premise, has no greater ability to produce consciousness
than the copying of the pattern, which, in turn, can be
interpreted as a huge number (rows of symbols O and X
can be concatenated and replaced by digits; besides, a
Turing machine with a larger alphabet could also have
been used, resulting in more than two digits).
Taking a sober look at the last dozen of paragraphs
(plus taking into account the detailed “proof” in the Ap-
pendix), it might seem strange that we had to devote this
much space to an analysis of the hypothetical side-effects
of a piece of wood moving some sand. Naively, one could
expect that everybody will agree that a moving piece of
wood can cause some moving of the sand and that any-
thing beyond that can be only weird imagination. Why
waste time? Surprisingly, there are too many people who
are ready to take very seriously the prospect of this piece
of wood generating consciousness, vivid perceptions, and
feelings of some agents simply by moving this sand. To
address this belief equally seriously, we had to go through
all these details and demonstrate that, if the belief is cor-
rect, then also writing of a specific huge number must
have the same strange power.
We now turn to the discussion of no-go theorem im-
plications, first for the Neuroscience postulate and in the
context of cognitive science, and later on also in the con-
text of physics.
Discussion of the no-go theorem and of its cognitive
science implications
In very general terms, there are a few positions that
one can assume with respect to the result of the no-go
theorem.
The first possibility is to dispute the theorem conclu-
sion. To that end, one (or more) of the logical steps (i.e.
theorems 1 through 7) leading to the final result must be
invalidated.
The conclusion of the Behavioral theorem (Theorem 1)
– that agents which behave indistinguishable in principle
must possess a similar level of consciousness – is, in gen-
eral, a source of much debate. However, it must be kept
in mind that in Theorem 1 this inference is reached under
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the premise of Neuroscience postulate. While we believe
(and argue in the Appendix) that there is a strong case,
even in general, for the plausibility of the behavioristic
conclusion, disputing it in the context of NP would cer-
tainly be very hard. Any such attempt must carefully
address the arguments in the Appendix.
To refute the Theorem 2, one needs to deny that the
brain can be simulated even in principle, despite that
Neuroscience postulate is assumed. It is not clear how
this could be supported for a system of the size of a brain,
whose relevant part of dynamics is governed by classical
physics (Neuroscience postulate). Even putting aside the
option to simulate physical dynamics of the brain, one
must also argue that it is in principle impossible of to
develop sufficiently advanced general AI based on classi-
cal computing – an assertion which seems unsupported
by the current progress in that area.
We have no idea how Theorems 3 and 4 could be dis-
puted in any truly relevant manner (within the classical
physics paradigm).
Theorem 5 is peculiar, as we believe that at this very
link the logical chain breaks in a crucial way when we
switch from classical physics to quantum mechanics (as
we shall discuss in the third part of the paper). However,
as long as we stick to principles of classical physics, insist-
ing on determinism and definiteness of matter properties
irrespectively of the observation, we see no possible ar-
gument why the simulated input from the sensors could
be relevantly different from the actual one.
Contesting Theorem 6 would require an explanation of
why two mathematically equivalent realizations of a com-
puter would differ in the ability to produce subjective ex-
perience, giving a special privilege to electronic (silicone)
architecture over some others. We have no idea how this
stance could be plausibly supported.
Finally, we went at great length in the Appendix to ar-
gue that there cannot be any relevant difference between
the computing and the copying head, differing only in
very subtle correlations of head and sand movement. It
must not be lost from sight that we were not proving
computational equivalence of a Turing machine and a
copying machine – these two are obviously computation-
ally inequivalent, but that is completely irrelevant for our
discussion. Instead, we only showed that motions of the
sand caused by one particular design of a certain wooden
machine have no more potential to give rise to subjective
experiences than the same motions of the sand caused
by a slightly modified design of the same wooden ma-
chine. To challenge Theorem 7, one should propose what
of these delicate differences in motions of the sand and
wood is exactly responsible for the emergence of subjec-
tive experience and how.
None of these seems to us very promising. While it
cannot be excluded that we have overlooked some ad-
ditional possibilities (and finding loopholes in the theo-
rem might give important insights into the phenomenon
of consciousness), we should now concentrate on options
that seriously acknowledge the result of the no-go theo-
rem.
The first such option is to accept that both the human
brain and the process of printing of the appropriate huge
number do elicit subjective experiences, and of the same
type.
Given the huge number (that is the simulation log), it
is far from obvious whose subjective experiences and with
what content such number represents. The hypothesis
that printing of the number causes the experiences to
emerge and to be subjectively lived through, immediately
implies two things:
i) There is a well-defined mapping between the num-
bers and the contents of subjective experiences8 (i.e. the
meaning of the number is objectively there, encoded in
the number);
ii) The writing of the number causes these particu-
lar experiences to become subjectively experienced by
encoded agents, and that should happen merely as the
consequence of this writing process.
One of the problems evident in the second of the two
implications is its strong magical connotation. It points
that mere writing “brings to life” the subjects weirdly
(magically) encoded in the number, out of nothing. In-
deed, it is hard to avoid analogy that such a number
is then some huge equivalent of “abracadabra” which
summons spirits into existence. Certain numbers would
then encode and thus bring to life subjects going through
great pains and agonies, and it would be highly immoral
and unethical to write any such number down. On the
other hand, writing some other numbers would bestow
immense pleasures to agents that would spring into exis-
tence, as the digits are laid out on surface – and writing
such numbers as many times as possible would become a
sort of a moral imperative.
If one is nevertheless willing to further pursue such hy-
pothesis, there are even more serious problems awaiting.
First, what sorts of writing (i.e. copying) result in the
emergence of subjective experiences? Is reading of the
number aloud sufficient? It should be, since it is effec-
tively “imprinting” the number in sound waves. In prin-
ciple, we could devise a (technically demanding) Turing
machine that operates on sound waves instead of in the
sand and then repeat the proof. The magical analogies
with chanting of the correct spell to summon the spir-
its would be even stronger. Actually, if we follow this
route, we must acknowledge that it is (repeating of) the
information that causes consciousness to emerge. And
allowing information per se to have a certain effect, not
via any physical mechanism, is usually considered as a
sort of “magical thinking”.
8 One could argue that the existence of such mapping already pre-
sumes sort of property dualism. While avoiding to get lost in
classification issues, it is our position that the no-go theorem
also poses a problem to such philosophical views, if they are du-
alistic to matter governed by classical physics.
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But the problem actually goes even deeper and is re-
lated to vague definitions of information and of the copy-
ing process in classical physics, which are necessarily re-
lated to some (arbitrary) level of coarse-graining. For
example, if we write the number in some reflective ink,
turn off the lights, then take a flashlight and illuminate
a digit by digit in the correct order, it is reasonable that
the subjective experiences should arise again – by this
process, we have copied the number into a sequence of
light signals. Alternatively but to the same effect, we
could, instead of pointing the flashlight from digit to
digit, briefly turn on an omnidirectional light source po-
sitioned to the left of the first digit. The geometry itself,
combined with finite speed of light, will ensure that the
digits become illuminated in the correct order and thus
this light will accomplish the same effect as the flashlight.
If so, then a flickering light will induce numerous expe-
riences of the encoded agents – each time the light goes
off and on again, they will relive their hour of simulated
time over and over again. But there is even no need for
the light to flicker. For example, if it only changes the
color every now and then, the new round of subjective
experiences should frequently emerge since the photons
(or light waves) of new color are copying the information,
and these should have nothing do with the photons of the
previous color. Proceeding in this way, only slight vari-
ations of the light frequency should be sufficient to each
time produce a new instance of agents emerging together
with their subjective experiences. (It is possible to re-
peat the same reasoning with reflected sound instead of
reflected light – if one objects that due to the theory of
relativity a Turing machine operating on reflected light
signals might not be feasible even in principle.) On the
other hand, a question of “how many times has Data gone
through the experience of slamming his finger” should
have a well-defined answer (we are dealing with classical
physics, not many-worlds theory). But the answer seems
to depend upon arbitrary coarse-graining for the light
color – how small variation is sufficient to make another
instance of agents and their experiences emerge.
These issues are further exacerbated if we use some
more common configurations of sand (or soil) instead
of X/O symbols: for example, a small heap of sand
could serve instead of “X” and shallow hole/depression
instead of “O”. And now we consider billions of billions
of solid bodies throughout our Universe, with myriads
of heap/hole patterns on them, illuminated from vari-
ous directions and in an unsteady manner. When some
of these appropriately align and happen to produce the
correctly evolving pattern, will some Data, or someone
with experience of one of us, pop in and out of existence
for a split of a subjective second? Or, why take into ac-
count only heap and hole patterns – anything that can
carry information should suffice, our choice of particular
coding must anyhow be irrelevant. On the other hand,
some researchers already take seriously the Boltzmann’s
brain problem9 in its original form [42], and here we have
its analogon on steroids, making it almost certain, under
these premises, that our subjective experiences are actu-
ally elicited by a flickering light illuminating a seemingly
random pattern in a universe close to a thermodynamical
equilibrium, rather than being products of biologically
evolved creatures.
Problems of this type arise because the information has
no meaning per se in the classical physics and instead be-
comes meaningful only in the context and through some
process for which this information is pertinent, as these
naturally dictate what is the relevant coarse-graining
level. Ambiguities in defining the information are usually
no reason for concern in classical physics paradigm: infor-
mation per se does not affect anything, so we are free to
define it as we like (suited to context). Normally, within
this paradigm, “information” is only a helpful emergent
property itself, not something that has inherent ontolog-
ical meaning (same as “Turing machine” or “computa-
tion”). Attempts to attribute independent meaning to
information separated from any context, and, moreover,
to attribute nontrivial effects (such as causing the emer-
gence of consciousness) to the information alone and by
itself, likely results in logical inconsistencies as the ones
just considered.
And, even if we put aside the problems of coarse-
graining and of the definition of information, and take
for granted that a well-defined string of bits (which is
a mathematical abstract) can exist in the world of clas-
sical physics, yet another layer of potential difficulties
arise. It is the old conundrum of whether syntax alone
can produce semantics (meaning), just on its own, per
se. Can a sequence of bits possess a well defined unique
meaning, irrespective of the external interpretation and
observers? Does this huge number inherently carry this
one and only one meaning of the Data’s finger getting
hurt, five minutes into the simulation? To probe this
question in our framework, we can do the following short
thought experiment. We may imagine that no androids
ever existed, and no fingers, and no pain, and that even
this four-dimensional universe has never existed. That
the only thing that had ever existed was a one dimen-
sional (time)line, enough to support a string of bits (rep-
resented in whichever way) randomly appearing. Sooner
or later, the proper binary number (i.e. the proper X/O
sequence) will appear – is it really plausible that, at that
moment, the concepts of the androids, colors, pain, and
of the four-dimensional space-time will all of sudden ap-
pear and spring into existence as the specific bit pattern
appears? Or is it more likely and plausible that the se-
quence of bits in that one-dimensional world will remain
9 Estimate which shows that it is statistically far more probable
(under certain reasonable assumptions) for randomly distributed
matter to form, by mere chance, an isolated brain with an illusion
of the external reality that we see than it is the probability that
such external reality indeed exists.
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what it is – just a sequence of bits?
We could easily extend the listing of logical complica-
tions and inconsistencies tied to any attempt to assign
objective mapping from the numbers to the subjective
experiences, and especially to the claim that copying of
a certain number causes the corresponding experiences
to be actually lived through. However, taking that these
few arguments were sufficient to render the whole idea
absurd, we now we turn to the option that settles all
these issues in the logically simplest way.
Neither is conscious
Indeed, by far the easiest and the most parsimonious
way to avoid the previous logical mess is to deny any
“emergence” at all. When the digits are printed, they
are printed and that is all that happens – it could not
be more obvious and simple. The motion of the wooden
head causes motion of the sand, and that is all to it.
It trivially solves all the riddles posed by “emergence”
hypothesis: there is neither need to explain what exactly
emerges, nor what motions of sand and wood make it
emerge, nor when it emerges, nor how many times it
emerges. Anyhow, it is very unlikely that a consistent
set of answers can be given to these questions, even in
principle. In this way, there is no need to invoke any
magic of agents with subjective experiences popping out
of thin air, only because someone has uttered the correct
chant.
But, the price to be paid is that, by the equivalence es-
tablished through the no-go theorem, nothing can emerge
also as the byproduct of the brain functioning. The brain
is still perfectly capable to produce behavior – i.e. ba-
sically the motions of our muscles. External stimuli,
which are in the essence also some types of motions (ei-
ther of photons, or of air in the sound, or of some other
molecules/hard bodies in case of other senses), after some
processing turn into our responses which are again some
motions (either of our bodies or of our vocal appara-
tuses). No mystery there. Motions can and will cause
other motions, but nothing apart from that. In partic-
ular, since we deny that printed symbols can evoke sub-
jective experiences, by the logical inference we must deny
the same magic to the brain this time.
And here this hypothesis, in spite of being logically
consistent and simple, runs into a grave problem – it
cannot sustain the test of an elementary subjective ex-
periment of introspection. There is hardly anything of
which we can be as sure as we are confident of having
some subjective experience – be it an illusion or not, it
is there. This subjective and yet undeniable observa-
tional fact cannot be accounted by the hypothesis that
motion causes other motions and nothing else (and that
HP holds).
While this conflict with observational data might be
slightly obscured when we analyze brain functioning, the
established equivalence (in regard of the subjective expe-
riences) between the brain and the symbols in the sand
makes this problem far more obvious. There is clearly no
“pain”, at least not just like that, in the rows of “X” and
“O” symbols imprinted in the sand (with or without a
wooden machine). There is also no “red” in the yellow-
ish sand and brown wood. These concepts must somehow
emerge, which requires the mapping of the symbol con-
figurations to the experiences – the option that we have
just previously discarded due to too many “magical” in-
consistencies – or otherwise these notions simply would
have never existed in the world of sand symbols. Sure,
there might be a pattern of “X” and “O” that would cor-
respond to virtual Data virtually reporting “I feel pain
and see red” in the virtual world. But these would be
only some additional symbols on top of the rest of mark-
ings in the sand, unless there is some “internal” vantage
point of Data that somehow emerges and is led into the il-
lusion that he is feeling the pain and seeing the red (which
is emergence of subjective experience and the mapping
again). Otherwise, red and pain would have just never
existed in such a world, and neither would the meaning
of the symbols. But we know too well that pain and red,
whatever these are, do exist in reality, and that they are
not literally certain configurations of sand symbols.
Irrefutability of the fact that we do possess some sort
of subjective experience has led some proponents of the
physicalist views to seek the refuge in the word “illusion”
(most notably D. Dennet, promoting, for example, the
concept of the “user illusion” [26]). Indeed, no matter
how logically consistent and appealing by the simplicity
that would be, no one would seriously consider a hypoth-
esis that clearly and openly states that there is no any
subjective experience, not even an illusion of. It would
be in too obvious conflict with results of personal ob-
servation (i.e. introspection). Importance of our no-go
theorem in this context is that it helps us get rid of the
illusion that the word “illusion” can miraculously save
the day.
Namely, the proponents of the “illusion” solution al-
ways had the problem to explain “whose illusion it is?”,
i.e. a problem with the subject of illusion. But we are
here pointing to another problem, maybe even more se-
vere: there is also a problem of “illusion of what?”,
that is, with the object of illusion. Namely, if the sand
symbols have the illusion of “pain in the finger”, then
nonetheless there must be a mapping of the symbols
into this subjective experience and this mapping has to
be somehow and at some moment “activated”, i.e. the
mapped illusion must be at some moment experienced
by the agent having the illusion. The mapping tells us it
is the illusion of the finger pain, and not of an ice cream
flavor. The “illusion of pain” is not made of sand, and
thus it must emerge and occur in the sand as the sym-
bols are written. And since the mapping is still there, all
the magical problems already discussed arise nonetheless.
Fact that it is “the mapping of sand configuration into
the content of illusion” instead of “into the content of
subjective experience” is a mere renaming of the prob-
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lem and does not diminish it a bit. But if we decide to
consistently apply the clear-cut solution that there is no
mapping at all, then we also entirely lose the object of
the illusion, and nothing remains, apart from the dead
carvings in the sand. And all of us know too well the
pain of a smashed finger certainly is not “nothing”.
An additional argument why it would be logically con-
sistent to replace “illusion” with “nothing” is the fol-
lowing. The essence of the “illusion-like” view of the
consciousness, is something like this: we can in principle
explain everything we objectively see, measure, observe,
including also the talk about consciousness – solely on
cause and effect grounds, without need to invoke any
“consciousness” thing. Therefore it is wrong to artifi-
cially introduce any “consciousness” concept in the ex-
planation of the world because that would automatically
presuppose the existence of non-objective facts. And we
do not need the latter for the explanation of any exper-
iment. But the trouble is that the same logic applies
also for the concept “illusion of consciousness”. By the
same criteria, we no more need the “illusion of conscious-
ness” than the “consciousness” itself, so then we should
introduce neither of these, and stick to “nothing”.
Besides, why is there an urge to replace the plain word
“nothing” by the word “illusion” and make the expla-
nation more complicated? The only possible motive can
be: in order to fit some experimental data. But what ex-
perimental data – there is no objective experiment that
points to the necessity of introducing any “illusion” into
the explanation. Insisting on “illusion” means acknowl-
edging a new class of experiments whose outcomes do
not follow from and cannot be inferred from any combi-
nation of objective experiments. Admitting the existence
of such independent “subjective experiments” is equiva-
lent to admitting the existence of phenomena which are
not explained even if we successfully account for all ob-
jective events – in other words, it here means accepting
the “hard problem”. Thus, the opponents of the “hard
problem” should pay the utmost attention not to involve
the word “illusion” into their explanations and to use the
fair-and-square word “nothing” instead.
But, hypothetical beings that would experience abso-
lutely “nothing”, not even any sort of “illusion”, are easy
to distinguish from humans via experiment of introspec-
tion. The former beings are commonly denoted as “philo-
sophical zombies”. The world inhabited by such beings
would be very much like a movie projected on a cinema
screen, where everybody leaves an impression of a sen-
tient being, but it is only an animated picture, “no one
inside”, not even having an illusion.10 And we are quite
certain at least of the illusion.
In any case, the “illusion” thing must either be “some-
10 It is unclear in what sense such a world could be said to exist
– if it is not experienced by anyone – apart as a pure abstract
mathematical possibility.
thing”, in which case it induces mapping between the
symbols and that something, or it is plain and true “noth-
ing”, which is then easily discarded due to conflict with
observations. The certain appeal of the word “illusion”
lies in its ostensible ability to exist in a limbo between
“something” and “nothing”. But the source of this false
impression is easy to track – “illusion” manages not to re-
ally exist in spite of not being “nothing” only because it is
commonly defined as someone’s belief (existing contrary
to the evidence), or as (a distortion of) our perception of
reality. In other words, it exists subjectively, while not
objectively, i.e. as a difference of subjective and objec-
tive. Therefore, strictly speaking, if we use it as a word
different from both “nothing” and “something” then we
implicitly recognize the true existence of the “subjective
realm” different from objective phenomena in the first
place. But if our intention from the outset was to avoid
this, then we must pick: illusion is either something or
nothing – and we have just demonstrated why neither is
acceptable.
To sum up, none of the options that maintain the Neu-
roscience postulate seems plausible. This actually should
not surprise us a lot. The classical physics is basically all
about motions (and interactions that influence these mo-
tions). It was never clear how exactly motions, connected
in a cause and effect chain, could eventually result in a
phenomenon such as subjective experience, which is so
much qualitatively different from the low-level physical
motions in the brain that supposedly cause it. Conven-
tional wisdom is that enormous complexity and delicate
structure of the brain organ somehow turn these low-level
motions and interactions into our subjective experiences
such as pain or red. This always required a leap of faith,
as there was never any real explanation of how this qual-
itative change can occur. What we did by the series of
theorems was to put this hypothesis under formal and
systematic scrutiny, we followed logical inferences from
start to end and finally concluded, based on quite strong
arguments, that this faith was never rationally substan-
tiated.
Therefore, we turn to the remaining option: that the
premise under which the no-go theorem was derived –
namely, the Neuroscience postulate – must be wrong. We
deal with this possibility and its implications in the rest
of the paper.
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PART II: NEUROSCIENCE POSTULLATE IS
WRONG
The negation of the Neuroscience postulate, at its
face value, simply implies that the paradigm of classi-
cal physics is insufficient to explain the phenomenon of
consciousness. Should this truly surprise us, more than a
century since we have discovered that all the basic tenets
of the classical world picture were deeply wrong? From
where comes such confidence, expressed via the prevail-
ing credo of the Neuroscience postulate, that the deepest
and yet elementary truths about our Universe must be
irrelevant for the explanation of such an elusive, perplex-
ing and profound phenomenon as the consciousness is?
A part of the answer is certainly irrational, reflect-
ing our prejudices about how the Universe should be,
the lack of intuitiveness of quantum mechanics and the
sharp fragmentation of science in which researchers from
one field are often quite unfamiliar with even the basics
concepts from the others. However, there are also strong
rational arguments that we have already mentioned in
the introduction: i) hot, noise-dominated environment
of the brain seems unsupportive of manifestly quantum
phenomena such as interference and entanglement over
distance; and ii) deterministic, cause and effect reason-
ing of classical physics, as well as artificial intelligence
progress based on classical computing, look promising to
explain the power of the brain to compute and produce
behavior – without need to invoke quantum mechanics
or anything beyond.
Could the mere paradigm shift from the ontology and
logic of the classical physics to that of the quantum me-
chanics, even without invoking any not-so-plausible hy-
pothesis about explicit quantum effects in the brain, close
the gap from the explanation of the human behavior to
the explanation of consciousness? We believe it can, but
this obviously depends upon what this ontology of the
quantum mechanics really is. In other words, it depends
on the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
We will now discuss a few of the more popular interpre-
tations of QM, in the light of the problem to understand
consciousness and with respect to their potential to ac-
count for the existence of this phenomenon (for which,
as we have argued above, the classical physics seems in-
capable of). We concentrate only on “pure interpreta-
tions”, i.e. ones that are mathematically equivalent to
the textbook formulation of QM and thus indistinguish-
able in principle by the standard experiments (we leave
to the experimental test the hypotheses which predict
new physics).
First of all, we note that the interpretations which
tend to recover as much as possible of the classical world-
view are the least promising in this regard. De Broglie-
Bohm pilot-wave interpretation is paying a hefty price
(of renouncing covariance of special relativity, of difficul-
ties to produce quantum field formulation and of pre-
supposing, against the reasoning of the Occam’s razor,
unnecessary and unobservable properties such as parti-
cle positions), only to regain some intuitive features of
the classical physics such as determinism and definite-
ness of reality at the level of particle trajectories. Yet,
these are the same features that disqualify the classical
physics from the list of frameworks capable to account for
the existence of the subjective experience. In turn, due
to these very properties that pilot-wave interpretation
strives to reestablish (at the cost of running into inher-
ent mathematical obstacles), it falls in the same category
of world-views that likely cannot explain the existence of
consciousness. Since the essential difference between the
de Broglie-Bohm interpretation and the classical physics
is in the much more complicated and nonlocal dynamics
(where the unitarily evolving wavefunction governs the
motions of particles with hypothetical sharply defined
positions), and the no-go theorem does not seem to cru-
cially depend on the details of dynamics or on the locality
features, it is unclear how replacing classical physics with
this interpretation can evade the conclusions of the the-
orem. Unless a relevant argument of this type is found,
the basic motivation for formulating the pilot-wave inter-
pretation (i.e. resurrection of the main classical features)
can ironically be, at the same time, a serious argument
which disqualifies it.
Next we are going to consider two classes of interpre-
tations that are particularly interesting due to their pro-
found relation to the hard problem of consciousness and
which require to be analyzed jointly and comparatively,
in more detail.
The first class encompasses interpretations that incor-
porate, on equal footing and without exceptions, both
of the standard postulates: i) postulate of unitary state
evolution governed by Schro¨dinger equation; and ii) the
wavefunction collapse postulate (i.e. the measurement
update rule) which includes the Born rule for the proba-
bility of measurement outcomes. Such interpretations do
not predict any new physics (i.e. do not assume any spe-
cific collapse dynamics) and stick to what is commonly
known as the “textbook formulation”. Note that in all
such interpretations the collapse event must be in one or
the other way observer or “system of reference” depen-
dent – it cannot be objective in the fullest sense, that
is, experimentally verifiable by an arbitrary observer.
Namely, if the collapse would occur in an entirely ob-
jective, observer-independent way, then we might enclose
the collapse event (together with the entire measurement
setup) in a big enough insulating box and note that, due
to the collapse, the evolution in the box is not linear and
unitary – in contradiction with the first postulate and re-
quiring some extension of the formalism to describe the
dynamics of the collapse. (This also holds for Wigner or
Penrose like “consciousness causes collapse” or vice-versa
hypotheses – they all require new physics to explain de-
tails of the objective collapse, and we do not consider
such proposals here.) The standard interpretations be-
longing to the first class are the Copenhagen interpre-
tation (with an appropriate reading), Rovelli’s relational
interpretation, Brukner’s variation of the relational inter-
18
pretation, QBism and Wheeler’s ideas of participatory
universe. These interpretations deal in different ways
with the scenarios where the two postulates seemingly
come into contradiction (e.g. of the Wigner’s friend type
[6]).
The second class on which we focus covers the inter-
pretations that hold that the collapse postulate is unnec-
essary and can be removed, without ascribing, as a re-
placement, objective reality to anything apart from the
wavefunction (unlike, e.g. the De Broglie-Bohm or modal
interpretations which discard the collapse postulate but
introduce some new elements of reality; the same is true
for dualistic ad hoc ontology extensions of the Many-
minds type). Historically the first representative of this
class was Everett’s relative state formulation. As this
view of quantum mechanics required further interpret-
ing, it gave birth to many variations of this basic idea,
of which to this day the best known is De Witt’s many-
worlds interpretation.11 The underlying idea of these for-
mulations is that the objective, third-person perspective
– represented by the global wavefunction – must be suf-
ficient to account for everything that is going on in the
universe, while the subjective, first-person accounts have
to be derivable from this objective picture. In particu-
lar, this also includes the collapse: it is in principle not
possible to pinpoint why, where or when it happens so it
may exist only as a sort of not truly real, subjective illu-
sion of the involved agents, one which in principle can be
explained on the basis of properties of the global wave-
function.
Already from this overview it seems natural to regard
the views from the second class as straightforward quan-
tum mechanical generalizations of the hardline cognitive
science positions which deny existence of the hard prob-
lem in the sense that they maintain that subjective ex-
perience is merely a sort of illusion and can be (as ev-
erything else), in principle, entirely deduced from the
objective properties of matter (while not attributing on-
tological reality to subjective phenomena). On the other
hand, the interpretations from the first class insist on the
necessity of the collapse postulate in order to account for
the actual measurement outcomes, obtained by the ex-
perimenter and from the viewpoint of the experimenter.
No matter the collapse is observer-dependent and thus
in some sense subjective (as it is not possible to objec-
tively say when or if it occurs), it is still necessary for the
complete description of reality. Thus, in these views, the
third-person perspective is not sufficient per se and must
be supplemented by taking into account the internal per-
spective of the system. The latter is done by postulating
an entire additional basic law of nature – the collapse pos-
tulate. Hence, the interpretations from the first class can
be seen as QM equivalents of the philosophical position
11 Some related ideas, such as the consistent history approach, can
also be, to some extent, seen as members of this class.
that the external, third-person perspective is insufficient
to fully account for all aspects of reality, i.e. for the sub-
jective experiences (by a straightforward extrapolation
these cognitive science positions then hold that there is
indeed a hard problem of consciousness – i.e. something
that remains even if we entirely understand the dynamics
of the brain from the external viewpoint).
Furthermore, denying the essence of the hard prob-
lem, while advocating a QM interpretation from the first
class would basically be a logically problematic stance.
Namely, if one assumes the position that the evolution
of the physical brain state (as seen from an objective,
external perspective) causes, per se and as a necessary
byproduct, the emergence of the corresponding subjec-
tive experience (or the illusion of that), then by the most
straightforward generalization it could be concluded that
a superposition of brain states should correspond to su-
perposition of subjective identities each having the ap-
propriate subjective experience. Consequently, the col-
lapse postulate would not be necessary even to account
for the subjective perception of the single measurement
outcome (from the experimentalist’s perspective), and it
would become completely superfluous.
In more detail: presume that we embrace the position
that brain, while being merely a lump of matter (albeit
a vastly complex one), directly and by itself produces
both the objective behavioral responses to the external
stimuli and the (illusion of) the subjective experience,
while the latter is essentially reflecting and accompany-
ing the former. According to the standard physicalist,
no-hard-problem position, a conscious agent should re-
main conscious even if we enclose her in an information-
ally sealed box. Besides, we can later confirm (e.g. by
watching a video record of the box interior, after the box
was opened) that the agent inside the box behaved as a
conscious being, reporting his subjective experiences in a
usual manner, supporting the assertion. So far, the over-
all state of the agent and the entire system in the box is
effectively classical, there is no any (at least not signif-
icant) superposition of macroscopic states. In any case,
no collapse can play any role in such setup: according
to interpretations of both classes, no collapse objectively
occurs anywhere in the box (otherwise there would be in
principle objectively measurable breakdown of some in-
terference) and what happens outside of the box anyhow
cannot be of any relevance. For an external observer, the
wavefunction of the system in the box is evolving unitar-
ily, and yet such evolution produces consciousness of the
agent inside. By the most direct line of reasoning, we
can conclude: the particle system which we call “brain”
produces consciousness as a side-effect of the unitary evo-
lution of its wavefunction. If we now expose the agent
in the box to a visual stimulus of seeing the pointer of a
measurement device (of a well-defined location), by the
previous premise this should cause the agent’s subjective
experience of perceiving the pointer position. Besides,
in the absence of any superposition of the stimuli (of
the pointer position), the system dynamics should closely
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mimic the classical brain evolution. Now, by the linearity
of QM, a superposition of two different stimuli (caused
this time by superposition of two pointer locations as a
result of some quantum measurement) must produce a
superposition of two, mutually orthogonal evolving brain
states (entangled with different pointer locations). Since
we have concluded that the evolving wavefunction of the
brain is sufficient to elicit subjective experience, and that
collapse plays no role in that, then each of the two or-
thogonal brain states should evoke the experience of a
separate personal identity having a different subjective
perception of the pointer position.12 In this way, we
have explained the subjective experience of perceiving
the single measurement outcome without invoking the
collapse postulate, which makes the latter essentially re-
dundant13.
In yet another words, physicalist presumption that
brain “secretes” consciousness14 leads most naturally to
a conclusion that a superposition of two brain states, dif-
fering in some memorized information, corresponds to a
superposition of two “secreted” conscious personal iden-
tities differing only in this memorized information. Each
personal identity then must have a subjective perception
of a well-defined measurement outcome, and introduc-
tion of the collapse postulate becomes difficult to justify.
This is not to say that introducing the collapse postulate
is logically forbidden, but only that it seems unreason-
able in the light of the Occam’s razor: any attempt to
argue that the introduction of the collapse postulate ac-
complishes anything at all then must prove that some
other aspect of the MWI is wrong (commonly it is the
derivation of the Born rule that comes under scrutiny, but
it is difficult to argue that this problem per se requires
something as drastic and vague as is the measurement
postulate; besides, we will soon return to the problem of
probabilities and point out that it is not separate from
the issue of subjective experience).
The above analysis agrees with the reasoning Everett
himself used to justify rejecting of the collapse postu-
late. He heavily relied on the nontrivial assumption that
the existence of a term in the global wavefunction that
corresponds to a brain state is sufficient to give rise to
a subjective experience associated with this brain state.
However, in his works, Everett did not recognize this as
a new postulate. Instead, he aimed to derive that the
subjective experiences of an observer arise from the ob-
jective and deterministically evolving wavefunction, by
12 The fact that we now have a sum of two terms in the wavefunc-
tion cannot easily influence the conclusion: any wavefunction can
be written as a sum of many terms.
13 Up to a presumption that the remaining problems of the many-
worlds view are indeed satisfactorily addressed, as the MW pro-
ponents claim.
14 Here we allude to the influential claim by 18th century French
materialist Pierre Cabanis that “brain secretes thought as the
liver secretes bile”.
resorting to another assumption [2]: “As models for ob-
servers we can, if we wish, consider automatically func-
tioning machines, possessing sensory apparata and cou-
pled to recording devices capable of registering past sen-
sory data and machine configurations”. Then he takes
for granted that from the correlation of states of such
automata with different experimental outcomes in the
superposition one may directly infer: “...the usual asser-
tions of [the collapse of the state on measurement] appear
to hold on a subjective level to each observer described by
an element of the superposition.” His conclusion thus ex-
actly agrees with ours: the hard-line physicalist position
on the hard-problem logically implies redundancy of the
collapse postulate. Crucially, we also see that the entire
relative state formalism explicitly (and openly stated)
depends upon the belief that evolving states of these au-
tomata, alone and inevitably, cause the emergence of the
subjective experiences.15 In other words, Everett here
implicitly presumes, without any further discussion, that
there can be no true hard problem. In a similar fash-
ion though in a conditional form DeWitt writes, in an
attempt to explain subjective experience of the splitting
of the worlds in his many-worlds interpretation: “to the
extent to which we can be regarded simply as automata
and hence on a par with ordinary measuring apparatuses,
the laws of quantum mechanics do not allow us to feel the
splits” [43]. We again see that the very idea of removing
the collapse postulate entirely relies on the assumption
that subjective experiences arise, per se, as a byproduct
of the functioning of the automata.
The alternative to MWI reasoning is to deny that the
unitary evolution of a brain wavefunction, as seen from
outside the box, is sufficient to account for the emer-
gence of the subjective experience. A supporter of one
of the first class interpretations can naturally assert that
subjective experience can be accessed and taken into ac-
count only by considering the internal perspective from
the reference point of the brain system. More specifically,
this internal perspective must then be a quality that is
not a consequence of the external properties (but merely
correlates with them), and it should incorporate and in-
voke the collapse postulate when dealing with superposi-
tions. But this is tantamount to acknowledging the hard
problem: the objective, i.e. external viewpoint is insuffi-
cient to explain subjective experience – starting with the
subjective perception of the single measurement outcome
(and as a remedy, we must introduce something qualita-
15 This is not to say that many-world views do not admit non-
physicalist ontological extensions of the Many-minds type, but
these are, as in the Many-minds case, commonly related to con-
ceptual difficulties which usually make the logical price to be paid
higher than the gain obtained by removing the collapse postu-
late. More importantly, we have constrained our analysis to the
standard and ontologically minimalistic version of the MWI, and,
reading their papers, there is very little doubt that it is the one
that both Everett and DeWitt had in mind.
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tively different, an entirely new physical postulate). In
this way we are not violating Occam’s principle – we are
indeed introducing another postulate, yet not in extrav-
agance but from a necessity to account for the existing
data (i.e. for subjective observation of any experimental
outcome).
By the previous reasoning, we have pointed out to a
more direct relation of the subjectiveness of the collapse
postulate (its observer/reference frame dependence) and
the subjectiveness of the experience. We provided ar-
guments that a strict physicalist position on the emer-
gence of the subjective experience implies also redun-
dancy of the collapse postulate and thus logically almost
necessitates many-world view. Consequently, any consis-
tent opinion which tends to retain the collapse postulate
should acknowledge the hard problem in some way.
In this light, whether the subjective experience is re-
ducible to objective phenomena or not, to much extent
naturally translates to the question of whether the col-
lapse postulate is reducible to unitary evolution, or must
be introduced as a separate postulate. Therefore, the an-
swers to these two questions are tightly interrelated. As
for the latter question, volumes have been written both
in support and in refutation of Everett’s claim that the
collapse postulate is redundant.16 Here we can afford
only to briefly illustrate the main aspect of the problem
which is relevant to us now and related to the notion of
the measurement outcome probability.
For this, it is sufficient to consider a quantum equiva-
lent of a coin toss, let that be a spin z measurement of
a particle with spin 1
2
oriented along the x-axis, and an
agent, e.g. Alice, performing the measurement. Common
wisdom, as well as the textbook formulation of quantum
mechanics, tells us that after Alice carries out the mea-
surement the observed outcome will present new informa-
tion to her, that is, she will get to know something she did
not know before. Namely, quantum mechanics, invoking
the collapse postulate with Born rule, predicts that Al-
ice will observe z spin projection to be either + 1
2
or − 1
2
,
both with probabilities 1/2. There is no way to predict
the result in advance, and as Alice finds out the out-
come she learns a piece of information she did not know
a minute before (in certain sense a new bit of informa-
tion, not existing before, has been created). And indeed,
this account of the events is what actual experiments con-
firm, at least in the sense that the experimenters in such
situations always report a single outcome obtained with
probability one half.
But this is not how the many-worlds (or relative state)
interpretation describes the events. In that view, the
16 Even by the proponents of the many-world ideas, it is nowadays
commonly accepted that some additional postulate must be in-
troduced as a replacement, at least to technically reproduce the
Born’s rule [44]. But these technical details, as well as problems
related to the preferred basis, are of a secondary nature to our
discussion.
state of the system (Alice + measurement device + par-
ticle) before the measurement is:
|Alice0〉|device0〉|X+〉 =
1√
2
|Alice0〉|device0〉(|Z+〉+ |Z−〉), (1)
where |Alice0〉 and |device0〉 correspond to initial states
of Alice and the device, while |X±〉 and |Z±〉 correspond
to spin projection ± 1
2
along the given axis. The measure-
ment, in this view, now only induces interaction between
the subsystems which results (after a period of unitary
evolution) in the entangled state:
1√
2
|Alice+〉|device+〉|Z+〉+
1√
2
|Alice−〉|device−〉|Z−〉, (2)
where |device±〉 represents the state of the measurement
device indicating that the spin projection is ± 1
2
, while
|Alice±〉 represents the state of Alice and her brain af-
ter registering the corresponding device reading. No col-
lapse has ever occurred in any de facto sense, not even in
Alice’s reference system alone, and anything that might
look like a collapse from the viewpoint of Alice is an il-
lusion entirely derivable and explainable by considering
the complete wavefunction. Alice persists in the super-
position, occurring in both terms of (2).
Important point is that there is no element of chance in
the above description: the evolution of the system is fully
deterministic and easily predictable. After the measure-
ment, we read from (2) that in the reality, represented
in MWI by the overall system state, there exists both an
agent Alice who has perceived projection + 1
2
and an Al-
ice who has perceived− 1
2
outcome. Both are equally real,
and the many-worlds view stipulates that both subjective
experiences (of perceiving + 1
2
and − 1
2
outcomes, corre-
sponding to two subsystem states |Alice+〉 and |Alice−〉
in the superposition) are equally real. This is, as we
have already noted, based on unsubstantiated presump-
tion (the fact often neglected) that unitary evolution of
the brain state causes per se the emergence of subjec-
tive experience, something that is tacitly deduced from
the, again unproven, assumption that functioning of an
automaton gives rise to consciousness.
But, there is even an additional quantum-mechanical
twist to such assumptions about the consciousness, that
complicates matters further than in the context of classi-
cal physics: namely, the problem to explain where the el-
ement of chance enters the story. The account of Alice’s
measurement scenario given by the many-worlds inter-
pretation does not include any element of chance. In this
view, the final state (2) is entirely predictable, and there
is nothing new that anyone learns from the experiment
result, at least certainly not “objectively new”. Follow-
ing Everett, advocates of many-world theories insist that
probability enters as a subjective experience (illusion) of
the agents involved. But even this is difficult to establish:
the subjective experience of the Alice that recorded spin
up, and of the Alice that recorded spin down are equally
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real, and none is preferential to the other. Yet, subjec-
tively Alice feels that she got to know something new as
she learned the measurement outcome, i.e. that now she
has a piece of information she did not possess before –
therefore, that there still is an element of unpredictabil-
ity. Alice has a subjective experience that she ended as
only one of these Alices in the superposition, and if ev-
erything is deterministic and predictable, she would like
to be able to calculate in advance as which of these Alices
she will turn up. Even if that it is merely an illusion that
she turned up as only one of these Alices, she neverthe-
less should be able to compute everything in a fully de-
terministic universe, including what the illusion will be.
It is difficult to deny that there exists some randomness
that defies our ability to predict, since that randomness
is so obvious in the practice. If the theory cannot predict
the content of the “single outcome illusion”, there still
seems to remain an element of chance, not accounted
for by the deterministic many-world hypothesis. It is,
at least to say, philosophically unclear whether this can
be indeed successfully explained by simply saying that
there is another Alice in the second branch pondering
over the opposite measurement outcome. In an attempt
to solve this riddle, S. Saunders, one of the MW propo-
nents, contends: “...Alice does know everything there is
to know: she knows (we might as well assume) the en-
tire corpus of impersonal, scientific knowledge. But what
that does not tell her is just which person she is or where
she is located in the wave-function of the universe”[45].
But this reasoning seems to indicate that there is a sort
of hidden variable, not accounted by the theory, which
determines her “location in the wave-function of the uni-
verse”. Consequently, such lines of reasoning explain why
many-world theory has motivated such a departure from
physicalism as is the many-minds variant [46, 47], and
how comes that arguments about a formally realist and
deterministic interpretation of a physical theory necessi-
tate discussions about subjective experience, problems of
identity (whether minds exist only instantaneously with
no continuous identity extending over time), whether ac-
count of mind states supplies a natural definition of a
future self, whether it is possible for agents to formulate
a rational welfare strategy (and whose welfare?) and so
on [48, 49].
In the end, more than 60 years after the first formu-
lation of Everett’s ideas, all these discussions have not
so far led to any consensus and have left us in the dark
whether the very foundations of this class of interpreta-
tions are consistent and in agreement with observations
or not. In our opinion, however, all these arguments fail
to identify the main problem, which is: critically rely-
ing on the belief that functioning of an automaton can,
per se, induce subjective experiences. Another way to
recognize this problem is to note that there is a very
straightforward and easy solution to all above logical co-
nundrums posed by the many-word view: all of these
foundational problems plaguing formulation of MW the-
ories immediatelly disperse if we assume that there is
simply no subjective experience, i.e. that we are purely
philosophical zombies. All events then happen only ob-
jectively: there are objectively two terms in the global
wavefunction corresponding to complex particle system
which form a certain rigid body, a biomechanical automa-
ton that we denote as Alice; in one term this configura-
tion of particles has been correlated with the spin-up out-
come, whereas the configuration in the other term ended
up entangled with the spin-down outcome. There is ab-
solutely no mystery of how the initial system containing
(in a factor space) a single subsystem state |Alice0〉 de-
scribing particular configuration of particles that form
Alice, unitarily evolves into two distinct terms, each con-
taining (mutually orthogonal) subsystem vectors |Alice+〉
and |Alice−〉 which correspond to slightly differently ar-
ranged configurations of atoms (both atom configurations
we, by a convention, call Alice).
Nothing in that case ever occurs subjectively: Alice
never feels anything and never experiences anything, the
configuration of the atoms which constitute Alice is only
capable of “reporting” stuff. Reporting is an automated
process by which the wavefunction of the particle sub-
system that we call Alice, via unitary evolution corre-
lates with the wavefunction of the surrounding air (again
a many-particle subsystem) in the manner that can be
interpreted as the air carrying vibrations of Alice’s voice
(and the voice is again correlated with the quantum state
of her brain subsystem). Therefore, the subsystem of
particles representing Alice can, in both terms of the su-
perposition, further evolve into a state in which these
particle configurations are “reporting” the corresponding
spin outcomes (i.e. getting accordingly correlated with air
molecules). But none of the Alices is experiencing any-
thing. Under these assumptions there is no longer any
problem of “which of the Alices she would subjectively
feel to have become”, that is “which of the outcomes she
would subjectively perceive”. The answer, in all cases,
would be simply – none. Asking about the subjective
experience of philosophical zombies would be plainly an
ill-posed question.
Furthermore, since any randomness in these interpre-
tations is only a subjective illusion, removing the phe-
nomenon of subjective experience also removes all the
problems related to probability. There is no more even
need to derive the Born rule – some terms in the super-
position simply have larger associated multipliers than
the others, and that is all to it. On the level of philo-
sophical zombies, i.e. of automata without any internal
perspective, it is difficult even formulate the notion of
probability: we can imagine a zombie tossing an un-
fair quantum coin, e.g. with head to tail probabilities
of 25 versus 75 percents, but it would only lead to two
equally real superposition terms with coefficients of mag-
nitudes
√
1
4
and
√
3
4
– asking what was the probability
of a given outcome makes no sense, since we are not al-
lowed to ask what outcome the zombie (or automaton)
has actually subjectively perceived. We may have the
zombie repeat the tossing many times and record the
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outcomes, but that would not change much – unitary
evolution would deterministically lead to a superposition
of terms corresponding to each of the possible outcome
sequences, in general with different multipliers. The zom-
bie in each of the branches can report a conclusion based
on his outcome sequence: from uttering “the ratio of
heads to tails was approximately 1:3” in superposition
terms with larger multipliers, to exclaiming “there are
only head outcomes in this universe” in the term with
a tiny coefficient. However, this has nothing yet to do
with probability or chance. Another postulate can be
introduced (and usually is) to somehow relate the “num-
ber” (or measure) of identical worlds existing within each
branch with the corresponding coefficient in the superpo-
sition. This is standardly done to explain “why are we
more likely to find ourselves” in a branch with a higher
multiplier. But this question already implies “us” and
our subjective experience, and such a step in neither nec-
essary nor easy to motivate in the philosophical zombie
scenario. In such a scenario, there is actually no need to
bother with the derivation of Born’s rule since all objec-
tive and impersonal experimental data can be explained
without it. Therefore, we arrived at an important recog-
nition that problems in MWI related to probability and
the Born rule are again the same problems of subjective
experience and of the unwarranted assumption that func-
tioning of automata by itself produces consciousness (i.e.
of the negation of the hard problem).
It should be noted that also all “preferred basis” prob-
lems plaguing (to some degree) MW interpretations im-
mediately go away once we replace agents with subjective
experience by philosophical zombies, even without resort-
ing to decoherence: as the global wavefunction is real and
it anyhow does not induce subjective experience, it is as
real in any of the bases and there is no need to look for
a preferred one (singled out by decoherence or not).
Thus, remarkably, replacing agents with philosophical
zombies in the many-world scenario solves all its prob-
lems. The wavefunction only evolves and changes its
form. This certainly produces ever new and more en-
tangled forms of the global wavefunction, but of course,
does not produce any experience – actually a very natu-
ral and logical assumption. There is no need to introduce
additional postulates, not even to derive Born rule.
But it is that “illusion” of subjective perception of a
single outcome which we experience in practice and which
introduces the notion of probability and demands the
Born rule: the rule is necessary in order to explain out-
comes of subjective experiments, to account for “what
I’ve perceived”, and is not needed for explanation of
impersonal, objective experiments. Curiously, or maybe
expectedly, what then introduces the problems in MWI
is actually insisting that these wavefunctions of zombie-
agents (i.e. of some particle configurations) should be
miraculously endowed with the subjective perception, i.e.
insisting that it must be possible also to assume the
first-person perspective and have experimental predic-
tions from this personal vantage point. We saw that there
is one clear-cut logical solution of how to consistently es-
tablish the relative state (or many-worlds) formulation –
i.e. the one with philosophical zombies. However, the
proponents of these QM interpretations would like to
assume that there is yet another solution, which incor-
porates subjective experiences (but without postulating
consciousness as some fundamental entity as in Many-
minds interpretation). However, for this latter part, they
do not provide any arguments (just take it for granted),
whereas this very part turns out to be quite tricky, as we
have pointed out and as is manifest through the ongoing
debate on MWI foundations.
As a side note, we see that the hard problem itself in
the quantum context is deeper and more palpable than
the same problem in the classical case – the difference
is that in QM switching from the objective perspective
into the first-person account must, unlike in the classi-
cal physics, introduce also breakdown of the determinism
of continuous evolution and result in appearance of sub-
jective discontinuity and chance. As we have pointed
out above, without the notion of subjective experience
in MW interpretations it is difficult to introduce notions
of probability and randomness. On the other hand, it is
this discontinuity and randomness that we observe in the
experiments, since all experiments can be only performed
and analyzed subjectively in the end. This aspect of the
hard problem was not present in the classical physics: op-
ponents of the hard problem could far more easily negate
the very existence of the subjective experience since there
was not this qualitative difference between determinism
and chance which subjective experience was supposed to
bridge. Is much harder here than it was in the classical
paradigm to reconcile the internal, personal viewpoint
with the “impersonal” objective one where nothing is left
to chance and everything is continuous. For all these rea-
sons, it is overall more difficult to ignore the hard problem
in the quantum case, and this reflects in the philosophi-
cal obstacles to discard the collapse postulate and in the
history of the subjective elements of interpretations of
the quantum mechanics since its advent.
Once we have established this essential connection be-
tween the hard and the measurement problem, we may
also recognize that some other related concepts from cog-
nitive science have their counterparts in the QM. For
example, the “other minds problem” (the impossibility
to prove whether other agents possess subjective expe-
riences, already discussed in Part I) translates into im-
possibility to objectively prove if and when the collapse
occurs from the vantage point of someone else, who is
informationally isolated from us (i.e. in spite that Al-
ice will later report perceiving a single spin projection
measurement outcome, we expect all objective experi-
ments to confirm her to exist in the superposition state
(2) ). Also, the Searle’s problem of how syntax could ever
produce semantics (i.e. how “meaning” can arise from
manipulations with symbols or from complex but per se
meaningless motion of some matter), in QM context can
be traced to the puzzle of how is it possible that a bunch
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of particles, having superposed, smeared properties and
undergoing unitary evolution can form an observer from
whose vantage point the collapse occurs and turns prob-
abilistic potentialities into actualized reality. But we will
not further elaborate on these connections here.
To sum up our previous conclusions: the hard physi-
calist line on the subjective perception implies that the
collapse postulate is superfluous, but it also goes the
other way round – MWI explicitly requires (and thus im-
plies) presumption that subjective experience is a neces-
sary byproduct of functioning of an automaton, therefore,
one position does not go without the other; accepting of
the collapse postulate demands also recognition of the
hard problem in some form; due to the gap between the
subjectively perceived randomness and the determinism
of the objective (from an external viewpoint) wavefunc-
tion evolution, the hard problem is more difficult to ig-
nore in QM; illustration of the previous conclusion is the
fact that philosophical zombies automatically solve all
the riddles posed by MW formulation, while it is the in-
troduction of the subjective experience hypothesis that
lies in the core of the foundational controversies of the
MW theories; the established relation between the hard
and the measurement problems allows us also to trans-
late some other concepts, such as “other minds problem”
and “syntax is not semantics” from cognitive science into
QM.
Of these conclusions, it is particularly indisputable
(not only because it is explicitly stated by both the Ev-
erett and DeWitt) that QM interpretations of the second
class, which seek to discard the collapse postulate, rely
heavily on the assumption that functioning of an automa-
ton can, per se, elicit subjective experiences. Even with-
out our no-go theorem, which we did not yet take into
account in the above analysis, the last hypothesis opens
many conceptual problems in MW formulations. But the
derived no-go theorem makes the case for MW theories
much worse, since the theorem’s most probable implica-
tion is that this vital tenet of MW views is entirely irra-
tional and hard to logically sustain. It is true, however,
that the no-go theorem was derived within the paradigm
of the classical physics, whereas, strictly speaking, Ev-
erett’s class of formulations relies on the idea that it is
the wavefunction corresponding to the automaton which
should be capable to produce subjective experience. But,
unless a strong argument could be constructed as to why
would a wavefunction of an automaton have more poten-
tial to produce subjective experience than the automaton
itself, the conclusion of the no-go theorem provides a seri-
ous counterargument for this class of QM interpretations.
In fact, proponents of the De Broglie-Bohm interpreta-
tion find the opposite more reasonable: in the pilot-wave
formulation the objective unitary evolution of a brain
wavefunction alone does not give rise to subjective expe-
rience – it is only the term of the superposition occupied
by hypothetical “real” particles which corresponds to ac-
tual experiences.17 In the end, not only that the class of
MW interpretations fails to offer any novel potential for
the explanation of the existence of the subjective expe-
rience (a quality that must be on the list of attributes
of a plausible interpretation), but it turns out that the
no-go theorem likely invalidates a pivotal presumption
on which these interpretations hinge.
Finally, what about the first class of interpretations,
containing views which incorporate the collapse postu-
late – do these interpretations provide a solution to the
hard problem? That would be quite peculiar, since not
only that almost none of the proponents of these interpre-
tations advocates these views as solutions to the problem
of subjective experience, but most of them are seemingly
totally unaware of the entire context of the cognitive hard
problem.
Nevertheless, we first need to notice that the line of rea-
soning of the no-go theorem definitely can be no longer
applied within the paradigm of any of these interpreta-
tions. It is not just that the dynamics of the classical
physics is replaced by the unitary evolution of the wave-
function given by the Schro¨dinger’s equation – as we have
already argued, this difference alone could hardly bring
us closer to any resolution.
The first potentially relevant difference is the intro-
duction of indeterminism. However, this step alone also
does not seem to be sufficient to allow for the existence
of consciousness. If we simply supplement mechanistic
materialism of classical physics with an element of ran-
domness, then the resulting non-deterministic dynamics
of the brain could be accounted for, in the theorem(s),
by its simulation on a non-deterministic computer, and
later represented by a nondeterministic Turing machine.
It is known that a non-deterministic Turing machine is
equivalent to a deterministic Turing machine endowed
with an additional tape with predefined random numbers
(each time an evaluation should depend upon a chance,
a random input is obtained from this auxiliary tape).
In this way, it seems to be possible to repeat the same
proof of the no-go theorem also for a non-deterministic
equivalent of the classical paradigm. The point is that
such a stochastic mechanicism is difficult to differentiate
from deterministic mechanicism with (nonlocal) hidden
variables: every element of chance can be, in principle,
explained by (nonlocal) interaction with some degrees of
17 While the many-world supporters believe that any term in su-
perposition containing an active brain state generates subjective
experiences, the pilot-wave adherents hold that all problems re-
lated to such assumption are somehow solved by a claim that
filling the wavefunction branch by real particles is what brings
the subjective experience into existence. Both groups imply that
these, mutually contradicting, positions go without saying and
it is particularly puzzling that none of them feels prompted to
provide any arguments in their favor. It seems that each group
erroneously takes for granted that neuro and cognitive science
have already solved these issues with a conclusion that somehow
supports exactly their hypothesis.
24
freedom inaccessible to us. It is very hard to motivate
why such dynamics would be qualitatively different from
the one discussed in the no-go theorem (even if the source
of this randomness would be external to the physical uni-
verse).
Nonetheless, an important aspect of abandoning the
determinism lies in the informational content of the uni-
verse. Namely, common for all causally-deterministic
models is that the existing information encoded in the
state of the universe never changes, and is already con-
tained in the initial conditions.18 In certain (informa-
tional) sense, in any deterministic universe, nothing re-
ally new ever happens. In every new moment, we have
the same old content merely represented (rewritten) us-
ing slightly different coding rules than before. This was
very much evident in our deterministic-brain simulator
in the form the sand-symbols Turing machine (in Part
I): all the rows of calculation progress were already con-
tained in the first row with the initial data, and this entire
simulated-brain evolution was no more that a sort of “un-
zipping” of the information packed in the first line, pro-
ducing essentially nothing new (this is exactly why the
information content, in the Kolmogorov’s sense, by defi-
nition remains the same during computation). Formally
quantum-mechanically, it is even less than that – time
evolution can be accounted for by mere unitary change
(a sort of rotation) of the Hilbert space basis vectors. Any
appearance of new information, as already discussed in
the context of class two interpretations, can be at most
just a local illusion of an agent which perceives only her
branch of the global wavefunction (and, if so, it must be
explained how and why this illusion arises).
Contrary to that, the collapse postulate axiomatically
introduces the emergence of new information, as the re-
sult of a measurement, whenever the probability of the
outcome was less than one. Which of the possible out-
comes will actualize – that piece of information which
we obtain upon the measurement – was not previously
present at all in the universe. This emergence is seen by
Wheeler (and often repeated by A. Zeilinger) as “an ele-
mentary act of creation” [50]. Still, without more serious
modifications of the ontology, the new information might
be simply coming from some pre-supplied source, e.g. like
from that additional random Turing tape, and whether
the “location” of this information source (tape) would
be within our universe or external to it, could hardly in-
fluence our earlier conclusions. Therefore, to change the
18 No new information (in Kolmogorov’s sense) can appear if the
universe is in every future moment uniquely determined by its
present state. However, strictly speaking, for the information
to be unchanging it is also necessary that past can be uniquely
reconstructed from the present, which is a requirement that was
satisfied by all major deterministic models in physics so far.
Without this, the amount of information could reduce as time
progresses. Some other subtleties which may arise here in the
context of General relativity we find of no relevance.
no-go theorem’s verdict about consciousness and to per-
haps grant some real significance to indeterminism itself,
we need a much more momentous change than the mere
introduction of randomness.
And the room for a true and relevant paradigm shift
lies in the fact that the interpretations of the first class
effectively (if not always explicitly) give up the idea that
the first-person account of events is logically derivable
from the third-person perspective, i.e. from the evolution
of the wave function alone. An entirely new postulate is
introduced to explain the internal perspective, relative to
the observer/system. When and whether the collapse oc-
curs is only relative to the observer (i.e. subjective), and
even the mere existence of the generally agreeable facts
(i.e. of the “facts of the world” in Brukner’s formula-
tion19) is thus brought under dispute. In general, for the
views of the first class, it is then also the wavefunction
which becomes relative to the observer, not having an
objective ontological reality which is otherwise ascribed
to it by the interpretations from the second class. It
is the actualized quantum events, as seen and as exist-
ing from the relative perspectives of observers/systems,
which are granted ontological existence, while the wave-
function turns more into a bookkeeping aid to predict
probabilities of future events, given the previous ones. It
should be also stressed that even with the use of the col-
lapse postulate an observer can only infer things about
his exterior: any attempt even from him to closely and
mathematically follow own internal state and rigorously
deduce how his own subjective experiences arise, seems to
be fundamentally hampered by the impossibility of com-
plete self-measurement (the later impossibility is derived
in the context of relational interpretations [51]). These
differences are now sufficient for the complete break-
down of the no-go theorem derivation. We can no longer
speak at all about the “emergence” of the internal, sub-
jective observer/system perspective from the objective,
third-person perspective system dynamics. This inter-
nal perspective is here taken to be fundamental and non-
derivable, seemingly both from the external and from the
internal viewpoint.
However, it should be immediately made clear that
interpretations of the second class do not necessarily im-
pose any anthropocentric element, that the word “subjec-
tive” might resonate with. One must either accept that
a human can be also seen as a complex system of atoms,
or must seek some extensions of physics (and we have
many times expressed our belief that the latter is not
necessary). It is thus a reasonable position that the right
to this fundamental, non-derivable internal perspective
thus should be granted in some way also to other sys-
tems apart from humans (or animals), notwithstanding
19 It is there disputed that “one can jointly assign truth values
to the statements about observed outcomes (‘facts’) by different
observers” [14].
25
the fact that the complexity of the human system (and
of the brain in particular) introduces new qualitative fea-
tures to this internal perspective. Relational interpreta-
tion is a good example: it is there mostly understood
that every (quantum) system is entitled to a referential
role and the collapse (i.e. quantum events) can happen
from its frame of reference. The exact word “subjec-
tive” hardly ever appears in the context of this inter-
pretation – the role of this word is usually taken by the
notion of observer relative events/facts, where observer
can be in principle any system and the relativity is more
understood in a similar way as in Einstein’s theory of
relativity.20 For example, while the length of a rod is ob-
server (inertial frame) dependent in the special relativity,
this is not (at least not commonly) seen as an indica-
tion that the rod or its length is in any way subjective
or not objectively real. Though this is in part a mat-
ter of terminology, there are some important differences
between the relativity of the rod length and the observer-
dependence of the collapse, which lend more justification
to the use of the word “subjective” in the latter than in
the former case. In the former case the description of
the reality will be to some extent different for different
observers – however, each of these descriptions is suffi-
cient to account for all elements of reality: each observer
can reconstruct how the reality looks from the aspect of
another one since each of the perspectives in principle
contain the same mutually-nonconflicting information.21
Was it the case that the rod did not exist at all in one
referential frame, while existing in the other, that would
certainly raise more doubts about the rod’s objective ex-
istence. But that exactly seems to be the case with the
collapse: in configurations of the Wigner’s friend type
[6], when an observer is performing a measurement of
a quantum system while being sealed in a box, the col-
lapse she observes does not occur at all (i.e. does not
exist) from the outside-the-box perspective. Also: while
in relativity the perspective and the properties of reality
depend on kinematic (geometric) properties of the refer-
ential (coordinate) system, in the case of the collapse we
can only vaguely relate it to the “internal” perspective
of a physical system. Combined together, these differ-
ences intuitively give more grounds for the use of the
word “subjective” in the case of collapse, though, in the
end, it certainly comes down to the precise definition of
this word.
In any case, in all interpretations of the first class
20 We actually do not think that there should be any fundamental,
low-level difference between these two concepts. Below we even
discuss a view that subjectivity of the collapse event, i.e. the fact
that it may occur for one observer but not for the other, can be
replaced by temporal relativity of when the subjective experience
arises.
21 We will not here discuss special cases in General relativity, such
as observers falling into a black hole and alike, but it can be
argued that their case is also different from the relativity of col-
lapse.
lurks a possibility to slightly intuitively extend this no-
tion of the fundamental non-deducible and irreducible
observer/quantum system right to internal perspective
in order to recognize that the same phenomenon might
be essential for the subjective perspective and the subjec-
tive experience in common sense. And in this possibility
lies the potential to not merely avoid the conclusion of
the no-go theorem but also to somehow account for the
existence of consciousness. Therefore, in our opinion, the
least what can be said for the interpretations from the
first class is that they leave a room for some future ex-
planation of consciousness, unlike, it seems, the rest of
here considered QM interpretations. In the modern ter-
minology, we could dub the first class as hard-problem
“solution ready” interpretations, in the sense that the
formalism of physics is potentially ready to handle, i.e.
incorporate an explanation of the existence of subjective
experience in a sort of natural, seamless way.
This main idea can be pursued further, towards some
more concrete hypotheses on how consciousness can be
understood. That is the subject of the next section.
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PART III: GETTING CLOSER TO THE
HARD-PROBLEM SOLUTION
The main motive in this section is to demonstrate, by
providing a sketch of some logically consistent solutions,
the potential of the first class interpretations to take us
closer to the resolution of the hard problem. The ideas
presented in this section are of a more speculative nature
and should be rather seen only as possible options on how
to proceed from here.
As we have already announced, an obvious path to
follow is to recognize the existence of this non-derivable
internal perspective, inherent to the collapse postulate,
as the essence also of the phenomenon of subjective expe-
rience in the every-day meaning of the word. Therefore,
the subjective experience, i.e. the consciousness, in its
core has to be then seen as a fundamental, non-derivable
concept, too.
Of course, the inner perspective of the type we were
referring to so far cannot be alone sufficient to manifest
high-level consciousness of human type (with its stan-
dard traits such as the internal monologue, sense of self,
phenomenal experiences, emotions...). While consider-
ing the functioning of the brain as seen from the external
perspective seems to be insufficient to explain or infer the
existence of the subjective experience of the brain-owner
(without having to postulate the internal perspective of
systems), brain certainly does play a huge role in shaping
the form of these experiences. The postulated existence
of the “internal perspective” appears here only a nec-
essary, but certainly not sufficient, prerequisite for the
existence of human-like subjective experience.22
This relation of internal and external perspectives in
the context of subjective experience obviously begs for
further explanation. We must consider it first on the
low, quantum mechanical level and clarify how is it pos-
sible that the wavefunction collapse can occur internally,
but does not happen from the external viewpoint. Next,
we must discuss the same relation on a higher, cognitive
level by addressing how and why agent’s subjective expe-
rience of the world and of her own actions coincide with
the external description of that agent, when seen as a
complex particle system. The latter problem is particu-
larly nontrivial if we want to renounce the epiphenomenal
views on the consciousness and allow for the existence of
free will – which is philosophically certainly more prefer-
able position if can be logically reconciled with the laws
of physics. After that, we will discuss in which way the
expounded framework might potentially lead to an ex-
22 Some researchers suggest that this internal perspective, which
could be understood as a sort of “pure” consciousness stripped
off all personal human features, should be called differently to
avoid confusion. E.g. C. Stoica suggests the word “sentience”
in this context, while the word “proto-consciousness” might be
suitable but is sometimes used in a relation to panpsychism and
thus with a somewhat different meaning.
planation of consciousness capable to pass the test of the
no-go theorem.
Reconciling different perspectives – quantum
mechanical level
When we consider human-like agents as physical sys-
tems (i.e. as seen externally), they possess many internal
physical degrees of freedom (located in agent’s memory)
which correlate with the external degrees of freedom (in
the environment). If represented by a wave function this
correlation is modeled as in (2), where |Alice±〉 corre-
sponds to the state of the agent’s internal memory de-
grees of freedom which are entangled with the external
degrees of the measurement device |device±〉. (In gen-
eral, there can be more terms in superposition, with vary-
ing multipliers, or just a single term.) We also note that
this type of entanglement between the agent and the en-
vironment is not only initiated via agent senses, but also
the other way around: via behavioral responses and via
different forms of involuntary leaking of information from
the agent, her internal states leave a certain imprint on
the environment. However, once we have adopted views
of the first class, we should not see the superposition and
entanglement of (2) as any real entity – it is just a part of
mathematical procedure helpful to calculate probabilities
of future measurement outcomes.
This was the external description and, in addition, we
must also incorporate the postulated non-derivable inter-
nal perspective. There seems to exist a direct correlation,
a sort of mapping between the physical degrees of free-
dom localized in Alice’s brain (as seen externally) and
Alice’s internal subjective experience. We may say that
Alice is in some sense aware of her brain state (or of a
part of it).We will return shortly to the question of how
the existence of such a correlation could be explained.
Via this correlation of subjective experiences and brain
states, where the latter are further correlated with the
environment, Alice forms a subjective internal represen-
tation of the external world. As these subjective expe-
riences (constituting the internal representation) are by
definition well defined, real and do never exist in any sort
of “superposition of qualia”, by the virtue of this chain
of correlations also certain external degrees of freedom
(such as the device pointer position and the z projection
of particle spin) become well defined and real from Al-
ice’s perspective. This she recognizes as the wavefunction
collapse.
It is worthwhile to stress a few points. First, it is wrong
to apply classical intuition about the time ordering of the
cause and effect when it comes to collapse: in the spirit of
Wheelers delayed-choice effect [52], there is nothing con-
tradictory in the fact that Allice can, from her vantage
point, actualize events in her arbitrarily remote past by
experiencing them in the present. Secondly, the collapse
here is not objective, in the sense that for another agent,
e.g. Bob, neither Alice nor the device has to be in a well
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defined classical state – they become well defined and ac-
tualized for him only as these states get entangled with
his internal degrees of freedom and he subjectively expe-
riences them (this is in clear contrast with the objective
collapse in the Penrose-Hameroff orchestrated objective
reduction [8], or in the Wigner’s consciousness causes col-
lapse hypotheses [6]).
Due to this latter reason, perspectives of different
agents on the very occurrence of the collapse can be
directly conflicting and reconciling them is a nontrivial
problem – and one that potentially leads to profound
implications. The problem most seriously surfaces in the
form of the Wigner’s friend type of paradoxes [6], which,
according to some authors, jeopardize the very founda-
tions of QM and question its consistency [53]. We share
the majority view that there are many ways to consis-
tently deal with this ostensible contradiction (without
altering the mathematical formalism of QM), as we have
discussed in detail in [15]. Here we will only summa-
rize some main points from that paper which deals with
the Wigner’s friend paradox, to the extent that will be
needed later in our analysis.
Alice, in the initial state described by (1), can have
the role of the Wigner’s friend if we assume that she is
enclosed in an ideally insulating box. Let us denote that
initial moment corresponding to state (1) as t0, while
at some future moment t1 Alice performs the spin mea-
surement and learns its z-axis projection. Bob, who here
plays the role of the Wigner in the original setup [6], is
outside of the box and from his vantage point, after t1,
the system in the box (including Alice) must be in the en-
tangled state given by (2) – we do not consider objective
collapse models, so there cannot be other options. At
moment t2 Bob performs in-practice-impossibly-delicate
and yet in-principle-feasible quantum interference mea-
surement on the entire box content (which includes mea-
surement of Alice’s brain quantum state), by which he
experimentally proves that Alice is indeed in the super-
position state given by (2). Note that since the state
(2) is an eigenstate of his measurement, the measure-
ment actually does not alter at all this prior state of
the system in the box. On the other hand, had the col-
lapse occurred objectively at t1, then from his and ev-
ery other perspective at time t1 state in the box would
have turned either into |Alice+〉|device+〉|Z+〉 or into
|Alice−〉|device−〉|Z−〉, and he would have mere 50 per-
cent chances to measure the superposition state (2). Fi-
nally, in [15] we argued that of utmost importance for
the understanding of this scenario is also the moment t3
when Alice eventually leaves the box and tells Bob which
outcome she perceived.
The views of different interpretations about this sce-
nario largely diverge. The tricky part is how to address
the question “what did Alice experience in between t1
and t2?” (at t2 Bob must perform the measurement on
Alice’s brain, so it is beyond the point to discuss what
that part of the experience might be like, or whether Al-
ice has to be sedated for this hypothetical operation).
Namely, both classes of interpretations agree what the
description of the events and the outcome of the experi-
ment must be from Bob’s point of view: quantum evolu-
tion of the system in the box is unitary (for him), state
in the box is after t1 described by (2), which he experi-
mentally confirms with certainty at t2 and, finally, at t3
he is told by Alice that at t1 she either measured spin
up or spin down (with equal probabilities). However, the
outcome that she finally reports (together with the con-
tent of her memory regarding the experiment that she
had carried out at t1) was somehow decided at t3, since
at t2 she was confirmed to be in the superposition (2),
and the interference measurement must have erased any
trace in the brain of any particular outcomes occurring at
t1, if these existed. The only thing that is under dispute
is what she has subjectively experienced after t1.
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According to the MWI, there are simply two Alices in
two worlds (branches), each experiencing one of the spin
outcomes at t1. These branches recombine in a predictive
way during the interference experiment at t2 and finally
split again once for all at t3. Of course, in this view, no
collapse occurs, apart from as subjective illusions of the
“two” Alices.
The interpretations of the first class at this point do not
concur even among themselves. The QBist view might
be seen as a sort of agnostic in this regard.24 Relational
and Brukner’s interpretation [12–14] would imply that at
t1 Alice performs the measurement and thus the collapse
occurs, but only from her perspective. She reads out a
single well-defined outcome and, unlike in MWI, there is
no other Alice in another branch obtaining the other out-
come. Accordingly, she also experiences the perception of
a single outcome, in spite that no outcome is ever singled
out at t1 from Bob’s perspective. In Bob’s reality nei-
ther “up” nor “down” in any sense happen at this point,
none of these two possibilities is preferred or realized,
no matter that this bit of “up-or-down” information was
23 Already at this point we find the Wigner’s friend type of para-
doxes to be very peculiar in this context, as such paradoxes ac-
tually completely depend on the existence of subjective experi-
ence: if one refrains from questioning how the events look from
the first-person viewpoint (of the Wigner’s friend), the problem
entirely disappears.
24 C. A. Fuchs in [11] explains: “It is just that quantum theory
provides a calculus for gambling on each agents own experiences
– it doesnt give anything else than that. It certainly doesnt
give one agent the ability to conceptually pierce the other agents
personal experience.”
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indeed created in Alice’s world.25 In the view of these
interpretations, the paradox here is only superficial since
“there are no general facts of the world” [14] and talking
about what had or had not ever happened makes sense
only given the precise reference system. This further im-
plies that there is a huge number (probably infinitely
many) of different worlds corresponding to different (in-
formational) reference systems, each with its own “facts”
being real (which slightly reminds of the infinite number
of realities in MWI).
Finally, in [15] we have pointed to a specific reading of
the standard textbook QM interpretation which allows
us to retain the comfort of single reality and of generally
valid facts of the world. Of course, some price has to be
paid, since we have pointed out many times that the col-
lapse in the interpretations of the first class is necessary
to some extent subjective (i.e. observer relative). But
instead of seeing as relative what has become real (as ac-
cording to the “no objective facts of the world” motto),
the other option is to accept as relative only when events
become real. This should come at a lesser price since we
are already used to the relative nature of time, thanks to
Einstein.
The key element is to consistently apply the idea that
the events become decided and in the full sense real only
upon the collapse. In particular, this means that, from
Bob’s perspective, the entire Alice’s spin measurement
activity and her accompanying subjective experience can
not be decided and real prior to the final moment “t3”
when he became correlated with Alice and the outcome.
For anyone outside the box, including Bob, it makes no
sense to ask what were Alice’s experiences at the moment
t1: the answer can be neither that she perceived one of
the outcomes (as in Rovelli/Brukner), nor both outcomes
(as in MWI). None of these hypothetical noncorrelated
and informationally disconnected events have become a
part of Bob’s reality until t3.
To the extent that it makes sense at all to speak about
Alice’s first-person subjective experience from the third-
person perspective of Bob, we may say that these experi-
ences become real at t3, together with the corresponding
events that happened in the box and collapsed into re-
ality just at that moment. This does not introduce any
inconsistencies since these are experiences of Alice hav-
ing seen the well-defined outcome when her wristwatch
showed time t1 – so Alice’s memory and personal recol-
lections, though decided and actualized at t3 (from Bob’s
25 Note that whatever she perceived at t1 has nothing to do with
the outcome she finally reports at t3 – in the meanwhile she has
undergone the interference measurement in the basis which is
incompatible with well-defined outcome at t1, and any outcome
she reports at t3 must have been “decided” anew somewhere in
between t2 and t3. However, if the outcomes she perceived at
t1 and t3 are not necessarily the same, then it is unclear what
and when causes the possible switch in the perception since the
interference measurement, as noted before, does not alter the
Alice quantum state.
perspective), are consistent with the time-line in which
she performed the measurement at t1. Rather than see-
ing this explanation as if Alice was, from Bob’s perspec-
tive, in a sort of “suspended animation”26 from t0 until
t3, we may understand it by arguing that it is pointless
to speak about time synchronization of events in total
absence of any physical flow of information which could
maintain this synchronization. In this case, there is no,
by assumption, any flow of information outwards corre-
lating events inside the box with the outside timeline –
such a flow would make events inside both real and truly
positioned in time (and space) also from the outside per-
spective (discussion of the experimental setup in presence
of partial informational flow, such as in Deutch variant,
can be also found in [15]).
From Alice’s perspective, she subjectively perceived
the spin measurement outcome at the moment when her
watch showed time t1, without experiencing any weird
gaps, and the outcome she perceived is the same one
that she later reports to Bob at t3 (the same outcome
that was, from Bob’s perspective, undecided all the time
until t3). Of course, she experienced the measurement
only once, and that outcome is the one she remembers
from then on (which does not seem to be necessarily the
case in the Brukner’s view, where perceived outcome at
t1 and the one remembered after t3 may differ). Nothing
in her subjective experience was altered by the fact that
she was enclosed in the box and that Bob performed the
measurement on her brain (we remind that this measure-
ment did not introduce any change in the wavefunction).
She would have had exactly the same experience of the
spin measurement with or without the box surrounding
her. Neither was her subjective experience somehow “ob-
jectively” postponed until the moment t3 – such assertion
would be impossible to prove by any measurement and
thus would be unphysical.27 For all these reasons noth-
ing changes even if we enclose Bob, together with Alice,
in yet another much larger box, or if we ask ourselves
if there is an “exterior” observer keeping us in the box
right now.
In this way, the laws of QM are preserved both from
Alice’s and from the Bob’s viewpoint and the confu-
sion can arise only if Alice mistakenly applies the per-
ceived subjective collapse as something objective, which
should then pertain also to Bob’s measurements (and
thus erroneously conclude that he should obtain super-
position state (2) outcome with only 1/2 probability).
Intuitively, this view perhaps goes best together with the
Wheeler’s idea of the participatory universe (Participa-
26 The term used by Wigner himself in his paper [6].
27 This aspect can be compared to the situation of an observer
falling into a black hole: in spite of the fact that the infalling
observer will cross the horizon only after infinity of time as mea-
sured by a distant observer, it by no means implies that he is
bound to “wait” or be “suspended” for infinity until he experi-
ences the crossing.
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tory Anthropic Principle): observers exist and through
their mutual interaction they co-create a single shared re-
ality, or, in Wheelers own words “the observations of all
the participators, past, present and future, join together
to define what we call ‘reality’ ” [10]. It is the logical
consistency constraints that give rise to the seemingly
objective and persistent properties of the external world
– the idea which Wheeler used to illustrate by likening
reality to his variant of the “twenty questions” game: one
player tries to guess the imagined object by posing (up
to 20) yes-no questions, but in Wheeler’s version, the
players who answer are playing a trick on him – there
is actually no well-defined, decided object at the begin-
ning, it is only the questions and the required logical
consistency of otherwise random answers that gradually
define and shape the object [54]. This Wheeler’s view is
inseparable from his “it from bit” doctrine, where infor-
mation replaces concept of matter at the heart of reality:
“Otherwise put, every ‘it’ – every particle, every field
of force, even the spacetime continuum itself – derives
its function, its meaning, its very existence entirely –
even if in some contexts indirectly – from the apparatus-
elicited answers to yes-or-no questions, binary choices,
bits. It-from-bit symbolizes the idea that every item of
the physical world has at bottom – a very deep bottom,
in most instances – an immaterial source and explana-
tion; that which we call reality arises in the last analysis
from the posing of yes-no questions and the registering
of equipment-evoked responses; in short, that all things
physical are information-theoretic in origin and that this
is a participatory universe.”[9] Thus, the information the
observers obtain from measurements – which in this con-
text means the information which is, in the end, sub-
jectively perceived – is the only true reality, unlike the
objects themselves which only derive their existence and
properties from that information. Since reality is here
unique (as opposed both to MWI and “no facts of the
world” views) and there is a presumed symmetry be-
tween the observers (i.e. participants) of which all ob-
serve the same laws of QM, it seems to us that the above
understanding of the Wigner’s friend scenario is the only
one that fits the premises. Besides, it seems more nat-
ural in this framework to accept that, in the absence of
any mutual interaction, subjective timelines of different
participants simply are not commensurable at all (e.g. if
there was never interaction between two sets of observer-
participants, these would effectively exist in two unre-
lated universes, and it would be completely pointless to
ever ask what the participant from one group experiences
at a given time measured by the time-scale of the other
universe).
As already noted, a more detailed analysis of Wigner’s
friend scenario along these lines can be found in [15].
In this context, however, we just needed to underline
this possibility to preserve observer-independence of the
“facts of the world” while relativizing and making subjec-
tive only the “when” of the collapse – as this option will
be later important in the relation to the hard problem.
Reconciling different perspectives – cognitive level
On the higher, cognitive level, once we have recognized
the essence of consciousness to be fundamental and non-
derivable from the external viewpoint, there is a prob-
lem of explaining the intimate connection between the
internal subjective experiences and the externally visi-
ble behavior of the conscious agents. On one side, this
external behavior is (at least it certainly seems to be)
entirely explainable in terms of dynamics of matter (i.e.
of the brain functioning). When seen as a complex parti-
cle system, as a “quantum-automaton”, probabilities for
different responses of an agent to a given stimulus should
be predictable by computation (i.e. we should be able,
in principle, to simulate unitary evolution of the entire
agent-system state and calculate probabilities of the var-
ious responses). The functioning of “quantum automa-
ton” Alice, as seen from external, e.g. Bob’s perspective,
should obey laws of physics, in particular, it should not
violate Born rule.28 And these explicable and predictable
(at the level of probabilities!) external properties should
somehow perfectly correlate with subjective properties,
i.e. experiences. The root of this connection on the brain
level is called “neural correlates of consciousness” (NCC).
Historically first and natural hypothesis about NCC was
that the physical dynamics of neurons not only correlates
with, but directly and per se produces the subjective ex-
periences. Yet, we have seen that this idea inevitably
faces the explanatory gap which seems to be impossible
to bridge (to explain how motions turn into qualia), and
this problem we tried to formalize as much as possible
via the no-go theorem. Alternatively, by taking the path
tacitly suggested by QM interpretations of the first class,
the neural correlates of consciousness should be taken to
be exactly that – merely correlates, expressing the com-
patibility of internal and external perspectives, in other
words, as a sort of consistency constraints.
And in spite of the presence of perfect correlations,
we stress once more that the very existence of the inter-
nal perspective does not logically follow from the exter-
nal description of an agent, and cannot be derived from
it. The external description provides a consistent, self-
sufficient account of the external behavior of any consid-
ered agent, which is neither sufficient to predict detailed
qualities of internal experiences (e.g. if subjective expe-
rience of “red” is the same among different agents), nor
even to prove that these internal experiences exist at all
(external description is entirely consistent also with the
philosophical zombie hypothesis). Thus, left only to ex-
ternal observation, we can never positively and rigorously
prove even that any other minds apart from our own exist
28 We will take this for granted, though, in principle, this is yet to
be verified by the neuroscience. On the other hand, if the Born
rule is violated in the brain, than we need new physics to explain
why a lump of matter called brain defies a basic physical law.
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(and we have to resort to various different philosophical
arguments to discard the solipsist option [37]). As noted
before, this is known as the “other minds problem” and
is, as the denomination “problem” suggests, usually seen
as an obstacle which requires some sort of solution (e.g.
the hope that pursuing investigation of neural correlates
of consciousness could someday prove that subjective ex-
periences indeed arise as a consequence of neural func-
tions).
Instead of seeing this perfect correlation as a problem
that awaits for an explanation, we believe it should be
pronounced a basic principle, in other words, elevated
to the level of “other minds postulate” pivotal for the
existence of the Universe as we know it.29 The postu-
late might be formulated as: “In a Universe inhabited by
conscious beings, laws of physics must be such to allow
complete consistency of internal (i.e. subjective) and ex-
ternal perspectives”. In other words, it must be possible
to explain externally visible behavior of agents solely on
the grounds of dynamics of physical systems, and, at the
same time, that behavior also has to make sense from the
internal side, that is, it has to be subjectively experienced
as stemming from conscious decisions. This “other minds
postulate” necessitates the “other minds problem”: the
physical laws must allow different minds (observers) to fit
into reality (or each others realities) so seamlessly, con-
sistently and without violating physical dynamics, that
it must be impossible to “objectively” prove existence of
the subjective experience.
At this point we must make an important distinction:
imposing the “other minds postulate” does not introduce
anything quite new if we take consciousness to be an
epiphenomenon. In that case it is trivial to reconcile
subjective experience with the external description of the
agent, simply because then it is the external dynamics
(in combination with chance or not) which alone drives
agent’s responses to stimuli, where, on the other side, the
subjective experience merely follows the events as they
unfold and what we perceive as agency is just an illusion.
On the other hand, the idea of epiphenomenal con-
sciousness was never a natural one: it contradicts our
subjective perception that we are influencing our behav-
ior and thus it must be artificially introduced. It was
a logical hypothesis in the settings where also the en-
tire subjective experience was a sort of illusion itself,
but once we were forced to give up the latter idea, this
assumption about free will lost much of its plausibility.
Assuming epiphenomenalism, if not by necessity, would
be against the logic of Occam’s razor. Indeed, the ra-
tionale behind epiphenomenalism was always the strong
belief that the laws of physics simply leave no room for
29 This type of twist can be seen as borrowed from Einstein’s rea-
soning, where we try to mimic the way he turned the problem
of how to explain the apparent constancy of the light speed in
Michelson-Morley experiments into the basic axiom of its con-
stancy.
anything else. First it was the determinism of classical
physics that ruled out any possibility of free will. Nowa-
days, it is still generally held that nothing has changed in
this regard in spite of quantum mechanics. Indeed, if in-
determinism of QM is understood superficially, as a mere
introduction of chance into physical dynamics, then it is
true that brute randomness no more reflects any “free
will” than the unwavering necessity of determinism: ei-
ther random or predetermined – it is not free in any case.
It is therefore exceedingly important to notice that our
current paradigm is very much different in this sense.
The recognition of this internal perspective, which is fun-
damental and not something that can be derived from
external properties, in combination with inherent inde-
terminism of physical laws used to predict the agent’s
external behavior, invalidates the above arguments and
naturally allows for the free will. Namely, randomness
observed in external behavior of an agent no longer im-
plies that the same behavior had to be also purely ran-
dom from the subjective perspective too. Actions of an
agent can be free from her internal perspective (within
the boundaries set by Born’s rule), and thus indeed truly
free, while from the external perspective this freedom
would be mathematically interpreted as the intrinsic ran-
domness of the quantum mechanics. It should be obvious
that adhering to the probabilistic Born rule in principle
still leaves immense freedom for the agency: there are
myriads of fairly probable outcome sequences of tossing
a coin thousand times, and each of these sequences rea-
sonably corresponds to a fair coin. Similarly, at almost
any moment there is a huge number of possible behav-
ioral responses of an agent, where all of them would be
externally indistinguishable from being random and in
compliance with the Born rule – just choosing among
these leaves more than enough room for true agency and
will.30 (Here we implied parting with the naive idea that
brain responses are deterministic in the classical sense:
not only that brain functioning seems to involve processes
that amplify low-level quantum randomness [55], but also
external stimuli certainly have quantum origins – some-
thing to which we will return below.) On the other hand,
while the freedom may exist, it must be limited in cer-
tain sense: we can imagine a human exposed only to ex-
tremely and artificially controlled stimuli and hooked up
to an advanced MRI machine capable of predicting prob-
abilities of behavioral responses – the free will would be
clearly constrained as the sequences of responses are not
expected to systematically violate predictions in statisti-
cal sense. For the same reason, our behavior and choices
have a very large predictable component, in spite of the
free will. However, in relation to the hypothetical MRI
machine, it is also important to note the following: the
30 Another way to see this is to presume the opposite: that obeying
the statistical Bohr’s rule leaves no freedom at all. However, that
could only mean that Bohr’s rule leads to fully predetermined
outcomes, which is obviously false.
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“amount” of free will an agent possesses is not necessar-
ily the same in the highly controlled conditions of the
MRI setup and in common, real-life conditions. The QM
taught us that the world is highly contextual, and that
many things depend on whether something is being mea-
sured or not – there is no reason to presume that the free
will is an exception.
Hence, since this paradigm does not prohibit free will,
it would be here very difficult to motivate the epiphenom-
enal stance. And this interplay of the randomness (from
the external perspective) and free will (from the internal
one), can be now seen as a nontrivial consequence of the
“other minds postulate”. Such postulate here automat-
ically put constraints both on the internal and external
“dynamics”: the external dynamics cannot be (fully) de-
terministic in order to leave a room for the subjective
freedom of conscious decisions (i.e. free will), while the
physical laws governing the external side of dynamics do
also constrain this free will to some extent (e.g. within
the bounds of satisfying probabilistic Born law). These
consistency constraints which allow for the free will of the
observers and, at the same time, maintain that internal
and external perspectives are in full accord, are necessar-
ily much less trivial than in the case of epiphenomenal-
ism. It could be argued that something very much like
the laws of quantum physics is necessary to accomplish
this, and, in this sense, one could hypothetically seek
to derive QM laws from the “other minds postulate”.31
On the other hand, universes with laws that cannot sat-
isfy the “other minds postulate” could maybe exist, but
could accommodate just one sentient perspective, like the
solipsistic universe of a dream.
The “other minds postulate” also resonates well with
Wheeler’s participatory universe idea: it only extends
the basic idea that the “answers” we obtain from mea-
surements must be consistent, however not only when
we observe particle properties and inanimate matter, but
also when we observe other observers. And there is little
doubt that Wheeler, when speaking about “observers”,
had in mind conscious agents in the fullest sense - i.e.
those capable of exerting their free will (e.g. when partici-
pating by posing the questions to the universe). Epiphe-
nomenalism actually makes no sense in his essentially
idealist world view.
Therefore, we have concluded that postulating the non-
derivable internal perspective has automatically opened
a door for (re)introducing the free will in a way that is
consistent with laws of physics. Alternatively, we can
31 It is here difficult to avoid the question of why there are then any
physical laws at all? Without further elaborating, we just note
that the existence of law(s) can be potentially explained as an un-
avoidable emergent effect, resulting from the fact that, otherwise
unconstrained, wills of different agents would be, in general, mu-
tually conflicting. Mathematically, this could be translated into
a requirement that newly created information is minimal, from
which it should be possible to derive statistical Born’s rule.
start from the “other minds postulate” alone (which al-
ready incorporates the presumption about the internal
perspective) and conjecture that laws of QM are neces-
sary to provide the consistency of internal and external
perspectives, required by the postulate. Here we have
implied that conscious beings in the postulate must also
possess free-will. This is not only a natural attribute of
consciousness, but we will soon argue that closely asso-
ciating free-will with the consciousness is one of the rare
options to defy the conclusions of the no-go theorem in
a logically satisfactory way.
Defying the no-go theorem
So far we have discussed how the internal and external
viewpoints may be reconciled within the interpretations
of the first class, both on the lower level of quantum
events (discussing the Wigner’s friend type of scenarios)
and on the higher level (the interplay which naturally
allows for the free will, albeit of a limited type).
But the key question, to elucidate the announced po-
tential of the first class interpretations to defy the con-
clusions of the no-go theorem and in this way to consis-
tently alow for the existence of consciousness, is yet to
be addressed. Clearly, by presupposing the internal per-
spective of systems as an irreducible and non-derivable
concept, required for existence of subjective experience,
this paradigm explicitly violates the Neuroscience postu-
late, thus avoiding the troubling conclusion of the no-go
theorem. Nevertheless, it is very instructive to consider
more precisely where this modification of the basic ax-
ioms breaks the logical chain of the theorem. This is
also interesting from the perspective of implications for
strong AI.
One option is to immediately dismiss the conclusion
of the Behavioral theorem (Theorem 1). Our paradigm
now encapsulates consciousness as an ontologically real,
irreducible notion, so this becomes a tricky but logically
valid possibility. In spite that two agents behave in qual-
itatively indistinguishable way and both similarly report
conscious states, we are this time logically allowed to
assign consciousness only to one of them, guided by any
additional principle (e.g. possessing of a human-like brain
or not, or judging by the value of Phi as according to In-
tegrated Information Theory [24]) or even in an entirely
ad hoc manner. In this way we can simply preclude the
problems implied by the no-go theorem, breaking its log-
ical chain by insisting that a computer simulating brain
responses would not, unlike brain itself, cause emergence
of any subjective experience, no matter that both the
brain and the computer produce the same behavior (for
example, this is exactly a conclusion of IIT approach
[56]). In the context of first class interpretations, we
may further claim that only agents (physical systems) to
which we assign consciousness are then ones entitled to
internal perspective, or at least that they are the only
ones in which this internal perspective has given rise to
32
consciousness in the standard sense.
However, as already discussed, abandoning the con-
clusion of the Behavioral theorem comes with a certain
price. We may imagine a situation in which a being,
that behaves and reasons like a human in all relevant re-
spects, implores us to understand that it is genuinely con-
scious and that it feels the emotions and pain very much,
and yet we are adamant in our decision that it is just
a senseless automaton, simply because it does not fulfill
some formal criterion (such as possessing high enough
Phi number). Such a scenario would be very much remi-
niscent of a literal witch-hunt, even more so if the verdict
that it “does not possess consciousness” would imply that
this agent is expendable, for example, to serve in some
hazardous conditions instead of humans. The problem is
that such a verdict cannot be checked nor proved even in
principle (due to the other minds problem, as discussed
in more details in Appendix) and thus abandoning of the
Behavioral theorem calls for ethical and legal decisions
which are not only dubious, but also based on hypothe-
ses which are of unscientific nature. And worse than that,
in the Appendix we have argued that giving up the Be-
havioral theorem effectively means sacrificing entire sci-
entific method and choosing over it hypotheses which are
“cognitively unstable” [42].
While the option that Behavioral theorem is violated
cannot be entirely logically discarded (similarly as, for
example, the solipsist option), it would be far more sat-
isfactory if we could have a consistent framework where
the Behavioral theorem is preserved and yet the con-
sciousness can be accounted for without absurd impli-
cations that the no-go theorem brings. However, this is
not trivial, even with accepting consciousness (or inter-
nal perspective) as fundamental: once we acknowledge
behavior as the good criterion of consciousness, we can
always simulate brain on a Turing machine to reproduce
the equivalent behavior and we are seemingly back on the
track all the way down to copying of the sand-symbols
and writing of a number that produces subjective expe-
riences. Even the randomness of QM does not help much
by itself. To begin with, it is unclear whether this ran-
domness plays any significant role in the functioning of
the brain. And even if it does, we need more than that,
once we have accepted the behavioral criterion. First,
we would have to insist that artificial intelligence, based
on the classical computing, is in principle and ever inca-
pable of reproducing the behavior that brain produces –
a claim that is not easy to substantiate at this moment.
And secondly, we have the problem that brain, even as a
quantum system, can be anyhow simulated by a Turing
machine (at least in principle, with sufficient precision)
and at the end the behavioral output to stimuli could be
chosen randomly in accordance with the Born rule – it is
very difficult to motivate why making this choice based
on a computer-generated pseudo-random number could
not result in the same final behavior as by randomness
of the collapse.
In spite of these problems, we will demonstrate that it
is still possible to keep the conclusion of the Behavioral
theorem and nevertheless leave a room for consciousness
(of course, we do not claim that our proposal is the only
such possibility, but is sufficient to demonstrate that the
first class of QM interpretations has the potential to get
us closer to the solution of the hard problem even while
obeying the Behavioral theorem).
To this end, we first note that in all the views which
emanate from the subjectivistic understanding of the col-
lapse postulate, the wavepacket reduction which selects
actual outcomes from the possible ones is the key trait
of the presumed internal perspective. This process with
non-deterministic outcomes is also vital from the per-
spective of the introduction of fresh informational con-
tent into the universe. Therefore, within this paradigm,
it seems natural to seek origins of consciousness in more
tight relation to the collapse. Another layer of our con-
jecture would be to essentially equate the subjective col-
lapse and the subjective experience – in the sense to as-
sume that subjective experience arises together with the
collapse. In other words, to conjecture that not only
the collapse requires the existence of this inner perspec-
tive, but also vice-versa, that the inner perspective, or at
least its higher-level subjective experience phenomenon,
requires the collapse. That we are, somehow, aware of,
or thanks to, the process of creation of new information.
In such view, the consciousness is inseparable from the
active exploitation of this inherent freedom left for the
agency, from taking choices or, seen externally, from the
actualization of possibilities. That is, the consciousness
is inseparable from the free will.
It is probably not immediately clear how this assump-
tion makes the consciousness and behavior potentially
compatible in the light of the no-go theorem. For, by the
Behavioral theorem, a classical and deterministic com-
puter must nevertheless be conscious if it is capable to
reproduce the human-like behavior – which again threat-
ens to logically lead all the way to sand-symbols and
numbers that possess subjective experiences. However,
let us consider more closely a hypothetical android robot
driven by a classical computer. In order to reproduce a
qualitatively indistinguishable human-like behavior, the
android must be equipped with sensors (e.g. cameras, mi-
crophones) which sample external stimuli. These stimuli
then must be processed in an extremely complex and
nonlinear way (e.g. by layers of neural networks at least
to say) which makes it highly difficult to trace the cause-
effect chain from the combination of the initial stimulus
and the current state of the computer to the final behav-
ioral response. While the entire process remains deter-
ministic in principle, it potentially amplifies the fluctu-
ations of input stimuli in obscure ways: it might be the
color of only a few pixels in the visual field which will
determine which of two (or more) chains of responses
will be triggered. Now, it is sufficient that the environ-
ment is quantum-mechanical in nature (as it normally
is), so that the entire system becomes non-deterministic:
the two chains of behavioral responses become entangled
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with the color of the pixel. Externally, we will see the
robot executing either one or the other of the two chains.
We may say that the behavior was determined by the
random color of the incoming light. But, as well, we
may say that the color of the incoming few photons was
a posteriori (in a logical sense) fixed in accordance with
the chosen response of the robot. From the internal per-
spective of the robot-system, the collapse of the photons’
wavelength has occurred, and this new information of the
definitive photon color is created in the universe. In this
paradigm, this is sufficient, combined with the complex-
ity of the android’s cognitive system, to be perceived by
the robot as his own choice, and sufficient as the basis for
subjective experience. In a similar way, we ourselves can
exploit quantum randomness and have subjective expe-
rience even if (which seems unlikely) the functioning of
our brain is entirely deterministic in the classical sense
and has no internal sources of randomness.
In the context of our theorem chain, this means that
the second theorem, stating that a sufficiently advanced
android controlled by a classical type of computer may
possess the same level of subjective experience as a hu-
man, still holds, even in the QM setting. But the chain
definitely breaks up at latest with the Theorem 5, which
asserts the possibility to isolate the android from the en-
vironment inside a virtual reality simulated on a classical
computer. At that point there is no more room for cre-
ating information or taking choices, as everything is en-
tirely deterministic. From an informational perspective,
everything becomes frozen. And thus, under this conjec-
ture, from that point on in the sequence of equivalences
analyzed in the no-go theorem, there is no longer room
for any subjective experience.
A few comments are due at this point. Naively, one
could object that our environment is effectively classi-
cal and that the incoming photons in the above android
example probably have decohered long ago.32 It is im-
portant to stress that whether the photon was in a pure
state superposition of two wavelengths, or in a mixed
quantum state nontrivially entangled with some other
physical systems (i.e. decohered) is irrelevant for the ar-
gument. Namely, having the android response correlated
merely with a photon, or with a somewhat larger or more
physically distant part of the environment, makes no dif-
ference.
A more delicate question is whether this conjecture
is equally applicable to all QM interpretations of the
first class. We might imagine that the android’s CPU
is enclosed in an informationally sealed box (as in the
Wigner’s friend experiment) and that the only informa-
tion allowed from the outside are the sensory inputs ar-
32 Decoherence is often poorly understood and used as a general
buzzword to dismiss any significance of the QM nature of the
universe, while in truth it is nothing else but the process of en-
tanglement with a larger system in which everything remains just
as quantum as before.
riving from, for example, a camera. If we follow rela-
tional (or Brukner’s) interpretation, then it is unclear
how much speaking about the external world has any
sense from the internal perspective of the enclosed sys-
tem in the box (having in mind the “no facts of the world”
doctrine). In particular: what difference could it make
whether the data incoming from the camera is a genuine
picture of the environment or just a virtual reality per-
petually simulated by a classical computer? It seems to
us that insisting on the collapse and the change of infor-
mational content as the source of consciousness requires
a framework with a unique reality and “objective facts”
(even if our understanding of subjective timeline has to
be modified a bit).
However, if the environment can play some sort of role
in consciousness, as argued above, where is this subjec-
tive experience “located” (if not entirely in the agent’s
body/brain) and how that could be intuitively under-
stood? And also “when” the subjective experience oc-
curs?
So far, we tried to address such questions of intu-
ition through the Wheeler’s idea of participatory uni-
verse. But, Wheeler’s idea in its basic form cannot help
us a lot with dilemmas related to the Behavior theorem
since it seems to imply a fixed, discrete (integer) number
of participant-observers (admittedly, we are not aware if
Wheeler has even considered this aspect of the problem).
In such framework it looks impossible even to discuss
the question at what point an external physical system
(whose reality and properties are only a consequence of
information that participant-observers possess) can be-
come an observer itself. In general, if we want to keep the
idea that consciousness is present on a fundamental level
and yet to allow that any system which behaves indistin-
guishably from Wheeler’s observers can be an observer
itself, there are essentially two roads to follow. One is
panpsychism. As it basically assigns some level of con-
sciousness to any physical (sub)system, it might be seen
as an extension of the relational QM interpretation where
the internal perspective (from which the collapse occurs),
granted to any physical system, is recognized also as the
basic form of consciousness. Panpsychism comes in many
flavors, but the basic versions again assume some level of
reductionism and ontological existence of matter (with
added experiential properties). Due to the former, not
only that panpsychism faces the serious “combination
problem”, but also, in our context, it does not seem able
to support, in the light of the no-go theorem, our hy-
pothesis that quantum randomness and free will are at
the core of the consciousness phenomenon (thus it is un-
clear to us how this approach could reconcile the no-go
and the behavioral theorems).
The other option, opposite to splitting consciousness
into tiny atomic pieces as in panpsychism, is to assume
that, on a deeper level, there is somehow only one single
underlying consciousness, stripped of all personal pre-
rogatives, instead of a multitude of separate ones. Indi-
vidual consciousnesses in such picture would be merely
34
particular expressions of that single consciousness, mu-
tually interacting as in the Wheeler’s idea and observing
the whole from distinct internal perspectives. Intuitively,
this idea could be, in its most simplified form, likened to
a collective dream (or a sort of ”schizophrenic” dream)
which derives its consistency and strict laws of physics
(at macroscopic level) from the very fact that it is collec-
tive – that there is symmetry between different observers
(i.e. perspectives) and that each observer is entitled to
have a consistent account of the world external to him
(in effect, from the “other minds postulate”). On the
other hand, any system capable to process information
and to respond to stimuli becomes another perspective
through which the underlying consciousness can exert its
will (while remaining consistent with the “other minds
postulate”) and become aware on a different, “localized”
level.
As space and time itself would have to be the con-
structs within this large consciousness, there is nothing
inherently troubling if we cannot pinpoint where or when
the individual consciousness actually occurs (it should be
clear that no conflict with relativity can occur, just as it
does not occur in any wavefunction collapse). The follow-
ing analogy might help us to cope with non-intuitive time
ordering of events as seen from different subjective van-
tage points. We may imagine writing of a novel, where
the content is being made up as the letters are being
written. But the novel is special, as each of the involved
fictional characters becomes conscious and aware of the
parts that pertain to him, as soon as these are written.
Moreover, each character subjectively experiences that
he is taking part in the writing of these segments. Need-
less to say, the book must be sensible and consistent in
every detail. Alternatively but similarly, we may imag-
ine that the author of the novel suffers from a form of
“creative schizophrenia”: as he writes a part about some
character he puts himself into that role so literally that
he effectively becomes that character for a period of time,
experiencing what the fictional character does and writ-
ing down in the book the decisions that the character
“made”. The order in which the book sections are writ-
ten need not be in any strict relation with the time or-
der which characters in the book experience (as long as
everything is logically consistent). If a new character is
introduced in the third chapter, but is introduced “retro-
spectively”, describing some events years before the plot
of the second chapter, the character will have experienced
these events in the past, no matter that these were de-
cided and written “now”. As the matter of fact, there are
numerous (or even infinite) orderings in which the same
story might be told (for example, the plot as seen from
the aspect of any of the characters), and in some sense,
there is no meaning to claim which is the “true” one.
Time has sense only from the subjective perspectives of
the characters in the book and even for them it has some
common meaning only to the extent to which their sto-
ries interleave and logically affect each other. Following
this analogy, in this view there is a single underlying
consciousness and a single reality (effectively “made of”
information) that is being created by that consciousness
and through the perspectives of all of us (again, infor-
mation content is not frozen as is in deterministic frame-
works, which according to Wheeler deserves the use of
the word “created”). And being a part of this creative
process is what we subjectively experience.
Developing further this idea would be out of the scope
of the present paper. We only note that emphasis on
randomness as opposed to determinism as a prerequisite
of subjective experience might have some curious impli-
cations. The closer an agent is to obeying determinis-
tic rules (from the external viewpoint) and the more re-
stricted possibilities for her responses are, the more she is
lacking aspects of subjective experience, i.e. the closer she
is to a philosophical zombie. It is an intriguing though an
entirely speculative idea that this relation could be ex-
trapolated to every-day life: those individuals who lead
a free life, full of opportunities and bold taking of choices
might have stronger subjective experiences (and in some
sense be “more conscious”) than those always sticking to
a routine.
Returning briefly to the no-go chain of theorems, it
should be noted that although the breakdown of the The-
orem 5 was more essential, Theorems 3 and 4 also no
longer necessarily hold in the context of the first class
interpretations. Theorem 3 (on temporal correlation)
concludes that subjective experiences must arise syn-
chronously with the evolution of the physical system to
which they correlate. However, in the above discussion of
the Wigner’s friend scenario, we have pointed to a vari-
ant of explanation in which Wigner friend’s experiences
(i.e. Alice’s), from the reference point of the Wigner (i.e.
Bob), cannot be said to appear synchronously with the
evolution of the friend’s brain wavefunction.
And in the context of our latest proposal that the ac-
tualization of possibilites (which appears during the col-
lapse) is a necessary prerequisite for consciousness, this
assumption affects the conclusion of the Theorem 4 (the
Repetition theorem). First of all, the very idea of an ideal
repetition of the system’s evolution is problematic in the
quantum context. If we understand that as the identical
repetition of the evolution of the system wavefunction
and speak in the context of the first class interpreta-
tions, then obviously having the wavefunction evolve in
the same way does not mean that the sequence of col-
lapses will repeat either. Alternatively, if we somehow
force the system to repeat the same sequence of classical
states that the system underwent in the first run (as a
result of the initial spontaneous evolution and collapses),
then what were “free” choices and randomness in the
first run are no longer such in the second. In turn, if the
first run was accompanied by subjective experiences, the
second will not – according to the conjecture.
The bottom line is: once we give up the tendency to
derive the inner perspective from the externally visible
dynamics, we see that possibilities for explaining the hard
problem open up, at least in principle. In particular,
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the options are limitless if we are ready to accept the
violation of the Behavioral theorem (which becomes a
logically valid option in this new context), but also there
seem to exist consistent ways out even if we decide to
keep the conclusions of this theorem. Of course, there
are many remaining problems to be encountered along
any of these alleys, but these do not seem even remotely
as desperate as attempts to solve the hard problem in
physicalist terms, without invoking QM.
Common criticism
There are some common objections to interpretations
of QM which extend in this and similar directions.
One is that incorporating subjective experience (i.e.
consciousness) as a fundamental, non-derivable concept,
requires a huge extension of the ontological basis of real-
ity, which is, a priori, certainly less preferred by the Oc-
cam’s razor criterion than the monistic ontology of phys-
icalism. As we initially presented it, the duality of the
two QM postulates, one related to system’s subjective-
internal and the other to the objective-external view-
point, is indeed reminiscent of the Cartesian dualism.
But, while it might be formally possible to uphold such
dualistic reading of quantum mechanics, it is by no means
a natural one.
Namely, we should note that the very concept of a
well-defined, truly external perspective is a dubious ex-
trapolation, certainly not supported by experiment. In
the bottom line, every experiment ever performed yielded
only a subjectively perceived outcome. Thus the exter-
nal perspective we were frequently referring to eventually
boils down to a subjective perspective again, only from a
viewpoint of a system different (and external) to the one
being considered. Therefore, in our opinion, the most
natural reading of quantum mechanics which has the po-
tential to deal with the hard problem is again monistic:
the true ontological reality should be attributed only to
these internal perspectives of systems (that is, to subjec-
tive experiences). To consistently reconcile all these in-
ternal perspectives, that is, subjective experiences of all
coexisting and “participating” observers, there must be
an ideal correlation of the internal and external accounts,
expressed by our “other minds postulate”. For observers
Alice and Bob to coexist and interact, with both having
subjective experiences and some extent of free will, it is
necessary that Bob is represented in the referential sys-
tem of Alice and that Alice is able to find an explanation
for observed Bob’s behavior from her vantage point (and
vice-versa). Furthermore, Alice’s and Bob’s accounts of
events in their common exterior should be also consistent.
It is the mathematical consequences of these consistency
requirements and of the symmetry between different ob-
servers (internal perspectives) that is, in this view, be-
hind the ostensible objectivity of the world exterior to
us. Postulating existence of independent external reality
(e.g. matter) is likely to be entirely superfluous and thus
should be avoided. What we call matter is here seen as
a consequence of participation of (infinitely) many ob-
servers or points of view in defining the reality and there
should be no need to resort to dualism.
Another common objection is that non-physicalist
views like this one are unscientific, at least due to be-
ing unfalsifiable. While the charge of being unscientific
per se often draws solely from personal philosophical bi-
ases and from misunderstanding of concept of a rational
explanation33, the problem of falsifiability deserves to be
addressed in more detail.
First of all, we must keep in mind that even being
unfalsifiable is much better for a theory than being fal-
sified. And it is this latter danger, that seems to have
befallen physicalist views in the context of the cognitive
hard problem. The entire idea of physicalism (especially
in its purest form expressed in the Neuroscience postu-
late) hinges on a never proved assertion that the (illusion
of) consciousness can be derived from the mere motion of
matter. Here, “never proved” is actually a serious under-
statement – there is no a hint of a true idea how the gap
from motions to (illusion of) qualia could be ever bridged
(wishful thinking aside), to contest numerous arguments
(of which the no-go theorem is only one) suggesting that
this was an irrational expectation from the outset. If it
was about any other philosophical view but physicalism,
such a view would have been long ago discarded as a
non-serious contender for the theory that could explain
the universe, in other words, would have been taken as
already falsified by its inability to account for conscious-
ness. When seen in this light, even the non-falsifiable but
consistent-with-data positions should have a clear edge
over physicalism.
But, we do not even think that views presented in
this section are truly unfalsifiable, at least because they
do have certain verifiable logical implications or hints,
if not full-fledged predictions. We first note that non-
physicalist views were, to a large degree, thought to
have been falsified, by the temporary historical success of
mechanistic determinism of classical physics. This fact,
together with the consecutive breakdown of the classi-
cal paradigm, showed that these ideas could be falsified
in principle, but are not. In fact, the sudden departure
from the determinism of classical physics into the ran-
domness of observer oriented quantum mechanics can be
thus taken at least as a slight argument in their favor.
More specifically, indeterminism itself can be taken as a
prediction stemming from non-physicalist considerations
(e.g. more than two millennia before Planck, the Greek
philosopher Epicurus has in some way anticipated QM
by predicting random “swerving” of atoms, to account
for the free will).
33 ”Rational explanation” is often used as a misnomer for “hard-
line materialism”, while in truth it denotes an explanation that
successfully accounts for all the data, with resort to as little
starting assumptions as possible (Occam’s razor).
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But there are also some more concrete predictions and
implications than the indeterminism of quantum mechan-
ics. A different form of fundamental laws of physics (of
the particle physics and of the hypothetical theory of ev-
erything) can be expected if the universe is built of mat-
ter, and if it is “made of” information shared by partici-
pating observers. It is hard to tell how exactly different
these should be, but in the former case we could expect
dynamics to be governed by very specific ad-hoc formu-
las, given as predefined properties of matter, much like it
was the case in Newton’s dynamics. Also, it is arguable
that a hypothetical success of string theory could be more
suggestive that the universe is based on matter-like con-
stituents (strings) than it would hint towards universe
made out of information (at least intuitively). Contrary
to that, if the matter is only a derived notion, its dynam-
ics should rather follow from principles of symmetry and
information. A hypothetical grand unified particle model
with action (almost) entirely derivable from space-time
and internal symmetries, could be a tell-tale sign of a
non-physicalist ontology. In such view, particles would
most naturally be unitary irreducible representations of
the corresponding symmetry (super)groups, instead of
being “pieces of matter” with symmetry properties that
merely correspond to such representations. In turn, irre-
ducible representations could be mathematically seen as
tiniest bits of information that can separately exist in a
universe with a given symmetry. The unitary state evo-
lution, governed by such a dynamics derived from sym-
metry principles, would then merely express conserva-
tion of information: new information is being created via
indeterministic collapse in measurements, while in be-
tween nothing “new” happens; Born rule can be seen
as prescribing the maximal probability to events that
correspond to the least change of information content;
the existence of the probabilistic law can be seen as a
way to regain determinism and thus conservation of in-
formation on large scales (i.e. after averaging over an en-
semble), while maximally suppressing creation of new in-
formation and constraining this essential process to the
events in the micro-world. Furthermore, much like the
anthropic principle, the “other minds postulate” auto-
matically solves all fine-tuning/hierarchy problems: the
values of masses and coupling constants must be appro-
priate to attain consistency of internal and external per-
spectives (which is not possible if natural constants do
not support a reductionistic explanation of existence of
intelligent agents). However, the most natural mecha-
nism to establish the proper values of natural constants
in a participatory universe paradigm would be by invok-
ing the collapse postulate. This further indicates that a
formulation of the Standard Model (or a GUT model)
might exist where all of the constants (couplings, mixing
angles, etc) could be expressible in terms of some field
values – this would allow for the possibility that we have
collapsed the constants to proper values by mere observa-
tion of the external world (instead that these values are
miraculously, by chance, tuned to favor our existence).
We remind that, in this view, it is correct and logically
justified to derive physical properties, including the val-
ues of natural constants, from the fact of our subjective
existence, rather than the other way around, as is usually
attempted in physicalist frameworks. For this reason, the
“other mind postulate” can also naturally provide solu-
tion for many other problems of low probability, without
need to postulate existence of infinitely many universes
(as requires the usual combination of multiverse and an-
thropic principle): e.g. the extremely low probabilities for
all conceivable origin-of-life scenarios turn into substan-
tial values when recognized as conditional probabilities.
Namely, given that the agents with subjective experi-
ences exist, the wavefunctions in the past can collapse
only into states consistent with this fact. In practice,
this means that when exploring the evidence of the life
origin, we must always encounter (i.e. obtain as measure-
ment outcomes) findings which are compatible with our
existence. If more then one history is compatible with
all information up to a given moment, then according to
QM all such histories must be in superposition; once we
find a way to distinguish between these possible histories
by a measurement, and only then, the history becomes
indeed defined, as in the Wheeler’s delayed-choice phe-
nomenon [52]. This seemingly strange order of logical
causation (i.e. events in present defining causes in the
past) is surely counterintuitive for those used to classi-
cal reasoning (as is the Wheeler’s delayed-choice exper-
iment counterintuitive itself), which is reflected through
another common objection: the erroneous assertion that
these interpretations require existence of an (intelligent)
observer in the past to collapse the wavefunction, at the
time before emergence of life. Here, as always when deal-
ing with matters of quantum mechanics, one should avoid
the logical fallacy of confusing contradictory with merely
counterintuitive but otherwise rational ideas.
We are aware that most of the statements above re-
quire more detailed explanations and possibly some non-
trivial research, which is entirely out of the scope of the
present paper. Our present motive was just to illustrate
that each of the two ontological viewpoints (materialist
and idealist) leads physics research in a different direc-
tion, and hence both proposals are scientific and to some
extent falsifiable. Certain aspects, on the other hand,
cannot be addressed by the scientific method by defini-
tion, and are thus indeed unfalsifiable in the standard
sense. Scientific method presupposes the third-person
perspective and is therefore incapable to deal with the
internal perspective and its properties. Besides, our idea
of scientific ”explanation” usually implies a cause-and-
effect way of thinking and a belief that everything can be
reduced to more fundamental principles. However, such
reasoning seems to be applicable only in a narrow, macro-
scopic domain and when considering average values of
certain properties definable from the third-person view.
Expectation that the same approach should be applicable
also to properties of subjective experiences and to enti-
ties like qualia, could be simply pointless and wrong, in
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a similar matter as it is pointless and wrong to ask why a
radioactive particle has decayed precisely now and not a
bit later, or to ask why the particular photon has passed
a half-silvered mirror while the other has not. In turn,
this means that qualia themselves will likely never be ac-
cessible for scientific studies (only our reports of qualia),
but this by no means implies that we should deny their
existence.
SUMMARY
In this paper, we dealt with the hard problem of con-
sciousness from the perspective of physics. We explored
how the basic physical premises about the universe in-
fluence prospect of solving the hard problem, and, vice-
versa, what the difficulties encountered en-route to ad-
dress the hard problem can tell us about the nature of
our universe. The paper was naturally divided into three
parts.
The first part concerned the hard problem within the
framework of classical physics. Analyzing this perspec-
tive of the hard problem is nowadays of huge impor-
tance simply because it is still the predominant view
that the phenomenon of consciousness can be explained
entirely within the physicalist paradigm based on clas-
sical physics. We made an attempt to scrutinize this
stance by providing a (reasonably) formal framework for
the analysis of the problem. We have formulated the
Neuroscience postulate, which summarizes the prevail-
ing contemporary position on consciousness, and argued
that it inevitably leads to the statement of our “no-go
theorem”: that a human brain cannot have any greater
power to generate subjective experience than a process of
writing of a certain big number. A lengthy logical argu-
ment was given in the form of a sequence of intermediary
“theorems”, accompanied by the corresponding “proofs”.
Once the conclusion of the theorem was established as ap-
parently true, we went to further analyze its impact on
the likelihood that the Neuroscience postulate could be
ever reconciled with our subjective experience. We fo-
cused on the mapping between the brain states and the
content of the subjective experience, and used the “no-
go theorem” to translate the entire issue to the relation
between the “number being written” and this content
of the experience. Rephrasing the question in this new
context allowed us to show that none of the available op-
tions (under the premise of NP) can be compatible with
our introspection: neither assuming that consciousness is
nothing – in which case we realize that notions as “red”
or “pain” would have never existed, nor assuming that
subjective experience truly emerges (either as an illusion
or not) – in which case a well-defined mapping must ex-
ist and be experienced when writing a number, which
then not only bears a clear magical connotation but also
eludes consistent description. Finally, we interpreted the
conclusions reached in the first part as a clear sign that
the Neuroscience postulate must be abandoned and ex-
planation of the consciousness sought for in a broader
ontological context, where a natural candidate was, of
course, quantum physics.
The presented no-go theorem has some elements of
a more elaborate and formal Chinese room argument
(in spite of the final conclusion which is contradicting
Searle’s personal convictions). While we cannot hope for
the impact Searle’s thought experiment had – in part a
result of the concise form of his simple and yet profound
argument – we firmly believe that our formal and de-
tailed approach has some advantages on its own. While
the Chinese room argument revolves around the notion
of “understanding” which relies on its intuitive meaning,
we, in the end, concentrate on the concept of mapping
between a number and the content of the subjective ex-
perience. Since such mapping must be obviously non-
trivial (if exists) and is hardly a natural construction,
the conclusions are much harder to ignore (or to dismiss
either by hand-waving arguments or by pointless analo-
gies). The formal exposition in the form of “theorems”
facilitates analysis and helps identify the pivotal points
of the entire logical chain. Moreover, as it is often the
case with no-go theorems, even plausibly invalidating the
theorem claim could be highly insightful and of immense
importance, as it would necessarily pin-point some es-
sential prerequisite for consciousness. For these reasons,
we believe that properly addressing the issues raised by
this no-go theorem has certain potential if not to bring
the discussion on this matter to some conclusion, then at
least to better classify different views with respect to the
part of the proof they disagree with.
Since the conclusion of the first part of the paper was
the necessity to go beyond classical physics to explain
the consciousness, in the second part we turned to quan-
tum mechanics. We noted that different interpretations
of QM have different potentials to bypass the constraints
of the no-go theorem and to offer a framework that could
encompass the phenomenon of subjective experience. In
this, we concentrated only on pure interpretations, i.e.
the ones that are mathematically equivalent to the stan-
dard QM formulation (and left the rest to the experi-
mental test). We pointed out that, for the evaluation of
different interpretations, of great importance is a natural
mapping which exists between particular interpretations
of QM and predominant positions on the hard problem
of consciousness. We explored this mapping in detail, re-
vealing that the class of interpretations which acknowl-
edges the necessity of the collapse postulate on equal
footing as the postulate of unitary evolution corresponds
in a straightforward manner to cognitive science view-
points which fully acknowledge the hard problem and in-
sist that third-person description is not sufficient per se.
On the other hand, interpretations that find the collapse
postulate to be superfluous (e.g. MWI), are natural coun-
terparts of the cognitive science views maintaining that
once all objective functions of the brain are understood
there is nothing left to be explained and the subjective
experiences (if it makes sense to speak of these) must
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arise as a direct logical consequence of the physical brain
functioning.
Not surprisingly, we concluded that these two classes
of interpretations bear the impact of the no-go theorem
implications: the problems present in the attempts to
explain consciousness based on the classical physics still
hamper the interpretations of the second class, whereas
the interpretations of the first class, due to already in-
volving the non-derivable internal perspective from which
the collapse occurs, have certain potential to account for
the subjective experience (we dubbed the latter as “hard-
problem solution-ready”).
In the third part of the study, we argued that the set
of possible solutions to the hard problem is no longer
empty if we accept the paradigm of the quantum physics
and uphold the interpretations of the first class. How-
ever, even in this broader ontological context, when we
give up determinism and introduce some subjective ele-
ments as fundamental in the universe, it turned out to be
difficult to evade, in a truly satisfactory way, the prob-
lems brought up by the no-go theorem. The available
options depended crucially on whether we insisted that
Behavioral criterion for consciousness has to be still valid
or not. The conclusion was that if we give up this crite-
rion then a multitude of solutions appears, but not only
that none of them is falsifiable – worse than that, we lose
logically consistent framework to evaluate any hypothe-
sis about consciousness (i.e. we lose any hope of scientific
or even merely coherent treatment of the problem). On
the other hand, if we still require behavioral criterion to
be the final arbiter of consciousness, it turns out to be
relatively difficult to consistently reconcile this require-
ment with the rest of the no-go theorem in a way that
nonetheless leaves some room for subjective experience.
We pointed out that one such possibility seems to be to
relate subjective experience with creation of new infor-
mation that occurs during the collapse (and see that as
an expression of free will, constrained by the Born rule).
We proposed the “other minds postulate” as the basic
principle of this paradigm, which intuitively well corre-
sponds to Wheeler’s idea of the participatory universe.
Of course, a full-fledged solution to the hard problem
could not have been expected on this level, but we hope
to have done enough to illustrate the potential of quan-
tum mechanics to open the door towards the understand-
ing of the consciousness. In particular, one seemingly
viable alternative to physicalism of the classical physics
is quantum mechanics interpreted in a subjectivist way,
with a special emphasis given to the emergence of new
informational content which accompanies the collapse.
There are a few general conclusions that deserve to
be singled out and emphasized once more. First of all,
the problems formally explicated by the no-go theorem
either require its reasoning to be logically invalidated
with the same formal precision, or require us to aban-
don the (never quite substantiated) hope that conscious-
ness can be accounted for in the usual physicalist frame-
work. Furthermore, the no-go theorem suggests that we
might have recognized deficiency of the paradigm of me-
chanical determinism irrespectively of the experiments
revealing the quantum nature of the universe, simply
on the basis of its inability to accommodate conscious-
ness. The weakness of mechanical determinism is, para-
doxically, in the fact that it is too well-defined and too
constrained, allowing for strong and almost mathemat-
ical arguments which seem to dismiss it as a plausible
option for an explanation of the subjective experience
(and, consequently, of our universe). And quite gener-
ally, the more elements of mechanical materialism and
determinism a paradigm has, the more there is to sup-
port the proof of the no-go theorem and less likely it is
to find any hypothetical room for consciousness. This
realization might turn upside-down some intuitive ideas
about what are preferable properties for a QM interpreta-
tion. Deterministic and mechanically-materialistic ideas
of the pilot-wave interpretation (irrespective of its non-
local features) and determinism of MWI have, as a result,
that these views become seemingly as implausible as is
the classical physics when we take into account the exis-
tence of (illusion of) consciousness. On the other hand,
certain subjective elements and some sort of vagueness
in definitions which go in pair should not be seen as a
merely tolerable feature of a QM interpretation (or for-
mulation), but also as a necessary one, if we are to have
an all-encompassing understanding of the phenomena in
the universe.
But maybe the main takeaway from this analysis is
that the deepest problems in cognitive science and the
most profound questions in physics should not be treated
independently, since they are inherently interconnected.
Because the assumptions about the ontology of the uni-
verse and about the main principles guiding the evolution
of matter (both of which are the subject of physics) in-
fluence the available explanations of consciousness, there-
fore also the empirical fact of the existence of subjective
experience (or of the illusion of it) can serve as an indirect
test of our hypotheses in physics and inescapably also af-
fects plausibility of different interpretations of quantum
mechanics.
Acknowledgments
This paper would never have been written without inspi-
rational discussions with Vladimir Prelovac, Cristi Sto-
ica, Liviu Coconu, Adal Chiriliuc, Robert Ruxandrescu,
Vladimir Cˇeperkovic´, and Marko Vojinovic´. Their con-
structive criticism (and, in these discussions, most of
them tended to disagree with the above conclusions) led
to the immense improvement of the presented arguments.
39
APPENDIX
Here we will discuss in more detail arguments support-
ing the statements of the theorems.
Theorem 1. (Behavioral theorem). Under the premise
of NP, two agents behaving effectively in the same way
when it comes to reacting to external stimuli, report-
ing about internal conscious/emotional states, having the
ability to autonomously introspect and recognize its sub-
jective experience and engage into related discussions –
must possess the same qualitative level of subjective ex-
perience.
“Proof”. First, we will consider this theorem in a broad
ontological setting (i.e. ignoring the NP presumption)
and only after that we will take into account the Neu-
roscience postulate and discuss how it further constrains
our conclusions.
We begin by noting the “other minds problem”: we
can be strictly sure only of existence of our own mind
(or of illusion of it), and there is no, by definition, any
objective experiment by which we could verify presence
of “subjective experience” in any other (external to us)
agent. This is a direct consequence of the subjective na-
ture of the phenomenon and, in principle (i.e. without
assuming any additional presumptions), all other agents
we perceive in the external world could be “philosophical
zombies” – i.e. there is no chance to refute this possibility
with certainty or by any objective means. Thus, when
attributing the subjective experience to anyone else but
ourselves, we must be aware that we cannot seek solid
proofs to support our conclusions, but can proceed only
by analogy.34 (Strictly speaking, there is also a logically
valid option to deny the existence of any subjective ex-
perience, including our own, in which case the theorem
statement is trivially true.)
To go further from our own mind and the solipsist
stance, one can pursue the following reasoning: “I see
people that look similar to me, they seem capable of simi-
lar things I am capable of, thus I’ll assume that they have
also similar inner, subjective experiences as I do.” Now,
there are a couple of main directions from here.
First, we may proceed to make a generalization based
on the “capable of similar” part of the above statement
– in other words, to take the behavior as the criterion.
The behavioral criterion stands out, since we experien-
tially relate our behavior with our subjective experience
(via our mental actions, capabilities and properties, ap-
pearing either as the precursors of the related behavior
or accompanying it). This is true both for our deliber-
ate actions (before or along with saying something we
34 While we are aware of additional arguments in favor of existence
of other minds, such as the argument of best explanation [37],
all of them have, as a starting point, some elements of reasoning
by analogy – for, we would never tend to assign subjective expe-
rience to others, had not we been aware of our own experience.
experience a related stream of thoughts) and for most of
our involuntary responses (we feel anger or shame as we
blush). We know that our behavior reflects our inner life.
In spite that this connection cannot be established via ob-
jective experiments, it is the only type of correlation we
can expect to have with a subjective phenomenon - from
the first-person type of knowledge. It is thus natural to
judge the presence of subjective experience in others also
by looking for signs of such cognitive activity which is
correlated with these forms of behavior. Besides, there is
a relatively natural mapping from different aspects of be-
havior to different aspects of consciousness: for example,
if android Data does not express feelings, we need not
entirely deny its consciousness, but we would just deny
him the emotional component of it. In this way, based
on experimentally (by introspection) established corre-
lation of our behavior with our internal experiences, we
have established a potentially consistent criterion to de-
termine what is conscious and what is not – possibility to
judge, in principle, the existence of an agent’s conscious-
ness by analyzing the information exchange (response vs.
stimuli) between the agent and the rest of the universe.35
Another option is to take the “look like” path. It
means to make a generalization based on likeness, of
course not only of the external sort, but also on the sim-
ilarity of the inner workings. In this way, presented by
another (living) human, which is both from the outside
and the inside quite similar to us, there might be no
problem to conclude that he/she is conscious.
But we cannot simply redefine “conscious” to become
a synonym for “human”, it certainly must have an inde-
pendent meaning. However, without behavior as a crite-
rion, it is not clear how is it possible to establish what
is the relevant aspect of this similarity in the context
of the “consciousness”. To start with a trivial exam-
ple: is a human still conscious if someone cuts his leg
off? How do we know that the amputee is still sentient?
Shell we ask him to tell us, or consider how he behaves?
Certainly not, as we have now chosen to dismiss these
behavioral responses as credible criteria and follow the
other path. The amputee might have all of the sudden
become a philosophical zombie, now speaking about in-
ner experiences merely as an automaton. Indeed, if we
do not start from the premise that consciousness is man-
ifest through behavior, then not only we cannot prove
what is conscious, but we cannot even have a consistent
framework to deal with the problem. There is no way
to establish even that the brain is any more related to
35 This formulation emphasizing the information exchange is ca-
pable also to encapsulate some pathological cases, e.g. when an
agent is still conscious but with totally impaired motoric abili-
ties: in such case, we might need special devices (e.g. NMR) to
read his responses to stimuli, but that would still fit into the “in-
formation exchange” definition. It also covers the cases when an
agent intentionally subdues behavioral responses so that these
become invisible to the naked eye.
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subjective experience than, for example, a spleen.
As an illustration, let us formulate a couple of compet-
ing hypotheses about consciousness, which do not take
behavior as a criterion. Let Hypothesis 1 be that some
specific property of the neural system, having to do with
the way it processes information – for example, some-
thing about the way the neurons are interconnected – is
what is responsible for the emergence of consciousness.
Moreover, let the conjecture be that this particular sort
of interconnectedness in processing information is, in gen-
eral, a prerequisite for the appearance of subjective expe-
rience36. Let the Hypothesis 2 be that only agents with
two legs possess subjective experience, and Hypothesis 3
that being born with a spleen37 is the only thing that
determines whether an agent is conscious. First, note
that within general ontological setting (dualistic ones in-
cluded) all three hypotheses could be true in principle: if
the consciousness is ontologically real, it might be sim-
ply that some things/agents possess it and some not, and
there is no any way to discover how this fact is correlated
(if at all) to any objectively measurable property. And
not only that all of the three hypotheses are experimen-
tally irrefutable, but it is also that none can be deemed
more plausible than the others. Ostensibly, Hypothe-
sis 1 sounds most plausible, sort of scientific. However,
what at best can be proved for conjectures of this type
is that such-and-such property of the neural system is
required for certain type of (cognitive related) behavior
(e.g. in humans), but there is not even in principle any
possibility to prove that the property in question is cor-
related with subjective experience (one can only postulate
that such-and-such dynamics of the system correlates, or
causes accompanying subjective experience, as this part
can be never proved nor objectively tested due to defi-
nition of subjectivity). Besides, it is only the fact that
neural system is crucial for our behavior and especially
for the parts of behavior that we intuitively see as traits
of consciousness, which makes the first hypothesis sound
more plausible than the others. If we truly ignore the
behavioral criterion then the neural system is no more
related to consciousness than the digestive or immune
one, and all these hypotheses are on equal footing. Even
partial use of behavioral criterion is not sufficient: let
us assume that we decide to use behavior to test our hy-
potheses on a set of agents and realize, on one hand, that
the absence of a limb or a spleen does not seem to rele-
vantly influence behavior, while on the other hand, that
each of the agents who exhibited conscious-like behavior
36 The Integrated Information Theory [24] is one example of such
hypothesis.
37 There is a rare congenital condition that a baby is born with the
missing spleen, but with no other developmental abnormalities.
We included a congenital anomaly as the third option, as in
principle one could cut off his own leg and subjectively check if
he is still conscious – though his discovery would be again non-
verifiable and thus meaningless for everybody else.
also met the requirements of the first hypothesis. Could
we prove the first hypothesis in this way? Unfortunately
not, since the first time we encounter an agent that be-
haves in a conscious manner but does not fulfill the for-
mal requirement of Hypothesis 1, it will be impossible to
know whether the hypothesis was faulty (incomplete) or
the agent is really a philosophical zombie.
In this sense, by discarding the behavioral criterion we
lose any consistent framework to tackle the problem of
consciousness and any hope to evaluate remaining hy-
potheses. In spite that some of the non-behavioral hy-
potheses on how to recognize conscious agents might be
actually true, such could be never proved so and not
even seriously argued to be so, and in this sense such
approaches could be dubbed as unscientific (or “cogni-
tively unstable”38). In other words, if we live in a scien-
tifically accessible universe, the behavioral theorem must
be valid, and if we do not, then why bother to discuss
consciousness or formulate any hypothesis. The reason
why we cannot invert the argument and discard behav-
ioral type of criteria on the same basis (of not being inde-
pendently and objectively verifiable), is the one already
discussed: the behavior is inevitably singled out as the
criterion that we experience and introspect as relevant.
There is another type of problem, related to any at-
tempt to correlate subjective experience with something
else than behavior, directly stemming from the previous.
Let us consider two agents of identical external appear-
ances whose behaviors seem to indicate the same levels
of subjective experience (as observed during a prolonged
period of time). They give qualitatively indistinguish-
able responses to external stimuli and reports of their
inner life: for example, they express pain and joy in the
same manner, speak similarly of their perceptions and
emotions and discuss with the same passion and under-
standing about the philosophical problems of conscious-
ness. Moreover, as this is also a form of report, both are
in principle equally capable to, without external sugges-
tion, independently realize their own subjective experi-
ence and arrive at the “hard problem”.39 On the inside,
however, these two agents might function differently.
Assume now that we have adopted an exact and objec-
tive but non-behavioral criterion for consciousness, and
that, unfortunately, it turns out that one of these two
agents does not pass the test40. We might have even de-
vised an instrument, a “consciousmeter”, based on this
objective principle – and the device clearly indicates that
only one of the agents possesses subjective experience.
Unless our criterion always identically coincides with the
conclusions of the behavioral one (in which case these
38 In [42] S. Carroll introduced this term to qualify hypotheses
which “cannot simultaneously be true and justifiably believed”.
39 Some researchers attribute great significance to this “test” of
being conscious [36].
40 For example, does not possess high enough value of Phi as defined
by IIT.
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criteria are identical and the theorem is confirmed), such
a situation must occur sooner or later. Trusting our hy-
pothesis, we insist that one of the agents is a mere un-
conscious automaton and treat him accordingly, in spite
of the fact that we cannot see any difference in the looks
or behaviors of the two. And the poor agent begs us to
understand that he nonetheless has feelings and implores
us in despair to understand his position, but we stay
adamant. Worst of all, in all that we are aware that our
criterion is a mere hypothesis that we have actually never
proved, and, moreover, which cannot be ever proved even
in principle.
Obviously, such hypothetical literal witch-hunt would
be ridiculous and ethically unacceptable in practice
(legally even less so). Such a prospect should serve to
clearly illustrate the pointlessness of formulation of this
type of inapplicable criteria, which do not coincide with
the behavioral one – irrespectively of the ontological con-
text!
Apart from making generalization along “capable of
similar” logic, and generalization according to “look like”
criterion, there could be an option to require both, or
to require neither. But none of these is promising. In
the first case, we would anyhow inherit bad traits of
the generalization by the mechanism similarity approach:
the witch-hunt of the agents that behave exactly in a
human-like manner but have different inner workings (or
are missing a spleen) would remain. In the latter case
– requiring nothing in order to conclude that two given
agents have the same or similar level of subjective ex-
perience – would imply that a toaster can go through
emotional crises just as a human.
All this reasoning renders criteria differing from be-
havioral one dubious, inapplicable and sort of unscien-
tific, irrespectively of philosophical presumptions (and,
in particular, irrespectively of the Neuroscience postu-
late). Nonetheless, in a general ontological context as
was considered above, the existence of meaningful rules
about what possesses and what lacks consciousness is not
a logical necessity, and the converse of the theorem state-
ment still can be true in principle (i.e. agents without a
spleen, amputees or AI androids behaving identically as
humans potentially might lack human level of conscious-
ness). However, in spite that rules of logic do not strictly
prohibit such possibility, our conclusion is that discard-
ing of the Behavioral criterion comes with a very high
price tag, in any framework. (Although not crucial for
the proof of the no-go theorem, this conclusion will be
valuable in the third part of this study.)
Does this mean that we are doomed to redefine “con-
sciousness” as a synonym for certain patterns of behavior,
and that we should not seek deeper understanding of the
phenomenon nor try to identify “mechanisms” essential
for its occurrence? Not necessarily. A hypothesis about
the underlying “mechanism” essential for consciousness
that would, on the other hand, always effectively coincide
with the behavioral criterion, could be not only of great
importance for our understanding of consciousness, but
also a valuable guideline in the context of AI research.
However, the behavioral theorem would have to be the
final arbiter for all such hypotheses.
Next we will consider what the introduction of the
Neuroscience postulate and of the paradigm of classical
physics brings on top of the previous conclusions.
Within physicalist framework of classical physics,
objectively real are only matter and its proper-
ties/configurations. Agents themselves are merely cer-
tain complex configurations of atoms, and all their prop-
erties and their behavior (responses, reports) must be, in
principle, understandable in terms of the properties and
dynamics of these atoms. Indeed, these atom configu-
rations exhibit very complicated patterns of behavior –
for example, emergent behavioral patterns that we call
“expressing of emotions”, or, sometimes, these configu-
rations report stuff like “I see red”, or “I subjectively feel
that I exist”. But, in this paradigm, there can no longer
exist any additional, ontologically real, element of real-
ity that we call consciousness, which might accompany
these processes and behavior. Whatever is that what we
call “subjective experience” it must boil down to some
motions and arrangements of atoms. And nothing else,
since nothing else truly exists in this setting. This fact
further constrains our previous conclusions.
To start with – the solipsism is no longer an option.
If the system of atoms that constitutes “me” can result
in “subjective experience” (or an illusion of it) – what-
ever that could be – then an almost equivalent particle
system constituting “you” must produce the same effect.
Next, it is no longer logically allowed to have conscious-
ness attached to agents/things in an arbitrary manner.
Moreover, nothing can be “attached” at all to physical
systems we call “agents” – as the matter is all there is.
But this “attaching” option used to be crucial for all of
our previous example hypotheses that followed the rea-
soning of mechanism similarity. Such possibility was al-
lowing these hypotheses to be potentially true in spite of
being not only unprovable in principle, but also in spite
of being completely arbitrary.
Not surprisingly, hypotheses of this “unscientific” type
are not viable in the context of classical physics. We
return once more to the comparison of the two iden-
tically behaving and externally looking agents, now in
the NP context. To simplify the discussion, let one of
the agents be human, and the other of a different inner
structure, e.g. an android. In both cases all details of
how the agent functions and processes the stimuli into
responses are either understood, or understandable in
principle. The classical physics is causally closed and
cause-effect chain can be followed all the way through
– it is inessential if we maybe do not know, at present,
all parts of the mechanism and even if we do not know
about some basic matter constituents (e.g. some involved
types of particles or fields), we can nevertheless be con-
fident that all that happens is a causal chain of motions
and interactions of particles within the agent that, like
a clockwork mechanism, produce behavior. Behavior it-
42
self is again just specific motion and rearrangement of
the matter constituents and we can be sure that nothing
but possibly some other motions and rearrangements of
matter can be produced in the entire process. (Thus we
find quite unrealistic and in the domain of wishful think-
ing arguments that further exploration of brain functions
could alter these conclusions and show how consciousness
is “secreted”, without changing the entire philosophical
paradigm – unless, of course, “consciousness” itself is de-
fined as a type of motion.) Now, what is the prospect for
the claim that one of these agents possesses subjective
experience while the other one does not?
Since the only difference is in the details of motions
inside the agents, and there is nothing else to it, the only
clear way to substantiate such claim is to define subjec-
tive experience as some particular type of these internal
motions which occurs in one but does not in the other.
But this is hardly satisfactory: we may also redefine “sub-
jective experience” to mean “afternoon nap” or “a load
of bananas”, but these options clearly do not encapsu-
late the common meaning of the notion. In spite of the
vagueness in the definition of the subjective experience,
we do not know of any researchers or philosophers who
claim anything of the sort that such-and-such motion of
carbon atoms in the vicinity of some nitrogen atoms is,
per se, the subjective experience of “red”, or that the mo-
tion towards a slightly different rearrangement of carbon,
nitrogen, hydrogen (and a few other types) of atoms is
the “sensation of joy”. Instead, more common is the as-
sertion that such motions and/or arrangements of matter
cause these experiences to emerge. However, the phys-
icalist framework of classical physics is very strict and
conservative in this regard: the only thing these motions
can cause are again other motions and neither “red” nor
“joy” can appear in the formalism of physics. Allow-
ing such-and-such motion of some carbon to also directly
cause “joy” to appear, demands, strictly speaking, an ex-
tension of our framework at least into the paradigm of
property dualism, in conflict with NP.
Though property dualism is no longer physicalism in
its purest form and thus does not fit into our basic defi-
nition of the Neuroscience postulate, it makes sense also
to consider an appropriate extension of NP which would
allow for dualistic properties of physical matter. Then it
becomes conceivable that certain types of matter motions
or arrangements yield subjective experiences, but even in
that case we are faced with the earlier charge of the un-
scientific approach: it is absolutely impossible to discover
which of these motions correlate with what experiences,
and any such mapping is doomed to be totally arbitrary,
neither provable nor disprovable, even in principle! Un-
less, of course, we allow reports of the experiences to
guide us in construction of the mapping. The rationale
for this choice of guidance is again the same as before and
obvious: we feel that it is the experience itself that causes
us to report that experience and we introspectively know
that our reports of experiences are correlated with our
experiences. It is the experienced pain which prompts us
to verbally complain or to (involuntarily) make a corre-
sponding facial expression. And it is this thing which we
experience, which we later report or in some other way
express, that we call “subjective experience” and want
to explain in the first place (and not to explain any mo-
tions per se). If we let us be guided by reports, only then
we have a mean to correlate certain type of motion with
a certain experience. But in that case we have already
accepted the behavior as the criterion.
And what if we accept the behavior as the criterion
from the outset? In the strict physicalist framework,
behavior is again a type of complex motion and can-
not cause anything to emerge apart from other motions.
But, unlike in the previous case, there are notable posi-
tions which assert that behavior and reports of the expe-
riences are indeed all that there is, the rest is an illusion.
Whether the introduction of this “illusion” again implies
excursion into the property dualism is open to debate.
Even if it does, the mapping of different aspects of be-
havior into different subjective experiences is no longer
arbitrary as was in the case of motions of internal mech-
anism – here it is natural and direct (e.g. there is little
dilemma whether a terrifying scream correlates with sub-
jective experience of “pain” or of “seeing red”). In any
case – property dualism or not – the statement of our
present theorem holds either way if we choose behavioral
criterion: the two behaviorally indistinguishable agents
cannot have different levels of subjective experience, no
matter if the “subjective experience” actually denotes
nothing, something (i.e. if we extend NP into property
dualism) or an illusion.
To summarize: the above analysis seems to clearly in-
dicate that the only way to allow two agents of indistin-
guishable behavior to have different levels of conscious-
ness is to both: extend the paradigm of physicalism (at
least into property dualism) and to deliberately accept
non-scientific (i.e. cognitively unstable [42]) positions on
consciousness.
Theorem 2. Under the NP premise, a sufficiently ad-
vanced android controlled by a classical type of computer
may possess the same level of subjective experience as a
human.
“Proof”. In the light of the Theorem 1, all that has re-
mained to prove is that a classical type of computer can
generate behavior qualitatively indistinguishable from a
human. That this must be possible follows directly from
NP assumption that the human brain operates as a de-
terministic machine governed by laws of classical physics.
Since it is a biological machine of finite size, it is, in
principle, possible to model it with arbitrary precision,
simulate its operation on a classical computer and calcu-
late the same responses to stimuli that a biological brain
would produce. In the worst case, the simulation could,
in principle again, simulate the motion of each particle in
the brain. However, present understanding of brain func-
tioning indicates that such a low-level simulation would
not be even necessary to predict all details of behavior:
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it seems likely that modeling each neuron in the brain
(accompanied maybe with modeling of some other bio-
logical systems, such as endocrine) would be sufficient
for the task. Besides, note that, according to classical
physics, there is also nothing that prevents us to scan
the brain of a given individual as precisely as required
and use that data as initial conditions for the simulation.
Also, the part of the neural system responsible for sam-
pling stimuli could be simulated just as well, providing
that the simulated brain has the proper inputs.
Strictly speaking, to fulfill the behavioral theorem in
its basic form, it is also required that the calculations can
be performed in real-time. Though incredibly technically
demanding task altogether, there are no indications that
anything could preclude its accomplishment in theory –
and being possible in principle is the only thing that mat-
ters here. It might be that a classical computer capable
of performing such simulation could not fit in the size of
a human skull, but the theorem 1 does not necessitate
this (after all, the computer can control an android body
remotely).
Another indication of the validity of this theorem is the
contemporary development of AI, which is interpreted
by many to encourage our belief that even a practical
construction of a classical computer matching the brain
capabilities could be just a matter of time.
It is worthy of noting that the premise of a fully deter-
ministic brain evolution can be relaxed without changing
the conclusion of the theorem. Namely, if there are ele-
ments of chance inherent in the brain functioning, these
could be also simulated, either on a classical computer
using pseudo-random numbers, or maybe with the aid
of some pre-supplied set of true random numbers. As a
matter of fact, it is very difficult to motivate why good
enough pseudo-random numbers would not be capable
to reproduce qualitatively the same behavior as a brain
functioning in part indeterministically. This further af-
fects the case of real-life brain which is, as everything else,
a quantum system. In principle, a classical computer
should be capable to also simulate, with arbitrary re-
quired precision, the quantum evolution of a given brain
state. After that, the output response could be selected
from the resulting superposition of classical brain states
by some (pseudo-)random number generator. This task
would likely be so enormously computationally demand-
ing that it is not clear if it would be feasible even in theory
(given the finite resources available in the universe) – but
it is nevertheless hard to see why would these constraints
be relevant for the discussion of consciousness. A poten-
tially bigger obstacle is to obtain the initial condition for
the brain state – could such state be measured (in a rele-
vant basis) and would quantum mechanical “no-cloning”
theorem disqualify this prospect even in principle. How-
ever, the contemporary neuroscience position suggests
that such fine-details of quantum states of the brain do
not influence the computation of behavioral responses
and that a mere high-precision scan on the classical level
should provide good enough initial data. Therefore, it
seems that the conclusion of the Theorem 2 follows from
the Behavioral theorem even in a more general context
of a stochastic or a quantum mechanical brain.
Theorem 3. (On temporal correlation): Subjective expe-
riences (or illusions of) that accompany dynamical evo-
lution of a certain system (e.g. brain) are synchronized
with that evolution, and do not depend on evolution of
the system either before or after the considered period of
the dynamical evolution (apart from due to the contents
of memory).
“Proof”. This should be an immediate consequence of
the NP and the framework of classical physics. Namely,
subjective experience is here understood to be a direct
product and a function of the brain operation (or of the
functioning of the agent as a whole). Thus, there is no
way in which subjective experiences could precede the
corresponding brain dynamics and brain states. Simi-
larly, it is also impossible for the experiences to appear
with a (significant) lag, since there is nothing that could
“memorize” brain state from its occurrence until the ap-
pearance of the corresponding experience. For example,
were the subjective experiences entity with independent
existence, this would not be necessarily so straightfor-
ward conclusion.
Theorem 4. (Repetition theorem): If a physical sys-
tem that gives rise to consciousness undergoes identical
dynamical evolution more than once (fed by the identi-
cal stimuli and starting from the same initial state each
time), each time the same subjective experience arises.
Alternatively, if another system identical in every detail
to the first one, undergoes the same dynamics, both evo-
lutions must be accompanied by identical subjective expe-
riences.
“Proof”. The theorem statement can be seen either to
follow from the Theorem 3 (since experience arrises coin-
cidentally with the brain dynamics and none of the evo-
lution runs cannot “know” about the previous ones, nor
can influence the repeated runs afterward), or by noting
that if the consciousness is a consequence of system dy-
namics, the fact that a period of identical dynamics in
the same system state has already occurred before cannot
preclude or influence the emergence of the same experi-
ence again. Same goes if we consider a different system,
but identical with the first in all relevant properties.
Surprisingly, the theorem statement runs opposite to
some of the widespread expectations (not the majority,
however). Namely, there is a quite popular subculture
of people that take very seriously prospects of science-
fictional type of teleportation or ideas of uploading one’s
personality into a computer. But, the theorem poses the
following problem in this regard: a hypothetical identi-
cal copy of an agent (produced in an attempt to tele-
port him) would also then produce another instance of
his subjective personality (with all accompanying experi-
ences). This further means that copying would not affect
the original agent, who might be as well unaware that
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was copied: the original agent will obviously still remain
with his own personality and subjective experiences, cor-
related solely to his original body. If the original was
to be disposed afterward (as the idea of teleportation
requires), the original instance of the agent would ex-
perience that simply as his demise (instead of as being
efficiently transported), with only a feeble consolation in
the fact that his copy, which he cannot subjectively ex-
perience and is no more than a distant twin-sibling to
him, persists. (The same problem plagues the even more
far-fetched idea of digital “uploading”.) As a remedy, it
is sometimes conjectured that the two identical instances
of the physical agent would correspond to a single per-
sonal identity (i.e. single consciousness with two physical
bodies), and that, thus, subjective experiences would be
lived through only once (instead of each time again with
every new copy or a new run of the identical evolution).
This is also sometimes motivated by the claim that if all
properties of the system that give rise to the subjective
experience are the same in the agent and in the copy,
then they must correspond to one and the same expe-
rience, and not to a multitude of experiences with the
same content. However, in our opinion, this argument
ignores the fact that not all properties are identically the
same: position of the system in time and space is differ-
ent for original and the copy. There are also attempts to
advocate this position based on broader ontological pre-
sumptions and leading to more radical conclusions [57].
However, it is easy to identify many conceptual problems
with such conjecture which, at least, make it incompati-
ble with the NP. To start with, there are problems related
to non-locality. One aspect of this problem is related to
the Theory of Relativity, and it is analyzed in [58]. But
probably more acute in our context is that such nonlo-
cality seems to defy ideas of strict mechanical causality
assumed by NP. For example, if the copy of a given agent
is artificially constructed at a large spatial and/or tem-
poral distance, it is purported that agent’s consciousness
nevertheless becomes immediately linked to both bodies,
without any physical connection. This seems to be quite
acausal for the standards of classical physics. Besides,
it is quite unclear how precisely identical the copy must
be to attain such connection. Matters become only more
so hazy if we consider (illusion of) agency and its poten-
tial action over distance. The very idea could be proba-
bly more interesting in a broader ontological setting (e.g.
where information is fundamental entity instead of mat-
ter, and where it might be argued that repeating of the
same informational content does not give rise to a new
instance of subjective personality). However, we find it
irrelevant in the context of NP and thus of no influence
to the validity of the theorem.
Theorem 5. (Simulation theorem): Simulated android
(or androids), existing only in a virtual reality realm sim-
ulated on a classical computer, can be, in principle, pro-
grammed to be as conscious as humans.
“Proof”. We wil first consider a case when there are two
actual Data “units”: Data1 and Data2. Since each of the
CPU’s can be located in the external computers, nothing
prevents these two computers to actually be a single com-
puter powerful enough to do the necessary calculations
for both. Obviously, no need to stop at two – sufficiently
powerful computer cluster would be able to control an ar-
bitrary number of Datas (a sort of “Data” cloud), each of
which would be fully sentient in that cluster as it would
have been if its CPU was situated in the android’s head.
As the next step, we note that the data (”data” in low-
ercase denotes the common meaning of the word, not the
android) originating from androids’ sensors and arriving
as the input into the cluster is, from some point on, nec-
essarily digital (at least at the cluster input point). A
powerful enough cluster should be thus perfectly capable
of simulating this data as well, i.e. by generating some
rich enough virtual reality for these androids. How can
we be sure that the consciousness has not disappeared
in this transition? Well, let’s take, at first, that the
computer is simulating the actual environment of these
robots, and only replacing, from some point on, the data
arriving from android’s sensors with the calculated data.
For some brief interval of time at least, the discrepancies
between the computed data, and the actual one should
not be significant. Thus, the androids should notice no
difference, at least no significant difference: even if/when
they are able to eventually tell the simulation from the
true reality (e.g. by the level of detail) that should not af-
fect the fact that they must remain conscious in the simu-
lated surrounding if they were so earlier when their inputs
were sampled by some external sensors (more precisely,
in the NP context, there seems to be no room for any
difference in this regard). Besides, we can, for a while,
keep signals from the simulated Data’s minds drive the
actual robotic bodies ensuring the behavioral condition
– but this motion of the bodies would now become just
an epiphenomenon, as nothing from the outside world is
any longer entering the simulation. These behaviors of
the physical android bodies can only serve us as an indi-
cator of the sentience of agents that drive the bodies, and
since the bodies do not influence the agents anymore, and
that the agents have to be just as sentient with us watch-
ing as without, we may safely turn the bodies off (as a
direct consequence of the NP, act of observation cannot
influence reality). It seems that there can be nothing,
within the paradigm set by the NP, that could invalidate
the above chain of reasoning leading to the conclusion of
the theorem.
Lemma 2. The computer running a closed simulation
containing conscious agents can be arbitrarily slow.
“Proof”. Once we have isolated Datas’ world in a com-
puter simulation, the following becomes clear: if anyone
clicks a button “pause simulation” and then, after 10 sec-
onds presses “resume” button, androids living inside of
the computer will not notice any gap. Their lives and
experiences will just take up where they have stopped
upon the press of pause. Similarly, they cannot notice if
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the powerful computer slows down a bit – they can mea-
sure the passage of time only relative to events within the
simulation – so if everything slows down, that must be
unobservable to them. Even if the computer becomes dis-
astrously slow, so slow that it takes a thousand years of
real-time to simulate a single second of the virtual world,
the androids would not notice that. In other words, in
spite of widespread prejudices that computers perform-
ing such hypothetical simulations which include sentient
agents must be futuristically advanced and of immense
computational speed, we see that actually the computer
cluster does not need to be fast at all, only of pretty huge
capacity.
Theorem 6. A system comprising a pattern of X/O
symbols written in sand and a wooden Turing head mech-
anism performing certain automatic operations (of “read-
ing” the symbol beneath, flattening out the sand, inscrib-
ing a new symbol and moving left/right one step) ac-
cording to the instructions embedded also in the sand,
can contain conscious agents living through human-like
subjective experiences (i.e. agents belonging to the same
equivalence class of consciousness level as humans).
“Proof”. Combined conclusions of the Theorem 2 and
Lemma 2 indicate that the technical details of the com-
puter realization cannot play any significant role, as long
as the computer is capable of performing the required
behavioral calculations. This arbitrariness certainly in-
cludes particular computer architecture (e.g. RISC or
CISC), so we are also free to choose one from the vari-
ety of universal Turing machines, with a binary-alphabet.
Note that we are here not interested in halting problem or
anything similar.41 Instead, we are concerned with a spe-
cific well defined finite problem: running the simulation
of the Datas and their environment for a finite virtual
time (the time might be defined beforehand, e.g. one vir-
tual hour) and with finite precision. The program is not
supposed to halt on any condition apart from reaching
the end of the simulation time, which is again a well-
defined condition which can be translated into a finite
limit for the number of computational steps (therefore,
it eventually halts for any given initial conditions). It
is quite obvious that such task can be performed on an
extremely powerful but finite-resources computer cluster,
and thus it is also doable by using a finite length tape
Turing machine (besides, finite number of execution steps
implies that a finite tape is sufficient).
Turing machines are abstract mathematical idealiza-
tions, and as a such does not per se exist in the real
world (especially not one governed by classical physics).
We are free to choose any proper physical realization, and
thus the one with a mechanical wooden head writing X/O
symbols in the sand (instead of on tape) is also fine. We
41 For these reasons we also need not bother to discuss accept-
ing/rejecting states of the machine.
use universal Turing machine, where the simulation pro-
gram itself is also written on the tape (i.e. in the sand),
while the head itself is fairly simple: for binary alpha-
bet it was shown that 18-state head is sufficient [59] (or,
we could group X/O symbols into n-tuples, mimicking
in this way machine with bigger alphabet while choosing
a head with only 2 internal states). Without changing
the essence of the no-go argument, we might have also
chosen Rogozhin’s machine with 6 symbols and 4 states,
which uses only 22 instructions [60]. In addition to the
simulation program, the initial state of sand symbols also
properly encodes the initial state of the simulation, that
is the state of Data(s) together with the virtual environ-
ment, at some given time t0.
After the initialization, the head is put in operation:
according to the instruction table and taking into ac-
count only the symbol directly below the head (it reads
the symbol by sensitively checking sand level at a few
points), it either replaces that symbol in the sand (by
firstly flattening out the sand at the spot and stamping
the new one) or just moves one step to the left or right
– and proceeds to the instruction indicated as the next
one. It is well known and established with mathematical
rigor that this procedure can be made absolutely compu-
tationally equivalent to the intricate operation of the fu-
turistically advanced super-computer, for which we have
already concluded that must be giving rise to the subjec-
tive experience of the Data-agents within the simulation.
This seems to confirm the assertion of the theorem.
Theorem 7. (The no-go theorem). The Neuroscience
postulate implies that a human brain cannot have any
greater ability to induce subjective experience than a pro-
cess of writing a certain sequence of digits (writing can be
done in an arbitrary way and on the arbitrary surface).
“Proof”. The outline of the proof is the following. First,
we will modify the wooden Turing machine from the The-
orem 6, so that it no longer ever deletes any information –
each new state of the tape is now written in a new line of
sand, leaving the entire log of the calculation as the result
of the operation. Then we will consider and compare two
scenarios. In the first one we will re-run the same simula-
tion, with identical initial conditions (i.e. identical initial
state of both Turing tape and head), right below the pre-
vious run – and this must give rise to a new occurrence of
Data’s subjective experiences. In the second scenario, we
will consider a wooden head that merely copies the log
of the previous run, and argue that there cannot be any
difference of the two scenarios with respect to the elicited
subjective experiences. The reasoning will employ a se-
quence of “hybrid heads” that gradually bridge the differ-
ence between computing and copying in this setup. Once
we have established that the copying must have an equal
effect on subjective experiences as computing anew, it is
a trivial part to reinterpret copying of X and O symbols
as the writing of a given (binary) number.
Therefore, let us consider a slightly modified version of
the (Post-)Turing machine where nothing is ever erased:
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instead of replacing a sand symbol somewhere in a line,
as the result of each such instruction the head writes
again the entire row – writing this time the new value at
that position while simply copying all the other values.
The new line is written just below the previous one, and
so on. Furthermore, we will include in each written row
also the entire information about the state of the head
(the label of the current instruction and the position of
the head). Mathematically, it can be accomplished in
many ways: the standard methods for encoding the cur-
rent state of the entire machine (”the complete configu-
ration”) were discussed already by Turing himself, and
those most straightforward include writing some auxil-
iary symbols (i.e. apart from X and O) [40]. If necessary,
we can devise for this a supplementary machine (which
can be later seen as a part of the same mechanism) that
will be activated after every operation of the main head,
with the task only to traverse the current line from start
to the end and to perform the symbol-copying, plus to
add these few extra symbols describing the main head
state and position. And, in order not to spoil the ba-
sic idea of having solely X and O symbols written in the
sand, we can encode any auxiliary symbols by grouping
X and O symbols in n-tuples: for example, we can sim-
ply pair all symbols two-by-two, giving us now effectively
an alphabet of four symbols, two of which can be used as
special markers and have a head that operate on pairs, in-
stead on single symbols (obviously, we can combine more
than two X/O symbols if necessary).
Though certainly not optimal performance-wise, this
new calculation protocol allows that the entire informa-
tion of the system current state is encoded in each line
in the sand and, since nothing is ever deleted, the log
containing each step of computation remains in the sand
once the process is over. (We can decide to rewrite the
line also each time the head moves, even if no symbol
is altered – but the reasoning is independent of these
details.) These modifications do not change the com-
putational abilities of the machine: the evolution of the
simulated virtual reality and the of the Datas inside is be-
ing calculated just as before. As before, we can confirm
that by allocating a certain number of X/O symbols for
the “display” and thus be reassured that androids look
as conscious as before, even in this now 2-dimensional
giant tic-tac-toe like pattern.
Next, below the rows of the just-finished simulation,
we will repeat the same simulation again, starting with
a freshly written initial machine state in the first row.
If we let the head do its job once more, the identical
pattern of the computation log will be written all over
again. To facilitate analysis, let us enumerate lines of
the first run as A1, A2, A3..., and of the current run B1,
B2, B3... The resulting sand pattern, after the two runs,
would then be something of the following sort (though
immensely bigger and more complex):
A1: XXOOOOXXOOXOXXXXOOXXOOOO...
A2: XXOOOOXXOOXOOOXXOOXXOOOO...
A3: XXOOOOXXOOXOXOXXOOXXOOOO...
A4: XXOOOOXXOOOOXOXXOOXXOOOO...
...
B1: XXOOOOXXOOXOXXXXOOXXOOOO...
B2: XXOOOOXXOOXOOOXXOOXXOOOO...
B3: XXOOOOXXOOXOXOXXOOXXOOOO...
B4: XXOOOOXXOOOOXOXXOOXXOOOO...
...
The line identifiers Ai, Bi do not appear in the sand
(they are only written for our convenience) and we as-
sumed (as proposed in the above modification) that the
head operates on pairs of symbols as if being a single sym-
bol. (The schema above is merely a sketch and should
not be scrutinized. We did not feel as necessary to pro-
vide a too formal definition of our modified machine as it
suffices to establish that such modification is possible.)
According to the Repetition theorem, as the B rows
are written the Datas will certainly go through the same
subjective experiences once more, as they did while gen-
erating the A rows. More precisely, while the wooden
head was generating line An+1 based on the line An it
was already established that the sentience had to appear.
Similarly, when the same head calculates row Bn+1 based
on symbols in Bn, the same subjective experiences also
occur (Repetition theorem).
Next, note that if the same head calculates the row
Bn+1 based on the row An instead of Bn, the conscious-
ness must emerge in the same way: symbols in rows An
and Bn are identical, so which one it is going to read
is inessential (though it is time-consuming to go up and
down those few billion of lines in order to write each
symbol, we have concluded that CPU clock is irrelevant).
More precisely, in doing this the head moves up to the
corresponding symbol of rowAn, reads it and based on its
value and the current state of the head (m-configuration)
“calculates” the next symbol to be written atBn+1. Even
more precisely, according to the symbol just read at An
and the current head state, the gears in the head rotate
so as to prepare either the X-die (that is, piece of wood, a
plank, with X embossed) that will imprint the X symbol,
or a die with a symbol O (or pairs of symbols together, if
we take into account that technical modification). This
preparation of the embossed die we will call the opera-
tion “prepare the computation result”. Then it moves
back down to the row Bn+1 and impresses the prepared
symbol in the sand. This is nothing else but the standard
computational procedure, so the sentience of simulated
androids must be there.
Next, we will devise a head that does, in some sense,
both “computing the next symbol” and “copying the next
symbol” operations at once. It first goes to the row An+1
and engages in the following simple “prepare copy” op-
eration: it reads the corresponding symbol at An+1 to
be copied and prepares the wooden die with the same
symbol it just read. If it now goes back to the row Bn+1
and imprint this symbol it will be simply performing the
symbol copying procedure. But the head will not return
yet. Instead, after doing the “prepare copy” operation,
it will immediately climb one row up, at An, read that
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symbol and also, in addition, do the “prepare compu-
tation result” operation, i.e. shift the gears so that the
correct die for imprinting at Bn+1 gets prepared, now
based on internal state and the “computation”. Only
that this time actually nothing changes after the “prepare
computation result” operation since the correct die was
already prepared by the operation “prepare copy” (rows
An and An+1 are consistent). Next, the head moves back
to the Bn+1 and imprints the prepared symbol. Again,
the sentience of the simulated androids must emerge, as
there is no way why the “prepare copy operation”, done
before the calculation and in principle “overwritten” by
the process of calculation could spoil the emergence. Af-
ter all, this “prepare copy” operation can be seen as a
part of the computation process, which does not actually
do anything, but neither spoils the overall operation (as
inserting a few NOP-s in the assembly code).
In the next version we will let the head do just the
same, i.e. both operations before imprinting the prepared
symbol at Bn+1, only this time we will deliberately break
down/disable the last part of the “prepare computational
result” mechanism – the one that puts the correct die in
position. However, since the correct die was prepared al-
ready by the just performed “prepare copy” operation,
nothing changes in the overall operation. This now bro-
ken part of the mechanism was not actually doing any-
thing also in the previous setup. So stopping it from
doing something that anyhow did not have any effect
cannot be detrimental for the emergence of anything, in-
cluding sentience. So, if the sentience used to emerge
before, it must also now. Only, this time, the reading of
the symbol at An and switching of the gears and internal
states, while still being carried out, is absolutely uncorre-
lated with the symbols written in the B rows. What the
head does is merely copying the symbols from An+1 to
Bn+1, followed by some clicking of gears that has noth-
ing to do with the symbols written. In this way we have
disentangled the switching of head internal states on one
side and writing of the symbols on the other, making
them uncorrelated in the cause-effect sense (which is the
only sense that can matter in the framework of classical
physics), while retaining the subjective experiences of the
simulated agents. Except that there is no simulation any
longer – what is happening in the sand is mere copying
of the symbols.
To arrive at this final conclusion, we essentially used
the fact that it is very hard to explain by which magic
would “the way the head prepares the next symbol to be
impressed into the sand” be crucial in the feat of generat-
ing the subjective experience. Whether is the next die is
prepared based on the symbol at row An+1, or based on
the symbol at row An, cannot truly matter if the result
is always the same. And, to be sure, we went through
these intermediate steps involving the hybrid head.
Alternatively, we may see this combined mechanism
of the hybrid head in the final stage as two separate
mechanisms, one stacked over the other. Below is the
copying head and it can fully perform its regular opera-
tion. Above is the computing head. It also performs its
usual duty, only the copying head is always a few sec-
onds ahead of it – therefore, when the computing one
attempts to imprint the correct symbol in the next row,
actually nothing is done, since that very symbol has been
imprinted by the copying head just a second before. Its
die hits the empty space. However, that cannot matter,
since we have successfully retained both the dynamics
of the sand symbols and the evolution of the comput-
ing head (clicking of gears, changing internal states), so
that any subjective experience that used to emerge must
still be present in this setup. This is also clear since the
combination of the two heads can be seen together as a
single composite head, that head performs the computa-
tion (it can be easily seen if we imagine that there is no
log of the previous run to copy from, or if the previous
run was different – anything that the copying head do
will be overwritten by the computing mechanism).
On the other hand, there is no longer any causal effect
of the computing head on the sand. This is equivalent
to the effect of heads positioned somewhere in the midst
of the simulation log: as discussed in the Part I, these
heads would traverse the symbols but would alter noth-
ing, since all the symbols they attempt to imprint are
already there at that very spot. Indeed, we may again,
in this latest scenario, position a few of the calculating
heads at some position over the rows before, initialize
them to the state proper for that line of log and put them
in operation. Now, we have a few computing heads active
over the sand rows: the original one (that goes in pair
with the copying head), and a few additional ones. None
of them affects sand in any way. Our point is that, since
none of these heads has any causal effect on the sand,
there is nothing that singles out the original head, which
follows the copying head closely at the last row. And we
have concluded already in the Part I that such computing
heads, which do not move any sand but merely change
their internal states, have nothing to do with the emer-
gence of consciousness. Since our conclusion was that
consciousness must emerge also in this setup (if it used
to emerge due to action of a single computing head), then
it must be solely due to the effect of the copying head,
which does all writing in the sand. Therefore, we can
safely remove all the computing heads and the remain-
ing copying one must be sufficient to induce subjective
experiences of Data.
There is yet another, quite different way to realize that
complexity of those gear-motions that are going on in the
wooden head (and this complexity is already very low in
the simplest of the universal Turing machines) cannot be
of significance for the emergence of the consciousness (as
long as the correct symbols are generated). Namely, we
could repeat the entire proof by using “Rule 110” cellular
automaton [61] instead of a Turing machine realization.
It is less well known that such a simple automaton, where
in each step the binary value of every cell is replaced by
the value dependent solely on the value of that cell and its
two neighbors, is Turing complete, that is, is capable of
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performing any computation that can be performed using
the most advanced computers. Rule 110 can be imple-
mented by almost a trivial wooden device, that features
no internal states and no instruction sets. The device
needs to only traverse the line of symbols step by step,
for each three consecutive symbols check which of the 8
possible patterns they form and according to that imprint
a single symbol in the line below. (This checking can be
again realized by sensitively “touching” the sand, while
the patterns that are tested can be for example embossed
on a cylinder, at equal angles. The cylinder can revolve,
consecutively positioning each of the patterns above the
sand surface and trying if that shape fits the relief below.
Each of 8 orientations of the cylinder mechanically brings
either X or O die over the row bellow. When the patterns
match, the symbol is imprinted, the head moves a step
to the right, then checks again all eight orientations of
the cylinder and so on.) Since the automaton is Turing
machine equivalent, and the simulation of one hour takes
a finite number of steps on a Turing machine, so it must
take finite number of rows of the automaton operation as
well and a finite length initial pattern must suffice.
Now, if we go again through the “repeated run” ver-
sus “copying run” argument, it is far more difficult this
time to insist that it is the functioning of the wooden ma-
chine – being so trivial – that is essential for the emer-
gence of the subjective experience. The copying head,
which differs only in comparing “one-bit pattern” instead
of “three-bit pattern” is hardly anything mechanically
and motion-vise different from the “Rule 110” wooden
head.42 Again, we need to remind that “Rule 110” or
“automaton” is here only our description for certain com-
plex motion of wood and sand, and our task is to compare
what type of motion has greater potential to elicit sub-
jective experience. Since the motion of the wooden head
is so similar and trivial in both cases, what remains as
a hypothetical source of emergent consciousness are only
the emergent symbols in the sand – no matter if the cor-
rect sequence is inferred from the previous row, or from a
previous run (by mere copying). In any case, the burden
of a potential proof of the counter-hypothesis that one
setup causes consciousness while the other one does not
seems to be too heavy.
Once we have concluded that the copying process has
the same chances to generate consciousness as the com-
puting one, the rest of the proof is trivial: we can go again
through entire reasoning just replacing X with 1 and O
with 0, concatenate all rows together, and realize that
we are copying a huge number. Whether it is done by
a wooden mechanism, by hand or by some other means
obviously cannot cause any relevant difference (besides,
a human could have played the role of the wooden head
from the start). This completes our proof of the no-go
theorem.
42 Besides, copying head can be implemented as a “Rule 204” au-
tomaton with the otherwise identical design.
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